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ABSTRACT 
Cross-national policy sharing between legislatures of states in different countries is not 
well studied, possibly due to the existence of many domestic peer states whose laws provide the 
most frequently studied examples of cross-state borrowing.1 But in addition to these domestic 
examples, instances of cross-national policy transfer continue to arise. The theories that explain 
state-level policy diffusion among actors in the same country have not yet been extended to 
instances of cross-national policy proliferation. Therefore, this phenomenon of cross-national 
sub-national policy diffusion continues to play a role in legislative outcomes yet remains largely 
unexplained. 
This dissertation builds on the policy diffusion literature to investigate why cross-national 
learning occurs and under what conditions is it expected. It theorizes that legislators are 
motivated to study policies from states in other countries when lawmakers in those foreign states 
produce novel or innovative policies, or when legislators choose to undertake more thorough 
research to improve a policy that is not performing well at home. It further theorizes that state-
level institutions and attributes associated with legislative professionalism affect capacity to 
research policy in states in other countries and synthesize best practices into new legislation in 
the home state. Hypotheses are tested using network analysis, generalized linear mixed models, 
and text analysis.  
Results suggest that many states of varying levels of professionalism and economic size 
are included in cross-national policy networks and that the state-level attributes of legislative 
 
1 In this dissertation the word “state” will only ever refer to a sub-national unit of government. It will never refer to a 
sovereign nation. 
 xx 
 
professionalism, particularly staff levels, are important to providing the capacity to research 
foreign policies. However, these attributes are negatively associated with levels of textual 
similarity between the foreign policy originator and the domestic policy borrower. This indicates 
that professionalism attributes enable state policymakers to collect more best practices to 
synthesize into final policy documents and laws. Text analysis detects a reduced but meaningful 
level of textual similarity between the text of foreign policy originators and subsequent domestic 
borrowers, as compared to the level of policy similarity detected between two states in the same 
country. 
 These findings propose answers to why legislators might opt to learn from states in other 
countries in addition to peers at home and provide insight into the conditions under which cross-
national sub-national policy diffusion is more likely to occur. Examples of cross-national policy 
diffusion such as public bike sharing programs and primary seatbelt legislation suggest that 
many policies that lawmakers borrow from across international borders provide quantifiable 
benefits to the jurisdictions that adopt them. As public servants in states and provinces around 
the world continue to tackle similar policy issues, networks that foster the sharing of best 
practices have the potential to enhance cross-national learning and improve citizen quality of life 
more rapidly than when sub-national policymakers work in isolation. 
 1 
 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Cross-national lesson drawing between policymakers at local, state, and national levels 
was evident in 2020 as political leaders raced to identify the policies that could best protect their 
jurisdictions from the COVID-19 virus while simultaneously minimizing economic impact. 
Often learning occurred in terms of lawmakers sharing information with foreign jurisdictions, as 
well as studying and sometimes borrowing successful policies. For example, the Global Initiative 
on Sharing All Influenza Data, founded in 2008, has become a central repository for COVID-19 
genomic sequences from around the world,2 greatly facilitating scientific understanding of the 
virus’ spread over the planet and enhancing society’s ability to detect mutations. Analysis of this 
sort of genomic data helped shift policymakers in Washington state to the mindset that the virus 
spread through the state via multiple points of transmission instead of a single point of contact. 
(Boyle 2020) This seems likely to have contributed to accelerating the deployment of 
Washington state’s containment strategy, which was considered more aggressive and ultimately 
more successful than that of other jurisdictions such as New York City. (Duhigg 2020)  
Other examples of cross-national learning and sharing of best practices during the 
pandemic are also of note. U.S. medical universities held Zoom meetings with Chinese doctors 
to get a better understanding of how they could help treat patients. (Begley 2020) The Wall 
Street Journal reports that “more than 50 governments have expressed interest in learning about 
 
2 Over 58,000 COVID-19 genomic sequences from over 450 laboratories around the world have been uploaded as of 
June 2020. (GISAID 2020 and Boyle 2020) 
 2 
 
Singapore’s [contact tracing] app and the city-state has open-sourced the code.” (Lin and Koh 
Ping 2020) Along these same lines, U.S. city and state leaders are unveiling plans that feature 
contact tracing due to its observed effectiveness in China, South Korea, Singapore, New 
Zealand, Iceland, and elsewhere. (Rayasam 2020) 
In some cases, leaders have expressed regret at the consequences from failing to heed 
cross-national lessons. “We should have learned right away from the Asian experience, that was 
a huge mistake,” said Italian immunologist Sergio Romagnani on Italy’s delay in requiring all 
citizens to wear masks. Though the delay was only a few weeks, it is likely to have played a 
significant role in Italy having the sixth highest death toll per million residents in the world.3 
(Engelberg et al. 2020) Similarly, state epidemiologist Anders Tegnell of Sweden’s National 
Institute of Public Health stated of the country’s policy to avoid lockdown (which has resulted in 
the seventh highest death rates in the world4) stated that “if we were to encounter the same 
disease again, knowing exactly what we know about it today, I think we would settle on doing 
something in between what Sweden did and what the rest of the world has done,” specifically by 
testing more and greatly increasing protection of seniors. (Nikiforuk 2020) Occasionally a lack 
of information available about COVID-19 success outcomes in foreign jurisdictions has even 
given rise to complaint due to a desire to use data from foreign outcomes to guide policy choices 
at home. Of Sweden’s decision not to study infection rates in its school system (one of the only 
school systems in the world to remain open), Deputy Director for Johns Hopkins Center for 
Health Security Anna Cicero lamented that “in Sweden, they have had a rare opportunity to 
understand [school] transmission chains better. But you can’t find what you don’t look for. The 
 
3 Italy’s death rate from COVID-19 as of June 28th, 2020 is 574.5 deaths per million residents, behind only San 
Marino, Belgium, Andorra, the United Kingdom, and Spain. (Johns Hopkins University of Medicine Mortality 
Analyses)  
4 Ibid 
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U.S. and other countries with closed schools would certainly benefit from that research.” (Vogel 
2020)  
Overall, the unfolding of COVID-19 has shown that citizens in what seem like far-flung 
and isolated parts of the world are connected and sometimes put at risk by events unfolding 
thousands of miles away. Yet it has also shown that policymakers around the world are 
connecting in their search to find solutions to these shared problems of great urgency. 
Policymakers who studied best practices abroad carefully and who selected policy instruments 
that were feasible and sensible for their community have been able to save more lives while 
minimizing damage wrought by the pandemic on unemployment levels and the economy. The 
progression of the situation has also shown in an unusually brief time span that many areas 
around the world can develop policies that are useful for other parts of the world, and that 
foreign ideas developed abroad can be applied successfully in the United States. This case of 
widespread cross-national study and policy diffusion poses many fascinating questions. For 
example, how did policymakers determine when they would look to policy prescriptions from 
governments within the same country or when they would look abroad? When they decided to 
look abroad, who did they look to? How did they decide which lessons to borrow, and which 
analytical tools and resources were useful in their ability to assess that question? The urgency of 
the situation, which likely accelerated the spread of policy ideas around the world, also brings 
into sharp focus many intriguing questions about the nature of cross-national policy diffusion 
itself. 
Cross-national policy diffusion is not merely a byproduct of emergency, however. On the 
contrary, sub-national state and local government officials have regularly looked abroad for 
policy ideas and have borrowed policies with wide ranging implications as a result. One example 
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of a policy that started slowly but has since grown to global prominence is public bike sharing 
programs. The first public bike sharing program arose in Amsterdam in the 1960s through 
unconventional means. A radical anarchist activist group Provo (short for Provocation)5 gained 
one seat on the Amsterdam city council. The group’s elected representative to the council, Luud 
Schimmelpennink, submitted a proposal for 10,000 bicycles to be purchased by the city, painted 
white for easy identification, and left unlocked at various points throughout the metroplex for use 
by anyone who wished to use them. (van der Zee 2016) When the Witte Fietsenplan, or White 
Bicycle Plan, was voted down by other members of the council, Provo decided to carry out the 
plan without city approval. They acquired fifty bicycles, which they painted white and 
distributed around the city.6 (Gallagher 2015)  
The bicycles were quickly impounded by police for failure to comply with city 
requirements that all bikes have a lock. Provo managed to extend the longevity of the program 
by reclaiming the bicycles and fitting them with combination locks and painting the lock 
combination on the side of the bicycles. Ultimately, the activist group did not succeed in gaining 
official status for the White Bike Plan. But in the short time in which it was in operation, it 
attracted the attention of policymakers in many other cities and initiated what is considered the 
first generation of bike sharing programs. It was soon followed by programs such as the Vélos 
Jaunes or Yellow Bikes program introduced in La Rochelle, France, in 1974. (Shaheen et al. 
2010) In a clear example of cross-national learning at the city level, two policymakers in 
 
5 The group described what it stood for as “Provo has something against capitalism, communism, fascism, 
bureaucracy, militarism, professionalism, dogmatism, and authoritarianism. Provo has to choose between desperate, 
resistance and submissive extinction. Provo calls for resistance wherever possible. Provo realizes that it will lose in 
the end, but it cannot pass up the chance to make at least one more heartfelt attempt to provoke society. Provo 
regards anarchy as the inspirational source of resistance. Provo wants to revive anarchy and teach it to the young. 
Provo is an image.” (Gallagher 2015)  
6 van der Zee (2016) notes that Provo insisted on painting the bicycles because “the white bike symbolizes 
simplicity and hygiene as opposed to the gaudiness and filth of the authoritarian car.” 
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Copenhagen subsequently reached out to Schimmelpennink, the activist city councilmember 
from Amsterdam to ask for feedback on the Dutch program and advice for a similar program in 
Denmark. (van der Zee 2016) 
The result was Copenhagen’s “Bycyken” (City Bike) program, unveiled in 1995 and 
hailed as the program that launched the second wave of bike sharing programs. These were 
distinguished by the innovation of housing bikes in specifically designed docking platforms 
which can be unlocked with a coin deposit that can be retrieved when the bicycle is replaced at a 
different dock. (Shaheen et al. 2010) Thus a direct lineage can be traced from how the original 
bike sharing program started as a radical idea in Amsterdam, provided inspiration and in some 
cases direct guidance to policymakers in foreign jurisdictions who were studying the outcome, 
and catalyzed the second wave of programs in this policy area.  
With over 1,600 programs and over 18.2 million public bicycles in use in the world 
today, public bike sharing provides a clear case study of the extent to which ideas can proliferate 
around the world and take root in jurisdictions far from where the policy originated. In addition 
to demonstrating how policymakers can spread an idea all the way around the globe, this also 
provides an example of clearly calculable benefits that can be gained from borrowing policies 
that originate abroad. Bike sharing programs have been shown to increase spending at local 
businesses, decrease traffic and congestion, improve air quality, decrease commute times, and 
provide health benefits to those who participate who would have used a car or passive public 
transportation (such as bus or subway) to travel to work. (Buehler and Hamre 2014, Qiu and He 
2018) Bullock et al. 2016 found that Dublin’s dublinbike program provided a 6.4-to-1 benefit to 
cost ratio in terms of return on the city’s investment when comparing the cost of implementation 
and the cost of injuries sustained in accidents to the monetized benefits of the categories 
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mentioned in the previous sentence. Through studying the success outcomes of public bike 
sharing programs around the world, city officials have likely been inspired to borrow best 
practices and bring some of these benefits to their home jurisdictions. Thus, public bike sharing 
policies present an interesting opportunity to better understand the conditions under which a 
policy can propagate so successfully between cities in so many states, provinces, and countries. 
In a remarkable demonstration of the importance of cross-national policy learning, lesson 
drawing from these two case studies is beginning to overlap as policymakers incorporate bike 
sharing programs into their COVID-19 responses. Global communication between bike sharing 
policymakers has likely increased in the past several months to share best practices for handling 
the substantial rise in ridership that is occurring worldwide due to the virus.7 However, these 
policymakers may also have relied on the cross-national connections they originally fostered 
over bike sharing programs to consult with their colleagues on coronavirus topics unrelated to 
bike sharing. A potential example would be whether the delegates from other countries who 
visited Hangzhou in previous years to study their exemplary bike sharing program (Ma 2017) 
reached out in 2020 to the contacts they made on their bike sharing study to ask for best practices 
in managing coronavirus when China was still the only country with practical experience. If such 
policy connections are occurring, it would suggest that cross-national learning may beget more 
learning on more topics than policymakers originally envisioned when making the initial 
overture to learn about a policy topic. This type of policymaker interdependence and its capacity 
to encourage policy diffusion is discussed further in Chapter II.  
 
7 Ridership in Las Vegas’ public bike sharing program increased by 97% in April 2020 (Akers 2020), bike share 
demand has risen 150% in Beijing since stringent lockdowns have relaxed, and bike share company Nextbike 
announced a 35% increase in April and May in its European programs compared to the same time last year. (Morris 
2020) At least ten cities have made bikeshare programs free during the pandemic, and global cities like New York, 
Bogotá, Mexico City, and Berlin have all expanded bicycle lanes during the pandemic in an effort to both 
accommodate increased ridership as well as further promote socially-distanced transportation. (Carey 2020, Bliss 
2020)  
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The rapid rate at which policymakers borrowed and shared COVID-19 policies across 
international borders in 2020, and the diffusion of public bike sharing programs over the past 
fifty years are both modern examples of cross-national policy diffusion. Yet policymakers have 
been observing the actions of their counterparts in other countries for much longer, even when it 
was presumably much more difficult to learn about current events around the world. Rose 2005 
points out that Plato encouraged cross-jurisdictional learning in 360 B.C.E. in his Laws dialogue, 
stating that:  
“The citizens of a well-ordered city should be ever seeking out, going forth 
over sea and over land to find him who is incorruptible – that he may establish 
more firmly institutions in his own state which are good already, and amend what 
is deficient; for without this examination and enquiry a city will never continue 
perfect any more than if the examination is ill-conducted.” (Rose 2005, Jowett 
2008)  
Plato himself came from Athens, the city-state most commonly credited with first 
formalizing the policy concept of democratic government, which subsequently spread around the 
world. (Desjardins 2019) Citizens of twenty-first century democracies might assume that the 
right to cast a ballot in secret is another byproduct of the ancient Athenian democracy. But in fact 
this policy concept was not formally written into state electoral policy until the nineteenth 
century. The innovation developed out of a need in the states of Australia to maintain order 
among the number of “gold-seekers,” criminals, and “rowdy” and “troublesome” elements more 
common to Australia (owing allegedly to its origins as a penal colony) who created “raging 
mobs” during elections. (Evans 1917)  
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The states of Victoria and Tasmania each created legislation in 1856 to address this 
situation. Tasmania’s Electoral Act of 1856 stated that  
“No person other than the Elector who shall for that time be tendering his 
vote shall be entitled to be present in the inner room in which the Ballot-papers 
are filled up by the Electors…and any person other than such Elector actually 
recording his vote who shall intrude into such room, shall be deemed guilty of a 
misdemeanor.” 
Victoria’s Electoral Act of 1856 had similar provisions and stated that 
“At every booth or polling place there shall be one or more compartments 
or ballot rooms provided with ink and pens for the purpose of enabling the elector 
to mark the ballot…in which room no person other than the returning officer or 
his deputy, the poll clerk, and the scrutineers of the several candidates…and the 
electors who shall for that time be tendering their votes shall be entitled to be 
present.”8 
Voting by secret ballot proved effective at quelling the mobs that gathered around polling 
places. It soon became such a popular method of conducting elections that it spread from what 
was then considered a global backwater territory to every democracy in the world. Today the 
right to vote in secret is taken for granted with little thought to how this policy innovation arose 
out of a need to keep order among Australian frontiersmen.  
 
8 The Victorian Electoral Act of 1856 also includes a section entitled “Proceedings in case of riot violence &c.” to 
counter the mobs described in Evans 1917. The provision includes detailed instructions for how to postpone and 
resume any election that is “interrupted or obstructed by any riot or open violence,” and which also authorizes 
officers of the law “to cause to be arrested and taken before a justice of the peace any person…who shall cause a 
disturbance and the persons so respectively offending shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and punished by fine 
or imprisonment.” 
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 Examples of state lawmakers learning from other states continued to arise in the 
nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries. Quebec and British Columbia were the first sub-
federal units in North America to set up state liquor boards in 1921. (Dupré 2008, 8) This system 
was publicly admired and eventually emulated in many U.S. states. Learning was evident in both 
executive and legislative channels. For example, the Fairfield Daily Ledger wrote on June 23, 
1933, that “Governor Herring, as an answer to the belief of the dry forces that to do away with 
the eighteenth amendment is to restore an unbridled liquor traffic, has announced that the Iowa 
control program will be modeled after the Quebec plan.” And the Olean Times of western New 
York wrote on June 11, 1926, that:  
“One could expect Senator James W. Wadsworth to say, in clear, 
unequivocal language, just where he stood on the prohibition question. One can 
always rely on the New York Senator to talk plainly. There is never any doubt as 
to his views on any subject...So far as Senator Wadsworth’s solution of the 
liquor problem is concerned, it is interesting to note that he strongly advocates 
what this newspaper has, on several occasions, put forward as the best means 
yet devised to handle it - a form of government sale and limitation based on the 
Quebec plan.” 
Though Wadsworth’s preferences had yet to be confirmed as law at the time of that article, an 
article from the Escanaba Daily Press on June 30, 1933, says that “licenses in Delaware are 
issued by Pierre S. DuPont, liquor commissioner, and multi-millionaire anti-prohibition leader, 
under a law based mainly on the Quebec system.” This was a strong example of policy transfer 
between states in different countries in the interwar years. 
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 More modern examples abound as well. The Missouri Plan of electing judges instead of 
appointing them originated in 1940 and was subsequently adopted by various states and 
countries around the world. A research project from Manamela 2012 (80, 100) reported that the 
Limpopo legislature in South Africa sent legislative delegates on study tours to ten countries 
between 2004 and 2009 to learn about improving legislative committee oversight. The study 
found that, while much more a priori research was needed for trips to provide maximum benefit 
to delegates, that the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA), as well as the 
Agriculture, and Public Works Committees were able to implement some oversight practices that 
they found on their trips. A trip delegate noted that “SCOPA went to Malawi and ever since that 
study tour, it called police officers to form part of oversight [proceedings]”, ostensibly to “ensure 
that officials who are found guilty of corrupt activities during oversight are arrested on the spot.” 
Legislation delineating the rights of victims of crimes, as well as legislation allowing for post-
conviction DNA motions both originated in U.S. states and subsequently were adopted by 
legislatures in other states around the world, as were dozens of other policies.  
Evidence abounds that U.S. state legislatures are frequently studied by smaller and less 
sophisticated state legislatures abroad. But just as with the Australian Ballot System and the 
Quebec Plan, the flow of information continues to travel in the other direction as well, i.e., U.S. 
state legislators seem to gather policy ideas from abroad on a regular basis. Legislation 
mandating that refusal to wear a seatbelt can be a ticketable offense originated in Victoria, 
Australia in 1970, and several studies found it to be successful at reducing both injuries and 
fatalities in crashes (see Conybeare 1980 for examples). The policy made its way around the 
world in the next fifteen years by spreading to New Zealand, Europe, and Canada. A report 
prepared for the Virginia Highway and Transportation Research Council directly references the 
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law’s Australian roots by stating “in 1970, Victoria became the first state in Australia to enact a 
mandatory seat belt use law. This law was so successful that by 1982 every state on the continent 
had passed similar legislation.” (Grey 1985) The publication goes on to link Victoria’s success at 
reducing fatalities to its rigorous enforcement of the law, and to credit the public awareness 
campaigns undertaken in Australia for helping citizens to transition to the new system. It 
concludes that “a mandatory restraint use law in Virginia, coupled with public education and 
enforcement programs, will save accident victims and their families from needless pain. In turn, 
the Commonwealth will recover from the cost of implementation many times over.” (Grey 1985) 
Virginia would pass primary seatbelt legislation two years later and, despite stringent arguments 
over personal freedoms that characterized the debate on this legislation in the United States, 
every U.S. state except New Hampshire had a primary seatbelt law in place by 1994.  
To date, U.S. state-level legislatures and executive branches have signed hundreds of 
agreements, memoranda of understanding, and compacts with foreign governments, including 
over one hundred sister state agreements with peers from states in other countries around the 
world. (Hollis 2008, 1079) The formality and impact of these agreements vary widely, from 
more symbolic and less formal expressions of friendship and political statements of solidarity 
where no tangible objectives are set forth, to trade agreements, to pacts to work together on 
political issues that create firm commitments for concrete outcomes between signatories. The 
many pacts expressing friendship between U.S. states and Taiwan are examples of less formal 
and more symbolic relationships.9 On the other hand, many agreements focus on tangible 
 
9 One such agreement is West Virginia’s 2018 resolution renewing its 38-year sister state relationship 
with Taiwan, which does not announce any plans for specific projects and goals but affirms its political 
support for Taiwan by noting that “Whereas, Taiwan has been proven to be a very valuable contributor in 
a broad range of global issues and is necessary to be granted access to meaningfully participate in various 
international organizations…..therefore, be it resolved by the Senate: that the Senate hereby reaffirms the 
sister-state relationship between the State of West Virginia and Taiwan.” 
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objectives and knowledge transfer and have resulted in visible accomplishments. Sister State 
Agreements leading to trade and investment promotion, which date back to the 1950s and 
therefore represent one of the oldest types of legally established cross-national state agreements, 
prove perennially popular with executive branches.10 (McMillan 2012) Ralston 2013 and 
Steinbacher 2018 lay out several instances of sister state agreements between U.S. states and 
German Länder that resulted in meaningful energy policy changes for all parties. Lastly, 
although not specifically an example of U.S. cross-national relations, several states in South 
Africa have signed agreements with Canadian provinces and German Länder that were narrowly 
focused on building legislative capacity and training public servants, such as  the Renewed 
Agreement on Governance and Economic Development between North West and Manitoba, and 
similar agreements between Western Cape and Bavaria and between Mpumalanga and North 
Rhine-Westphalia. (Geldenhuys 1998, 37) The popularity of sister state agreements between sub-
national states and provinces around the world suggests that they are an example of how cross-
national sub-national agreements provide benefits to both legislators and constituents while 
fostering global connections.  
U.S. state governments have also entered into many international compacts that include 
multiple cosignatories. Compacts with Canadian provinces and Mexican states are often targeted 
at solving a specific issue that is relevant to all parties because of their proximity, such as the 
Great Lakes Basin Compact, the Northeastern Interstate Fire Protection Compact (Hollis 2008), 
and the joint declarations related to trade and border security that emerge from the annual United 
 
10 Anecdotal evidence suggests that cross-national trade partnerships formed at the sub-national level may increase 
during the Trump administration due to the federal government’s unpredictable stance on tariffs and trade. Scott 
Pattison, Executive Director of the National Governors Association noted in 2018 that “the international community 
is reaching out in a way that has never happened…you’ve got premiers calling and talking to governors like never 
before. I have CEOs of foreign companies wanting to know how they can meet with governors. I’ve got 
ambassadors calling me.” (Greenblatt 2018)  
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States-Mexico Border Governors Conference. (Texas Secretary of State) The three-way sister 
state agreement between the U.S. state of Maryland and Bong County and Maryland County in 
Liberia have outlined several areas for collaboration since establishing a sister state relationship 
in 2007. The website for the agreement highlights several examples of concrete outcomes 
generated from the partnership in health and sanitation, education, port authority best practices, 
and networking with other sister states. (SisterStates Maryland)  
More aspirational examples of cross-national sub-national state compacts between states 
that do not share borders can be found in multistate climate agreements, including the Montreal 
Declaration of Federated States and Regions, the 2008 Poznan Statement of Action, and the 
Under2Coalition (formerly the States and Regions Alliance) formed to help foster a sub-national 
community of states committed to fighting climate change. (Hollis 2008, “The Real Deal” 2009, 
The Climate Group) It should also be noted, however, that at least one formalized interstate 
compact exists with tangible goals that have produced results: the Western Climate Initiative 
(WCI), which is a regional carbon cap-and-trade program that has resulted in lower greenhouse 
gas emissions among cosignatories. Although the number of states and provinces participating in 
the Initiative currently includes only California, Quebec, and Nova Scotia, the WCI represents 
one of the most successful formalized partnerships to date between states in different countries in 
terms of setting tangible goals that drive change within members.11 Taken together, the volume 
of both formalized and nonformal agreements with both aspirational and very specific objectives 
indicates that U.S. states consider foreign counterparts important peers in their network of sub-
national policymaking entities and that there are benefits to be gained through partnership.  
 
11 Examples of requirements that participating jurisdictions must meet include adopting reduction targets, implementing an action 
plan, adopting California’s vehicle emission standards, etc. (Wincele 2019)  
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Research Question and Current Answers 
How have policymakers in far flung and disparate states found each other’s policies for 
over 150 years, and why have they chosen to borrow and adapt them for use at home? The 
research on policy transfer and policy diffusion suggests that momentum for policy inspiration 
rests with sources closer to home rather than further from it. On the surface there appear to be 
many key differences between the same-country and cross-national contexts that would suggest 
that looking abroad is a more intensive process for borrowing legislation. There is, for example, 
decreased opportunity for frequent contact between policymakers in states in different countries, 
and Mooney (1991) finds that legislators often rely heavily on their peers for policy information. 
Less contact suggests it is more difficult legislators to learn about policies that are being passed 
in foreign jurisdictions. Another example of how the foreign context is distinctive is that any 
policies borrowed from abroad must be adapted to comply with federal regulations in the 
borrowing country. Legislators have been shown to take care to craft policies that can withstand 
potential lawsuits. (Bogenschneider et al. 2019) This suggests that borrowing policy from a 
foreign peer may require extra vetting to be certain it will comply with relevant federal 
legislation at home. In contrast, policies borrowed from neighboring states have a higher chance 
of being compliant not only with federal laws but also with a state’s own laws due to the number 
of interstate compacts that U.S. lawmakers have created.12  
If this is the case, why does long distance policy transfer happen at all? A lesser but 
related question is, if cross-national policy transfer is so beneficial, why do we not observe it 
more often? The motivating examples described at the beginning of this chapter suggest that 
cross-national policy diffusion exhibits some similarities to same-country policy diffusion but is 
 
12 For example, any legislation about standardizing radioactive waste procedures, high speed rail networks, highway 
transportation and policing, etc. would likely be comparable with neighboring states due to the number of interstate 
compacts signed on these topics. Source: National Center for Interstate Compacts 
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also unique and distinctive in some important ways. Something that seems to apply to both 
domestic and cross-national policy diffusion is that policymakers in U.S. states do seem 
interested in policies where success can be measured more easily, and they seem willing to study 
and sometimes adopt policies that are considered successful from both in-country and cross-
country sources. Just as states tend to adopt ideas that come to be considered successful (such as 
antismoking policies that clearly lower the youth smoking rate) from domestic counterparts, 
states seem to be able to learn from foreign counterparts and adopt policies that clearly achieve 
some objective (like contact tracing and primary seatbelt laws). 
However, it is not clear whether the processes by which state policymakers learn about 
successful policies from domestic neighbors are the same as the processes used to learn about 
successful policies in foreign counterparts. Research suggests that legislators most often consult 
outside sources when drafting policy, but very little consensus has emerged about which sources 
are favored and prioritized. (see Mooney 1991, Gray and Lowery 2000 and Bogenschneider et al. 
2019) Do the same investigative processes used when studying domestic counterparts reveal 
useful information about successful foreign policy ideas, or are different methods required? It 
seems likely that legislators may rely on different resources for gathering information in the 
foreign context, which may lead to a different policy formation process. For example, it may be 
the case that professional organizations and interest groups are comparatively more important in 
delivering information about foreign policy initiatives, or that personal connections with foreign 
policymakers met through trips and conferences are disproportionately more important for 
learning about foreign-origin policy.  
The motivation for states to copy ideological counterparts in foreign countries also likely 
differs between the in-country and cross-national contexts. Evidence exists of states cooperating 
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with foreign states or provinces of similar political ideology (such as California and Quebec 
partnering on the Western Climate Initiative), but examples also examples such as Alaska and 
North Dakota (two states that have consistently voted for Republican presidential candidates) 
working with the classically left-wing Scandinavian country Norway on prison reform, severance 
tax allocation, and methane emission policies suggests that ideology may not be as important in 
the cross-national context. Physical characteristics, resource allocations, and economic 
considerations may transcend political ideologies in cross-national circumstances. Therefore, it 
seems that the borrowing of policy from states and countries that are not ideologues points to an 
additional driver of cross-national diffusion beyond the importance of ideology at the in-country 
level. Additionally, the extent to which legislators feel confident that an ideologically similar 
counterpart in a different country can provide information about whether a policy will be 
successful at home is yet unknown compared to the information they can get from a policy 
passing in an ideologically similar state in the same country. This is a potentially important 
difference separating the drivers of cross-national policy diffusion from domestic policy 
diffusion.  
Although the literature specifically related to cross-national sub-federal policy diffusion 
is quite limited, the fields of policy transfer and policy diffusion provide suggestions for how to 
answer this question. The cross-national policy transfer literature primarily espouses an agent-
based explanation for how actors bring policies across international borders at any level of 
government. (Marsh and Sharman 2009) It focuses on how individual actors within parties, 
interest groups, and government institutions look abroad for policy inspiration, either to find a 
best practice or justify an intended policy direction. (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, 347) An 
explanation rooted in the policy transfer literature for why policymakers in states in one country 
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borrow policy from lawmakers in a state in a different country would likely follow this line of 
reasoning. 
However, to a large extent the policy transfer literature overlooks the structural factors 
that influence policy diffusion and does not scale very well to a “general explanatory theory of 
policy change.” (Stone 2012, 490) Very few studies of policy transfer focus on cross-national 
learning at the state level (some examples include Ralston 2013 and Steinbacher 2018), and even 
fewer emphasize state legislative policy transfer (see Rabe 1991, and Boyd 2017 for two 
exceptions). However, extrapolating the policy transfer literature theories of national and 
municipal policy transfer to the state level suggests that policy diffuses cross-nationally between 
states because of isolated actors akin to the policy entrepreneurs espoused by Mintrom 1997. 
These actors either work to bring policy innovations to their home jurisdiction or work to share 
and spread best practices to systems beyond where they started to many other places where they 
could be beneficial. An example of this type of policy transfer is highlighted in Dolowitz and 
Medearis 2009: 
“Moved by the crisis of cholera outbreaks in New York City, Benjamin Marsh 
deliberately moved to Germany to understand city planning practices that 
emphasized human health and hygiene. Marsh considered German urban 
planning systems in general, but the concept of zoning in particular, to be a 
model for public health planning practices for the US, and introduced the 
nation’s first comprehensive zoning regulations.”  
 
 However, actor-based theories of policy transfer face difficulties in developing 
generalizable conclusions about when diffusion is likely to occur and what structural features 
hinder or promote it. In short, they identify the key features that lead to transfer in any one 
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particular instance, but do not provide a way to answer broadly the question of why 
policymakers might generally be interested in learning from abroad when closer options are 
available. To answer this question requires a broader investigation of the structural elements of 
state governments that would make them more or less likely to adopt.  
The policy diffusion literature is much better suited for this. One branch of the literature 
examines why legislatures might look abroad. The policy diffusion literature finds that learning, 
emulation, competition, and coercion are the four primary motives explaining why policymakers 
in one state examine policymaking in other states and sometimes borrow their policies. 
(Boehmke and Witmer 2004, Boehmke 2009, Shipan and Volden 2008, Berry and Berry 2018) 
From this perspective the literature offers answers as to what could drive examples of cross-
national diffusion, as the first three of these could apply to states in different countries, just as 
they could motivate lawmakers from states in the same country. This is especially true as 
globalization increases the ease with which state actors can learn about and emulate each other. 
(West 2018) However, the literature says nothing about when or under what conditions we 
would expect state actors to prioritize learning from a peer state in the same country or to look 
abroad, or when they feel they are in competition with states in different countries and make 
policy changes that were influenced by a foreign sub-national state’s actions.  
Another part of the policy diffusion literature studies whom state policymakers learn from 
after deciding to study outcomes in other states. As mentioned earlier, the literature has found 
that actors in a state are likely to study another state if the state under observation shares similar 
characteristics, is close by, or is a worthy role model based on some characteristic that borrowing 
legislators would like to develop in the home state. Starting with Walker 1969, scholars have 
discovered that state lawmakers examine counterparts that are close in proximity (Berry and 
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Berry 1990, Boehmke and Witmer 2004), states with similar ideologies (Grossback and Peterson 
2004), states perceived as leaders on certain topics (Boehmke et al. 2017), states with policies 
that have had more measurably successful results (Shipan and Volden 2014), states who share 
similar implementation environments (Nicholson-Crotty and Carley 2016), and model legislation 
from external sources. (Garrett and Jansa 2015) 
These studies do much to elucidate the sources of policy inspiration for states in the same 
country. However, by limiting the universe of actors between which policies can diffuse to states 
in just one country, they are not able to fully answer which of these candidates would likely be 
studied by state legislators when the legislators are looking abroad to a state or province in a 
different country. It can be supposed that the literature’s answer to the question of “whom do 
state policymakers look to when looking abroad?” would be that they look to states that fit into 
one of these categories – perhaps a state that is an ideological counterpart, has a similar 
implementation environment, or is a role model. However, this does not speak either to why a 
foreign role model or ideological counterpart would be prioritized over a domestic one, or which 
institutional features might predispose a state’s policymakers to look abroad more or less than 
other state legislators would compared to the well-established theories that suggest reasons for 
looking to domestic ideological counterparts, neighbors, model legislation, and so forth. The 
question is left open whether the reasons for diffusion identified in the literature can or do apply 
to states in differing countries as well as same countries (for example, if shared borders predict 
policy diffusion, perhaps states like Tamaulipas, Baja California, and Ontario should be included 
in North American diffusion studies), or else whether state policymakers look abroad for 
different reasons all together. 
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Lastly, the literature on policy decision making processes at the legislator level 
contributes to a theory of how legislators conduct research for policy development. Detailed 
investigation in Mooney 1991 reveals that legislators are greatly time constrained and responsive 
to political considerations, yet they are still reliant on research when crafting bills, a fact 
corroborated in a survey of legislators conducted over twenty years later by Bogenschneider et 
al. 2013. This literature suggests that legislators use a vast range of sources to conduct research, 
and furthermore that a broad spectrum of thoroughness in research exists between different types 
of tasks, different institutional actors, and even among types of legislators themselves (see for 
example Gray and Lowery 2000 and Bogenschneider et al.’s 2013 categorization of legislators as 
low and high research users). Similar to the questions about why state policymakers look abroad 
and whom they look to, the question of how they look abroad as not been rigorously investigated 
in the cross-national context. How do legislators gather research from foreign sources and 
synthesize it into policies and legislation, and how are these processes similar or different to the 
processes used to learn about domestic policy examples?  
Evidence indicates a wide array of research behaviors that might influence how 
legislators conduct research and whether they can find or utilize policy from states in other 
countries. Though a common research pattern that describes all legislators may not be realistic, 
vast potential exists for foreign research to be both possible and fruitful. For example, 
Bogenschneider et al. 2013 (269, 272) find that legislators were more likely than bureaucratic 
policymakers to agree that all necessary information must be collected before a decision is made. 
They also found that 46% of legislators and 50% of legislative staff surveyed were categorized 
as high users of research. However, this literature lacks any discussion of the conditions under 
which legislators may be expected to conduct foreign research. Is it, as advanced in the policy 
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transfer literature, a situation where individual policy entrepreneurs are responsible for bringing 
policies over from abroad on an ad hoc basis, or do institutions that promote thorough 
investigation lead some legislatures to systematically conduct more foreign research as a whole? 
And how are institutional features that boost research capacity associated with legislator ability 
to conduct these research processes in the cross-national context? 
Explaining and Investigating Cross-National Sub-National Policy Diffusion 
This dissertation supports the theoretical advancements of the literatures discussed here 
and bridges some of the gaps that currently exist in the realm of cross-national sub-national 
policy diffusion. I argue that, similar to same-country diffusion, cross-national sub-national 
policy diffusion is a logical extension and consequence of the theories of learning, emulation, 
and competition advanced to explain why state legislators borrow from any other state regardless 
of federal allegiance. This is because the benefits of learning from or emulating successful states 
transcend national boundaries, just as the threat of competition does. In bridging the gap of 
whom policymakers look to when considering borrowing a policy of foreign origin, I argue that it 
is primarily institutional factors related to professionalism which play an important role in 
determining whether legislators will look to states in other countries, since these factors affect 
capacity not only for looking abroad, but also the standard of evidence required to produce 
successful policies, and priorities for what legislators wish to accomplish during their time in 
office. In this way cross-national policy diffusion may be somewhat different from same-country 
policy diffusion, which occurs due to both institutional features like term limits and also 
frequently through non-institutional factors such as the policy actions of lawmakers in both 
neighboring states and regions. Lastly, I work to improve understanding of how legislators look 
abroad by theorizing that policies passed earlier in states in foreign countries provide more value 
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to time-constrained legislators due to ease of access and information on policy outcomes. Cross-
national policy diffusion is therefore theorized to generally be a more difficult context for 
diffusion to occur due to the higher costs of research and policy formation. It is also theorized to 
rely on both some similar processes as same-country policy diffusion (for example, the 
motivations of learning and emulation and the institutional capacities related to policy formation) 
but may rely on those motivations and processes differently (i.e., a potentially decreased or 
changed reliance on ideological counterparts and more reliance on different research procedures 
or institutions).  
To investigate this theory of cross-national diffusion I undertake three different analyses 
that each use a separate empirical method to test for the presence of systematic diffusion. These 
methods also examine what types of state-level institutions and attributes are associated with 
increased diffusion activity. The sub-national jurisdictions selected for this study are the seven 
states and territories in Australia, the thirteen provinces and territories in Canada, and the fifty 
states in the United States. These jurisdictions were chosen because they present wide variation 
in economic strength, legislative professionalism, degree of autonomy in the federal system, 
trade dependence, and geographic proximity to each other as shown in Table 1 below. Studying 
them thus provides valuable insight on how these factors may be associated with proclivity to 
observe or borrow from foreign counterparts. 
Potential downsides of the sample selected for this study is that they are all 
commonwealth countries that speak the same language and rely on the common law system. 
These similarities introduce the possibility that cross-national diffusion between states and 
provinces in these countries is more likely than between jurisdictions that do not share a 
language or the same legal system. However, this project is primarily focused on whether 
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evidence of systematic cross-national diffusion exists at all, and an investigation of diffusion 
between Australian states, Canadian provinces, and U.S. states can serve to illuminate this. It 
provides a valuable baseline by which future investigations can compare levels of diffusion 
between states who do not share the same language or legal system. Therefore, the variation 
displayed by the jurisdictions in this study make them ideal for an initial foray, while the ways in 
which they are similar prompt future exploration while not greatly threatening the objectives of 
the present investigation. 
 
Table 1: Properties of Largest and Smallest Jurisdictions in Sample 
 Australian States Canadian Provinces U.S. States 
Characteristic Smallest Largest Smallest Largest Smallest Largest 
 
Northern 
Territory 
New 
South 
Wales 
Nunavut Ontario Vermont California 
Economic 
Strength13 
$18.2 billion $401 
billion   
$1.9 billion  $578 
billion  
$32 
billion  
$2.7 
trillion  
U.S. 
equivalent: 
Gulfport-
Biloxi, MS 
Metro 
Statistical Area 
State of 
Maryland 
Tifton, GA 
Micro 
Statistical 
Area 
State of 
Georgia 
  
Sub-National 
Autonomy Medium-High Low-Medium High 
Geographic 
Proximity 
Separated by Pacific Ocean Shares border with 
United States 
Shares border with 
Canada 
Trade 
Dependence14 
42% of national GDP 64% of national GDP 27% of national 
GDP 
 
The second chapter in this project contains exploratory research to determine whether 
there is evidence of systematic cross-national sub-federal diffusion that can serve as a basis for 
 
13 2017 current USD, The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Statistics Canada, and the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics 
14 The World Bank, National Accounts Data. Trade as a Percentage of GDP. Accessed 22 August 2018. 
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further research. I theorize that policymakers borrow policies from sub-national units in different 
countries using the same types of network processes that operate in policy diffusion between 
states in the same country, for reasons that are both similar to and different from the reasons for 
same-country policy diffusion. Some of the similar motivations include a desire to learn and 
emulate, which may arise from knowledge that policymakers in other countries have developed a 
new and successful policy, whereas differing motivations may include a desire to fix a policy 
that has not had good results at home. Cross-national network connections can develop because 
states display patterns of interdependence from their legislators hearing of innovative new ideas, 
conducting focused searches for best practices, and having personal connections through shared 
policy interests and mutual contacts built through research, conferences, and trips. The chapter 
thus seeks to answer whether evidence for this exists in the pattern of policy diffusion between 
states in different countries, whether the patterns of diffusion vary by state size, and whether 
noticeable differences appear in state actors who are studied and actors who study others. 
I find that patterns of sub-national cross-national diffusion are present and account for 
approximately 17% of the connections in a network of Australian states, Canadian provinces, 
and U.S. states. Each edge between actors in the network suggests a connection where one state 
has frequently adopted the same policy as another state in close enough succession often enough 
to suggest that adoption behavior is not independent and that the second state to adopt may be 
observing the first one on a regular basis for policy information. The patterns indicate that 
policymakers in innovative and economically powerful states have the most connections in the 
network and that cross-country connections are formed to these states primarily by large peer 
states in different countries and also to some extent by smaller, less economically dominant 
states. This suggests that the largest and most innovative states are most likely to practice cross-
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national diffusion but that all states seem capable of conducting basic cross-national research, 
perhaps most frequently when a state or province in a different country shares similar 
characteristics.15 However, it does not give any indication of the extent or reasons for which 
cross-national diffusion is easier or more difficult, only that it happens less often. It provides 
evidence that cross-national diffusion is a process that relies on interdependencies between actors 
but does not suggest which processes promote or hinder it, or whether those process are the same 
or different to the ones for same-country diffusion. This chapter therefore serves as a promising 
introduction which demonstrates the need to focus on investigating the institutional features 
which are associated with cross-national diffusion and the state-level attributes that might affect 
legislative proclivity to cross-national learning.  
The third chapter in this project takes up this direction of focus by investigating how the 
institutional features of U.S. state legislatures affect their capacity for cross-national policy 
diffusion, and how these institutions’ effect on cross-national diffusion differ from their effect on 
same-country diffusion. I focus therefore on the institution of term limits, which has been 
associated with increased policy diffusion in the United States (Miller et al. 2018) and theorize 
that term limits (notably associated with declining professionalism in states that have adopted 
them) should be associated with increased borrowing of policies originating in states in foreign 
jurisdictions. I theorize that term limits increase motivation to find policies that are unique and 
pre-formatted and can be easily pushed forward as a new and novel concept on which a legislator 
who is term-limited can point to as evidence of a successful career in the legislature. I also 
predict that, as adapting the legislation to fit domestic needs would be less important to 
legislators in term-limited states who are more concerned with passing the policy than ensuring 
 
15 Such as being heavily dependent on oil or fishing industries. 
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its long term success or compatibility, policies of foreign origin present unique policy ideas 
whose broad concepts legislators can obtain fairly easily through internet searches while 
avoiding the greater and sustained effort required to conduct a thorough investigation of a policy 
of foreign origin to assess its long-term suitability for the home state. I test this using event 
history analysis modeled with generalized linear mixed models and time splines, limiting my 
study to policies that originated in states and provinces in Canada and Australia and which were 
subsequently adopted by U.S. states.16  
Although my results support the findings in Miller et al. (2018) about the effects of term 
limits on domestic policy diffusion, I find only limited evidence that Term Limits affect the 
likelihood of adopting a policy that originates in a state in a foreign country, and no strong 
evidence that Term Limits are associated with faster adoption of policies of Foreign Origin. 
Although I cannot fully reject the possibility that the conclusion may be driven by shortcomings 
with data collection and analysis, the results of this paper suggest that, while Term Limits seem 
related to the speed with which states adopt policies from their domestic counterparts, they do 
not have a clear association with cross-national borrowing. This points to meaningful differences 
in either the policy research process or the policy adoption process that legislators use for 
policies of foreign origin compared to the practices used for borrowing policies of domestic 
origin. One plausible difference along these lines might be that policies of foreign origin require 
more effort than previously theorized to make them compatible for adoption in the home state, 
and that therefore there is no way to simply pass these policies quickly, regardless of whether a 
state has term limits and legislators are incentivized to pass legislation as swiftly as possible.  
 
16 The difficulty of obtaining a comparable measure of professionalism for Canadian and Australian jurisdictions 
limited the scope of the project in Chapter III and Chapter IV to the diffusion of foreign text in U.S. states, but 
extending this to study adoption patterns in states in other countries is an avenue that can be pursued in the future. 
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On the other hand, the likelihood of adopting a policy of Foreign Origin is found to be 
positively associated with the Proportion of Foreign Adopters that have already adopted the 
policy. As the Proportion of Neighboring Adopters is commonly taken to be a sign of the extent 
to which states can learn about a policy (see Miller et al. 2018 for review of studies supporting 
this), it suggests that learning about the success outcomes of a foreign-origin policy may be 
important to all U.S. states considering adopting a policy of foreign origin regardless of term 
limit status. This indicates that some other institutional features may be very important in 
explaining the variation in cross-national policy adoption behavior in U.S. states and drives the 
direction of investigation in the next chapter. 
The fourth chapter therefore reframes the investigation of which state-level institutional 
features are associated with cross-national policy borrowing by investigating how different 
aspects of legislative professionalism are associated with cross-national borrowing of policy 
content. I theorize that professionalism is associated with less policy similarity overall because 
more professional states display more innovative policymaking and are likely to pass policies 
that are less similar. I theorize that this should be even more true in the context of foreign cross-
national searching because more professional states have more resources to aid lawmakers in 
collecting more best practices and synthesizing more different ideas into one document. On the 
other hand, actors in a less professional state conducting the same research may examine what 
was done by the policy originator and a few other sources and write a policy based on that more 
cursory research that investigates fewer actors due to the constraints of time and research 
capacity that characterize a part-time or citizen legislature. I therefore predict that the interaction 
of a policy being of Foreign Origin and a legislature being more Professional is associated with 
significantly lower policy Textual Similarity than when the policy is of domestic origin. I test 
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these hypotheses on a dataset of four policies of U.S. origin that were subsequently adopted by 
U.S. states and four policies of foreign origin that were subsequently adopted by U.S. states, 
modeling policy change by a measure of textual similarity between laws. 
I find that, though a policy being of Foreign Origin is associated with a 30% reduction in 
Textual Similarity across states of all levels of Legislative Professionalism, there are still 
meaningful similarities between the text of foreign policy originators and subsequent borrowers 
in states in other countries. This supports the ideas introduced above, and developed further in 
Chapter IV, that policies borrowed from abroad require more effort to borrow than policies from 
domestic sources because they require more modification than policies borrowed from domestic 
counterparts, perhaps partially to adapt them for compliance with federal regulation. 
Nonetheless, the linguistic similarities that carry over from foreign-origin policies to U.S. 
policies suggest that state policymakers borrow policies from abroad for the same motivations of 
learning and emulation that drive them to borrow policies from their neighbors.  
I find also that the results of the interaction of Legislative Professionalism and a policy 
being of Foreign Origin are mixed: higher Legislative Professionalism is associated with 
increased Textual Similarity for domestic policies, but both increased and decreased Textual 
Similarity for policies of Foreign Origin. This provides partial support for the theory that higher 
levels of professionalism suggest a better ability to find and study a wider range of policy 
examples that may in turn lead to synthesizing a wider range of ideas into a policy that displays 
low similarity to any of its predecessors. However, it also suggests that the association between 
Legislative Professionalism and policy Textual Similarity is more complex and that a more 
nuanced theory will not only clarify the conditions under which higher and lower similarity is 
expected in terms of borrowing from foreign sources and adding innovation. It will also enable a 
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better understanding of how the cross-national policy research and formation process differs 
from the same-country policy diffusion process. Lastly, a more complex theory will also 
illuminate whether the same legislative institutions are used for both types of diffusion or if 
different institutions are relied on more heavily for each type. This finding guides the 
development of a more complex theory of when high or low similarity to the policy originator 
should be expected based on professionalism, which can be tested in future research.  
Comparing Cross-National Diffusion to Same-Country Diffusion at the Sub-National Level 
Collectively, the three investigations in this dissertation present one of the first and most 
comprehensive forays into cross-national state-level policy diffusion research at the sub-national 
level, especially in terms of the state-level attributes and institutions associated with cross-
national diffusion and how these processes compare to the processes used in same-country 
diffusion. The findings suggest that the resources that make it easier for policymakers to learn 
about policy innovations in states in other countries have become more accessible through 
globalization and that all states have the resources required to conduct at least basic research 
about policy innovations abroad. The findings also suggest that the same motivations of learning 
and emulation (and, to a lesser extent, competition) presented in Shipan and Volden 2008 not 
only drive neighboring and non-neighboring states in the United States but also seem to motivate 
cross-national study of non-neighboring counterparts abroad. Studies like Desmarais et al. 2015, 
Nicholson-Crotty and Carley 2016 and Bricker and LaCombe 2020 find that states quite often 
look for policy inspiration to states that are not their neighbors. From this perspective, the 
practice of looking to non-neighboring states in different countries for policy ideas is quite 
similar to what states are already doing with their own noncontiguous counterparts in their home 
country. Some of the institutional behaviors associated with policy diffusion in the same-country 
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context also appear to generalize to the cross-national context. For example, non-term-limited 
state behavior is consistent from the perspective that non-term-limited states regularly borrow 
policies adopted by their neighbors later than states with term limits do, and this behavior is 
evident in the foreign context as well when non-term-limited states are considering whether to 
adopt a policy of foreign origin. 
At the same time, there appear to be some meaningful differences that make the cross-
national policy diffusion process different from the same-country policy diffusion process. For 
example, though term-limited states tend to adopt policies of domestic origin sooner than their 
neighbors, their behavior with respect to policies of foreign origin matches that of their non-
term-limited counterparts in terms of waiting longer to adopt. This suggests that the institution of 
term limits is more important in explaining in-country policy diffusion and is less important in 
the cross-national context and points to the cross-national research process being somewhat 
different.  
Similarly, the decrease in similarity of policy content of policies borrowed from foreign 
origins compared to policies of domestic origins implies that greater effort is required at least to 
modify a policy of foreign origin for adoption in a home state. It also suggests therefore that 
legislative capacity is of even greater importance in the context of finding and adopting foreign 
policies, as more research time, resources, professional organizations, and site visits may be 
utilized to borrow policies of foreign origin than policies of domestic origin. This would separate 
more professional, wealthier, and innovative states from those that have fewer resources in terms 
of both being able to deeply and comprehensively investigate policy areas abroad and the extent 
to which they are modified for home use.  
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Together, these findings suggest that cross-national diffusion is driven by similar 
motivations to in-country diffusion, is accessible to all states at a basic level but requires more 
investment to do thorough research that may predispose more professional states to conduct the 
highest volume of cross-national diffusion, and is dependent on many similar institutional 
features and processes but with some key differences that invite further exploration. Although 
cross-national policy study and adoption may therefore be easier for larger states, it suggests that 
the ideas developed by states in other countries are accessible at least on a basic level to all 
states, and therefore present an opportunity for all states to improve life for their own citizens 
through implementation of innovative best practices discovered elsewhere. The examples listed 
above of public bike sharing, the secret ballot system, legislative training documents, contact 
tracing and mask wearing, sanitary urban planning systems, and more span decades and provide 
compelling evidence that cross-national policy diffusion has already contributed greatly and has 
rising potential to provide great benefit in real time, much as in-country diffusion has provided 
countless benefits to society over many years. Finding ways to facilitate cross-national diffusion 
and make it more efficient could therefore greatly improve outcomes in public wellbeing. These 
concepts are explored in more depth in Chapter V. 
Although the case studies presented at the beginning of this chapter provide support for 
the existence, importance, and prevalence of cross-national diffusion, more systematic evidence 
is needed that policymakers adopt policies in a manner that is likely to be associated with studied 
learning and borrowing. A good first step is to use network analysis to see if states from multiple 
countries are connected in a policy network. If no cross-national network exists, analysis will 
show three independent clusters that represent the states in three different countries. On the other 
hand, cross-national diffusion networks would look different if, say, actors in all states learned 
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from each other versus only the legislators of one or two highly professional states doing the 
work required to discover and borrow policy from abroad, at which point the policy spreads to 
the rest of the actors in the home country. Evidence that cross-national sub-national policy 
diffusion is occurring will justify continued exploration of this topic in later chapters. Chapter II 
therefore makes the preliminary foray into investigating this concept.  
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CHAPTER II 
Network Analysis of Cross-National Policy Diffusion Among States and Provinces 
 
Abstract 
Policymakers regularly adopt policies that originate in states and provinces in other 
countries, but little is known about how or why they proliferate. This chapter develops a theory 
for why state legislators might look abroad and contends that globalization has increased the 
number of policy areas for which legislators may benefit from looking to their counterparts in 
other countries. I test for the presence of a cross-national policy diffusion network with a dataset 
of fifty-five Canadian, Australian, and U.S. state-level policy adoption dates adapted from the 
dataset created in Boehmke and Skinner 2012. Approximately 17% of connections formed in the 
network are between states in different countries. Wealthy and innovative states are most 
commonly studied, both by their peers and also by smaller, less innovative states. Exponential 
Random Graph Models (ERGMs) are used to assess what motivates the relationships and 
reinforce these findings while also suggesting that states share best practices with each other and 
that successfully studying a state in the past increases the likelihood of observing other states in 
the future. The findings in this paper suggest that policymakers persistently look abroad to 
foreign counterparts as one of many potential sources of policy.  
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Introduction 
What are the conditions under which legislators in sub-national units would be motivated 
to look beyond domestic borders for policy ideas? Anecdotal evidence indicates that learning 
from abroad does occur, from the proliferation of the Australian ballot system in the 19th and 
20th centuries from its origin in Victoria and Tasmania in 1856, to the spread of anti-stalking 
legislation through states and provinces around the world in the 1990s after high-profile stalking 
murders in the United States captured global attention, (Watson 2005) to how delegates from 
Chinese states launching carbon emission trading systems (including Guangdong, the largest 
state in China’s economy) signed agreements to receive technical assistance from both California 
and Quebec, (Narassimhan et al. 2018 p. 984) and to how a delegation of policymakers from 
North Dakota traveled to Norway to better understand the Norwegian system of controlling 
methane excesses.17 (Rabe 2018) 
Yet looking to foreign counterparts has rarely been cited as a source for learning or 
emulation. Linguistic, legal, and physical differences and distances make the cost of researching 
foreign legislation higher than researching legislation from states in the same country. What 
motivates state policymakers to look abroad for ideas when closer options are available? This 
chapter develops a theory of why cross-national state-level policy diffusion occurs and which 
policymakers lead their states in this type of policy research. I theorize that, in addition to the 
 
17 Lawmakers from the state of Alaska also carefully studied Norwegian methane emission policy and incorporated 
some of its elements into their own legislation. (Rabe et al. 2020) 
 35 
 
sources mentioned most often in the policy diffusion literature, legislators in any state may 
choose to observe their counterparts in other countries when actors of those foreign jurisdictions 
develop new and successful policies or when legislators seek to improve on a policy already in 
place. I test for the presence of policy diffusion pathways using network analysis and find 
evidence that states are linked in a cross-national adoption network. Exponential random graph 
modeling suggests that actors in both small states learn from their counterparts in large states, 
though legislatures in large states do not seem to observe the work of legislatures in small ones, 
and that each connection has a positive effect on the likelihood of an additional connection being 
formed. These findings begin to solve the puzzle of why state legislators can be motivated to 
search abroad for policy solutions in addition to looking at same-country peers. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows: I begin by outlining a theory to explain why 
cross-national diffusion occurs and offer some ideas about how globalization has influenced the 
phenomenon of cross-national sub-national policy diffusion. I then construct a network of states 
in three countries to test the hypothesis that systematic diffusion exists. I then use exponential 
random graph models to test hypotheses of whether and how state policymakers’ adoption 
patterns demonstrate cross-national diffusion. I conclude with discussion of the results and 
avenues for further study that would be fruitful based on these findings. 
Potential for Cross-National Diffusion 
State and provincial policymakers across the world grapple with many similar issues. 
They work to improve quality of life for their citizens by supplying public health and safety 
services, maintaining infrastructure, managing elections, providing public education, and more. 
Most states in foreign countries are more similar than different in terms of both the problems 
they face and the solutions they develop. Therefore, with varying degrees of modification, many 
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of the policy innovations and solutions that work in a state one country may also be of use to 
policymakers in the states and provinces of other countries. In addition to the vast literature on 
policy diffusion among U.S. states, scholars have conclusively shown that state policymakers 
around the world adopt policies that were first developed by other states in their own countries.18 
However, the literature has thus far limited its study of state-level diffusion to states that are all 
located in the same country. 
One plausible reason for the absence of studies examining cross-national sub-national 
policy diffusion is that there are plenty of sources of policy inspiration among a state’s peers in 
its home country. Studies identifying the importance of neighbors, regions, local governments, 
lobbyists, and more build a compelling case for many sources of policy inspiration much closer 
to home.19 Another plausible reason is that there are barriers that deter lawmakers from bringing 
policies home from a state in a different country that do not hinder policy diffusion between 
states in the same country. Legislators trying to learn about policies in states in other countries 
have fewer conduits at their disposal with which to learn about foreign policies, especially if they 
are in a different language. Policies of foreign origin most likely need to be modified for 
domestic use in a way that similar policies from domestic peer states do not. Additionally, 
policies from states in other countries represent possible political risk, as citizen feedback to the 
policy cannot be assessed as easily as could a policy that was borrowed from a domestic 
counterpart with a similar political ideology. (Grossback et al. 2004, 525) With so many 
potential challenges involved, it is not surprising that scholars have focused on identifying 
targets of legislative study and observation that lie closer to home. 
 
18 Examples of studies finding evidence for diffusion in non-U.S. countries include Germany (Kern et al. 2007), 
Switzerland (Gilardi and Füglister 2008), China (Zhu 2014), and Brazil. (Sugiyama 2011)  
19 See for example Boehmke and Witmer 2004, Mooney 2001 (145), Gray 1973, Shipan and Volden 2006, and 
Haider-Markel 2001. 
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However, diffusion between states in different countries seems to be occurring despite 
the obstacles. The presence of similar policies in states in different countries implies that 
legislators are either developing dozens of the same ideas in perfect isolation or else studying 
their foreign counterparts on a regular basis. This suggests that policy diffusion between states in 
different countries does occur under at least some conditions. Cross-national diffusion between 
state legislatures seems most likely when a state’s lawmakers in one country develop a novel 
policy that would also successfully solve problems in other states, or, as supported in the policy 
transfer literature, when legislators in the home country undertake a deliberate search for better 
solutions to a policy that is currently delivering less than satisfactory results at home and in any 
of the domestic counterparts that might normally serve as role models. (Dolowitz and Marsh 
1996) Examples of the former motivation are the proliferation of the Australian ballot system 
and the spread of stalking and cyberstalking legislation, each of which were new policy concepts 
that were quickly deemed successful and soon replicated by policymakers of states in other 
countries. An example of the latter type of motivation would be the study undertaken by 
Maryland and the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) to study best primary 
education practices in Alberta, Ontario, and additional foreign city-states and countries. This 
study was conducted find policy ideas more successful than those currently in place in the U.S. 
states. 
Cross-national sub-national policy diffusion may also arise from policy exploration trips 
and networking opportunities. For example, the National Conference of State Legislatures leads 
regular trips for policymakers to visit other countries and exchange best practices.20 However, 
 
20 Examples of state-level professional organizations that host trips in other countries include the Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Association, the National Union of State Legislators and Legislatures (Brazil), the Partnership of 
Parliaments (Germany), Secretaries Association of the Legislatures of South Africa, the Canada-U.S. 
Interparliamentary Group, and the National Council of Provinces (South Africa). 
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international trips seem to be the exception rather than the rule for state legislators, as they can 
face criticism for spending taxpayer dollars or neglecting their legislative duties at home. (Bader 
2019) It seems therefore that the discovery of innovative new policies and the search for best 
practices to improve pre-existing policies are two of the most likely forces that motivate 
legislators to incorporate research of foreign policies into their standard policymaking process 
even in the presence of so many examples at home.  
Given such examples and motivations for why state legislators might look beyond their 
domestic peers to their counterparts abroad, what are the patterns by which this behavior might 
be identified? I theorize that diffusion connections should be possible between states of all sizes 
and levels of global integration because all states should have at least the minimum infrastructure 
required to learn from their counterparts abroad. For example, Liu and Yuan (2015, 145) track 
the progression of information and communication technology used by governments over time 
and show how digital government services went from being almost nonexistent before 1990 to 
being almost fully integrated into daily use by 2010 (albeit more slowly in less developed 
countries). The rise of the internet and other forms of communication have made it less costly to 
for legislators to learn about foreign states who are handling the same problems. And in contrast 
to the argument that policies from foreign states might be a political risk based on an inability to 
forecast how a new policy direction will be received, there is some evidence that policies that 
come from third party or apolitical sources can sometimes be hailed as safer, more successful, or 
more sophisticated solutions merely by being from somewhere else.21  
If foreign states are considered third-party or apolitical sources, this effect may apply to 
their policies and make them more attractive to legislators at home. I draw on these concepts to 
 
21 See, for example, Dolowitz and Marsh 1996 (346), Sugiyama 2011, and Parinandi 2020. 
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form a testable hypothesis about the prevalence of cross-national policy diffusion between states 
and provinces in different countries: 
Hypothesis 1: Systematic cross-national state-level policy diffusion is possible and can 
exist between states of any size in different countries despite national barriers. 
This hypothesis lays the groundwork to establish whether cross-national policy transfer is 
a persistent phenomenon or whether examples of policy transfer such as those mentioned in 
Chapter I are merely anecdotal and not elements of a larger, more systematic pattern. Testing 
this proposition is important to determine whether further study of cross-national policy 
diffusion is merited. Evidence that policies are consistently transferred between certain states or 
within certain amounts of time would invite further research into the characteristics of states 
that might promote or hinder cross-national policy diffusion. 
Although globalizing forces enable legislators in all states to better scrutinize their 
foreign counterparts, not all states are likely to be examined equally. Studies of international 
policy diffusion at the country level and NGO level find that emulation is a frequent motivator 
for many types of global policy diffusion that are not necessarily at the state or province level.22 
Survey evidence from Einstein et al. 2017 finds that U.S. mayors sampled looked abroad for 
policy inspiration almost 10% of the time. The fact that U.S. cities generally look to foreign 
cities that are larger and famously vibrant (such as Bogotá and Paris) suggests that cities may be 
trying to emulate these jurisdictions because they aspire to be more like them.23 Such aspirational 
 
22 See, for example, Börzel and Risse 2011, Hyde 2011, and Lee and Strang 2006. 
23 This fits the pattern for emulation outlined in Shipan and Volden 2006, where smaller cities emulate larger ones. 
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emulation may also occur at the state level as state actors become more aware of their 
counterparts in other countries.24  
Following the concepts set forth about learning in Shipan and Volden 2008, the 
legislatures of more professional states should study each other due to their increased capacity 
for research and policymaking. However, I also posit that actors in smaller states are additionally 
highly incentivized to learn from larger states. Many small states do not have enough resources 
to enable their legislators to fully investigate all possible policy options before deciding on a 
course of action.25 Instead, they rely on the policy innovation of larger states to avoid the cost of 
developing policy themselves. Actors in small states around the world can benefit from studying 
larger states in other countries as well. Most countries do not have many large states, which 
would result in minimal policy variance to study. Therefore, policymakers in small states may 
wish to research multiple large states to consider which policy outcomes are most successful on 
topics that can be applied to states of any size. This leads to Hypothesis 2:  
Hypothesis 2: Policy ties between small and large states are more likely to show actors in 
small states observing large states than actors in large states observing small states. 
It is also important to consider how the interdependencies between states affects the 
likelihood of policy diffusion. Many of the current studies about diffusion examine how 
 
24 The hypotheses in this chapter cannot ascertain whether states borrow due to learning or emulation; however, 
future studies can assess this. Like Shipan and Volden 2014, policies that are borrowed before any measurement of 
success is possible are more likely to be due to emulation as the borrower cannot know ahead of time whether the 
policy will work. However, policies adopted by foreign states immediately after the necessary time has elapsed for 
legislators to evaluate their success would indicate that policymakers waited long enough to learn whether the policy 
was likely to be successful and therefore worth borrowing. 
25 For example, citizen legislatures that only meet once every other year do not encourage lengthy policy research 
and are not likely to have as large of research staff as are often found in full-time legislatures. 
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exogenous actor attributes such as wealth and population affect policy adaptation.26 However, a 
growing literature indicates that the interdependence between actors also influences actor 
behavior.27 Desmarais et al. 2015 show that the U.S. states can be formed into a social network 
of diffusion ties based on patterns in the adoption dates of 188 policies. The authors test for some 
common policy diffusion variables such as ideology and proximity but stop short of testing 
whether any actor-interdependent variables such as reciprocity or transitivity affect the 
likelihood of an additional tie in the network.  
The literature on social networks finds that actors in a network influence each other’s 
likelihoods of forming connections to other members of the group. (Goodreau et al. 2009) State 
legislatures are a social network because, as by the majority of the policy diffusion literature, 
their behaviors influence each other and are thus interdependent. Therefore, the social network 
literature can inform the theory of cross-national state-level diffusion. State lawmakers are 
constantly innovating to create successful policies. (Maestas 2003; Butler and Nickerson 2011) 
When a legislator finds a policy outcome to be ideal given the opportunity cost of creating it, he 
or she may rely on similar tactics in the future in the hope that they yield comparable success. 
Therefore, if a state’s legislators find that looking abroad was useful, they will seek more foreign 
policy solutions in the future. This leads to the following interdependence hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3 (Interdependence Hypothesis): States with cross-national policy adoptions 
are more likely to form additional cross-national policy adoptions than states who have no 
cross-national policy adoptions. 
 
26 See Mooney 2001, Buckley and Westerland 2004, Ducharme and Abraham 2008, Baybeck et al. 2011, and Karch 
et al. 2016 
27 This is certainly true in legislative politics, where actor interdependencies have been argued to influence such 
outcomes as voting turnout (McClurg 2003), vetoing European Commission proposals (Malang et al. 2017), and 
cosponsorship incentives in the U.S. House and Senate (Fowler 2006). 
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Lastly, the networks literature also suggests that reciprocity28 is found more often in 
social networks than in networks of actors connected at random. (Snijders 2001) This concept is 
applicable to state governments as well. When actors in the home state reach out to their 
counterparts in a foreign state, the policymakers in the home state are not the only ones who have 
a chance to learn from the exchange. The lawmakers in the foreign state may become aware of 
the possibility of collaboration with the home state, and the benefits to be gained by studying its 
policy. As predicted by the network literature on reciprocity, lawmakers in the state that receives 
the request are more apt to look to the policies of the initiator for inspiration than they were 
before the request was issued, regardless of state size. This leads to Hypothesis 4:  
Hypothesis 4 (Reciprocity Hypothesis): State actors are more likely to reciprocate ties 
that have been issued to them than they would be in the absence of a tie. 
In summary, the effects of globalization suggest that geography, while important, is not 
as critical for policy diffusion as it once was. Instead, heightened technology and connectivity 
foster an environment where cross-national diffusion from learning, emulation, and economic 
competition is more possible than ever before. State lawmakers have an incentive to look to their 
foreign counterparts for policy ideas when a foreign state has passed a new and useful policy, as 
well as when policymakers in the home state are conducting an extensive search to find best 
practices to improve on a failing policy at home. These motivations to look abroad, coupled with 
the increased access to foreign information and contacts in foreign legislatures brought about 
through globalization, indicate that actors can conduct transnational research and may rely on it 
as one element of their policy development process.  
 
28 Reciprocity describes a network where there is a two-way connection between two of the actors, indicating that 
each sends a tie to the other and each receives a tie from the other. 
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Globalization also has implications for which states and policymakers participate in this 
process. The rise of internet research, telecommunications, and multinational organizations foster 
the ability to learn about foreign innovations and makes it possible for public servants in both 
wealthy and less wealthy states to learn from the most innovative states (though policymakers in 
large and professional states are not likely to learn from smaller, less sophisticated states). 
Lastly, as state legislator relationships fit the characteristics of a social network, cross-national 
sub-national diffusion networks should increase likelihood of future ties with the addition of 
every previous tie, as well as reciprocity between actors. 
Data 
 To test these hypotheses, I create a network of policy adoption dates of Australian, 
Canadian, and U.S states and provinces, as explored in Chapter I. The provinces and states from 
these countries vary widely in economic strength and trade dependence, meaning there is useful 
variety in actors on two characteristics that may affect propensity for cross-national diffusion. 
Additionally, the sub-national units in these countries operate under different levels of 
federalism, with the U.S. being the most devolved and Canada the most centralized. 
Centralization of federal power is seen as inversely proportional to policy experimentation (see 
Shipan and Volden 2012), so this variety will help the analysis of whether federalism encourages 
or deters cross-national policy diffusion. This results in a network of 70 actors (50 U.S. states, 13 
Canadian provinces, and 7 Australian states). The data used are a list of when 55 different 
policies were first adopted in the Australian, Canadian, and American states and provinces. The 
policy adoptions in U.S. states come from a dataset compiled in Boehmke and Skinner 2012. The 
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Canadian and Australian data were collected by hand from June 2018 to September 2018, for a 
total of 2,344 adoption dates across all states.29 
 Two potential biases in the data are of note. First, although the policies drawn from the 
Boehmke and Skinner 2012 dataset were drawn at random, it is possible that they are in some 
way unrepresentative of all types of policy adopted in the U.S. states at large. If this were true, it 
might mean that the networks uncovered in this study are not accurate when the universe of 
policy adoptions is considered, i.e., that the connections found between states and provinces in 
this network are different than the linkages that would be found in the true network. However, 
the large number of policies used and the fact that Desmarais et al. 2015 do not find evidence of 
policy networks for U.S. states differing substantively by policy category suggest that bias from 
unrepresentative policy selection is low.  
 Second, this dataset may exhibit bias in that it was drawn from a database of policies 
passed in U.S. states and therefore is likely missing policies that are not relevant to U.S. states 
but may be relevant elsewhere. Any type of legislation that is regularly passed in parliamentary 
systems but not in presidential systems (such as procedures for dissolving state or provincial 
parliaments or legislation about the powers of the premier) will not appear in this dataset because 
no U.S. state will have passed legislation on any of these topics. Consequently, this dataset likely 
underestimates the number of policies that originated in Canadian provinces and were 
subsequently adopted in Australian states, and vice versa. This is likely to affect the analysis in 
this paper by generating networks with fewer connections than likely exist between Australian 
states and Canadian provinces than likely exist.  
 
29 The data were collected with the help of two trained undergraduate coders. No formal inter-coder process was 
developed but the accuracy of each date was verified by the author.  
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Although a better understanding of the cross-national networks between the states and 
provinces that properly accounts for connections between Australian and Canadian jurisdictions 
is desirable, this study will still be able to accurately test the four hypotheses above with respect 
to policies flowing between foreign jurisdictions and U.S. states, and will still provide a limited 
look at the policy flow between parliamentary jurisdictions on topics not related to governmental 
structure. Future studies should correct for this bias by compiling the dataset not from a list of 
policy topics on the NCSL website but rather by noting all laws passed in each sub-national 
jurisdiction for as many years as covariate data are available, and then identifying the adoption 
dates for every state for each policy on the list. This would capture the entirety of policy flow 
between both parliamentary and presidential systems and has the added benefit of reducing the 
risk of the first source of bias mentioned above, that is, inaccuracy due to sampling. 
Methods 
To test the theory of cross-national diffusion in Hypothesis 1, I create a network of states 
and explore whether there are plausible diffusion connections between them. To do this I use the 
Network Inference (NetInf) algorithm pioneered by Gomez-Rodriguez et al. 2010 and adapted to 
state-level policy diffusion by Desmarais et al. 2015. The actors of the network are the states in 
the dataset, and the connections between the states represent evidence for a tie based on repeated 
patterns of policy adoption sequences. If State A frequently adopts the same type of policy as 
State B but always adopts a few years later, over time it is less likely that this happens by chance 
and more likely that there is a specific reason that A always adopts after B. This will test 
Hypothesis 1 by indicating the likelihood of cross-national diffusion between states. 
The algorithm takes a list of policy adoption dates for all states in the dataset and 
computes which sequences of state-level policy adoption happen more often than what is 
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expected if policies were adopted at random. If policies are consistently passed in one state soon 
after they are passed in another, some latent factor is likely driving this behavior. If the algorithm 
detects this process, it will suggest that a connection (known as a tie or an edge) representing a 
potential policy pathway be placed between the two states. It calculates the likelihood of a 
diffusion edge using the following primary factors: the total number of other states that have 
adopted the policy before a specific state, the number of states where the policy has already been 
adopted who have a plausible tie to the state in question, and the estimated rate of adoption for 
each policy (also known as a rate parameter). (Desmarais et al. 2015, 6) 
 The rate parameter predicts an exponential adoption rate, to model the expectation that 
the chance of state A adopting from state B decreases exponentially as time passes between the 
two adoptions. This is set so that an average of two years is the normal length of time in the 
model for policies to diffuse from one state to another. The first edges it calculates are ties 
between states that score very well on these three conditions and that are therefore likely 
connected. An example might be the tie from California to Massachusetts, if Massachusetts tends 
to adopt the same type of policies that California adopts but consistently does so just a few years 
later. The algorithm adds edges iteratively based on how well they explain the policy adoption 
dates in the dataset (calculated using the BIC statistic), and stops adding edges when there are no 
more connections that would improve model fit by better explaining the adoption dates. 
The result is a network of what Desmarais et al. 2015 describe as “persistent policy 
pathways.” These are edges between states representing that more policies were passed 
sequentially (i.e., persistently) between two states than would be expected if policy adoption 
were completely random. The edges are “directed,” meaning that they flow from one state to 
another and imply that, if diffusion is happening between two states, it is flowing from the first 
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state to the second, not that information is flowing both ways. This method will therefore test 
both the second and fourth hypotheses. The direction of the edges will test whether actors in 
small states are predominantly learning from large states, as Hypotheses 2 predicts. If reciprocity 
is present and lawmakers in large states observe small states in return, as predicted in Hypothesis 
4, NetInf will place edges going in both directions between the two actors. 
There is a risk of bias if there is not enough data to perform the test. NetInf works best 
with at least two transmission events for every potential edge.30 There are 2*(n*(n-1))/2) 
potential edges in every directed network, meaning there are 9,660 potential edges in a network 
with 70 Australian, Canadian, and U.S. states and provinces. If all states were connected this 
dataset would require 19,320 adoption dates to be confident that NetInf is returning likely edges. 
Fortunately, most of those edges are so unlikely (for example, Nunavut to Alabama) that model 
design is not improved by adding them. Many social networks are a fraction of their potential 
size, and density tends to decrease as the number of actors increases. (Faust 2006) Analyzing the 
percentage of potential ties that the algorithm finds will reveal if there is cause for concern.  
The existence of a tie in the network generated by the Network Inference algorithm does 
not prove that there is diffusion between the two states. The algorithm returns a network of 
which states most frequently follow each other in policy adoptions, in a way that accounts for the 
passage of time and who their sources might be based on previous adoptions. It is not capable of 
showing that the reason for those ties is that diffusion has occurred and a legislator in one state 
studiously examined the policies in another state on a regular basis. It merely indicates that there 
are latent variables driving sequences of policy adoptions to manifest in ways that do not 
resemble what they would look like if they happened by chance.  
 
30 Gomez-Rodriguez et al. 2010 p. 24 
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However, the parameters that NetInf uses to find patterns account for the factors that 
would most likely represent policy diffusion, should it be occurring. One factor it considers - 
how many other states have already adopted - matches the theory of learning as described at the 
city level in Shipan and Volden 2008 (842), where they hypothesize that “the likelihood of a city 
adopting a policy increases when the same policy is adopted broadly by other cities throughout 
the state.” The number of other jurisdictions that have passed a policy is considered an important 
potential driver of diffusion, and the edges that NetInf returns are calculated with respect to this 
factor. 
The algorithm also accounts for how many adoptions have occurred among the states that 
might be considered “favored” sources have adopted, i.e., sources more likely to be within the 
state’s network based on previous patterns. States might either learn from these more common 
sources or see them as producers to be imitated. This resembles the description of policy 
diffusion via imitation from Shipan and Volden 2008 (843), as described at the city level, of how 
policymakers of smaller cities hope that “such imitation will raise their profile and make [their 
cities] more attractive places to live, like their larger, wealthier, and more cosmopolitan 
neighbors.” 
Finally, NetInf takes the amount of time between each policy passage into account in a 
way that penalizes longer time spans that are less likely to be linked to diffusion. It does not 
assign equal weight to a policy passed fifty years after the first state versus five years after the 
first state; it favors policies that were passed in shorter time frames to model the possibility that 
one state’s adoption of a policy prompted another state to change the status quo. This provides a 
more difficult test for cross-national ties, in that even with globalization it still takes more time 
for policies to be studied across countries than it does to be observed locally. 
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By taking these steps, the algorithm is constructed to favor only those edges for which the 
conditions exist for policy diffusion to have created them. It is certainly possible that some of 
these edges develop for completely unrelated reasons -- for example, perhaps lawmakers in large 
states simply pass policies first and actors in small states follow after learning about it 
independently. However, when considered in the aggregate, the parameters by which NetInf 
searches for adoptions recover the edges most plausibly generated by nonrandom patterns of 
sequential policy adoption. 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 predict that a state legislature’s adoption of a policy is in some way 
dependent on the adoption behavior of other states in the network. Exponential Random Graph 
Models (ERGMs) are a useful method to test for these patterns. If the sequence of policy 
adoptions is influenced by diffusion, then the edges between actors capture some likeness of that 
diffusion process. And if those edges represent some of the diffusion happening between states, 
then ERGMs model which actor-interdependent factors increase the likelihood of an additional 
edge being formed, i.e., an additional instance where diffusion is likely.  
It is optimal that ERGMs can model actor-interdependent drivers of edge formation 
because diffusion is theorized to occur because actors influence each other through 
interdependent behavior. For example, the process of learning is posited to be dependent on 
geography because the states most often observed “are most likely to be nearby states, for 
reasons of political and demographic similarity, political networking, and overlapping media 
markets.” (Boehmke and Witmer 2004, 40) Political networking and overlapping media markets 
are quintessential examples of influential interdependence factors driven by institutions in the 
policy-spreading state, and not driven by exogenous attributes of the policy-adopting state. Thus, 
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ERGMs are helpful for testing theories of how diffusion occurs in a way that linear regression 
cannot always investigate.31 
Hypothesis 332 can be tested using the ERGM concept of in-degree, where each 
additional inbound tie an actor has increases the likelihood of an additional edge being added.33 
In terms of diffusion this means that policymakers who discover that borrowing from abroad can 
result in policies that suit constituent preferences have a greater chance of doing it again 
compared to those who never look abroad and who are therefore less likely to try to reach out for 
a first time. This creates more incoming ties that represent borrowing policies from some other 
jurisdiction. 
Hypothesis 4 (reciprocity between actors) can be examined by observing the number of 
reciprocal ties in the network and using ERGMs to see if mutual connections persist in 
simulations. A network will have meaningful reciprocity if it exhibits several actors who have 
both a tie coming to them from another state, and a tie leading from them back to that same state 
(i.e., a tie from B to A, and also from A to B). This would indicate that State A adopts policies 
that State B has passed, but also that State B adopts policies that State A has passed in a pattern 
that is not random. 
 Creating an ERGM consists of running thousands of simulated models to show what 
network attributes can, in combination, reproduce a network like the one created by the data. 
Applied to this context, it means that an ERGM will show what exogenous and endogenous 
factors create simulated networks of state edges that are similar to the observed network. It 
 
31 Another good description of how the literature on policy diffusion theory features interdependent mechanisms is 
found in the explanation of competition offered by Shipan and Volden 2008 (242): “In each instance, policymakers 
consider the economic effects of adoption (or lack of adoption) by other governments. If there are negative 
economic spillovers...then it will be less likely to adopt the policy itself.” 
32 The interdependence hypothesis: states with adoptions are more likely to add edges than those without edges 
33 See explantation in De la Haye et al. 2010 p. 164 
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therefore shows what factors are associated with an increased likelihood of a tie being formed, 
representing an above-average frequency of relatively rapid sequential policy adoption. 
 ERGMs use a Monte Carlo Markov Chain algorithm to simulate large numbers of 
networks with the properties predicted to define the observed network structure. This is a way to 
stochastically approximate maximum likelihood. The success of these simulations at recreating 
networks like the observed network inform how likely it would be that the observed network 
could have been generated with the properties theorized to define it. If the observed network is 
not statistically significantly different than the simulated networks, it means the network 
properties predicted and used to generate the simulations probably do describe the attributes of 
the network. However, if the observed network’s properties are different from the properties of 
the simulated networks, it is unlikely that the observed network embodies the properties that 
were used to simulate the networks. 
 Creating an ERGM simulation requires four steps. The first step is to theorize which 
characteristics describe the observed network. The next step is to run the model and check the 
Goodness of Fit statistics, which indicate how well the observed network falls within the 
confidence intervals of the simulated networks on several baseline diagnostics. The next step is 
to adjust the network characteristics included in the model until the observed network falls 
within the confidence intervals of the simulated networks as well as possible. If the model can be 
fit, the summary shows which factors are significant via coefficients for each parameter that 
express how much the conditional log odds of a tie being formed are changed by a one unit 
change in that parameter. 
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Results 
The graph of the network in Figure 1 (shown below) supports Hypothesis 1 in that it presents 
evidence of cross-national policy diffusion between a wide variety of states. Of the 231 ties in 
this network, forty of them are between states in different countries, a cross-national edge 
proportion of seventeen percent. A quarter of the cross-national ties are from other countries 
going into the United States. This implies that there is a meaningful population of potential edges 
leading from foreign states to the United States, even though the U.S. states are policy leaders in 
many areas. If policy adoptions in each country occurred at random or only between states in the 
same country and without influence from abroad, the network would show three isolated 
networks for the Australian, Canadian, and U.S. states and provinces.  
Instead, the graph shows that states and provinces from all three countries are entwined 
with each other. This suggests that some policy adoption sequences are nonrandom and that 
some relationships may be particularly noteworthy. For example, the locations of the Australian 
states permeate furthest into the center of the network. They start with the Northern Territory on 
the periphery and lead all the way in to South Australia, which is quite central to the network and 
which ties to six foreign states. Canadian provinces, though not integrated as thoroughly as 
Australian states, are still tied to many foreign states. In total, approximately half of all 
Australian and Canadian state edges are with states in other countries.  
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Figure 1: 55-Policy Network (All States and Provinces) 
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Although it is possible that these characteristics of the network could be generated due to 
the policies or jurisdictions selected, this does not seem likely. It would be difficult for any one 
unusual policy or policy category to overwhelm the effect of the multiple other policies and 
policy categories included. As referenced in discussion of possible biases that the dataset may 
contain, Desmarais et al. 2015 found that patterns of diffusion were not sensitive to the policies 
chosen for inclusion. The in-country linkages within the network look like what would be 
predicted in the policy diffusion literature, with wealthy and innovative states known to be policy 
drivers (such as Massachusetts, California, New South Wales, South Australia, and Ontario) 
closer to the center and more interconnected with states or provinces from that country. Testing a 
subset of 35 policies drawn at random yielded comparable network structure, characteristics, and 
ERGM results. These points suggest that the results are not likely being driven by any specific 
policy or subset of policies. The network thus displays preliminary evidence for the hypothesis 
that systematic cross-national policy diffusion occurs between states in different countries. 
Examining the density (proportion of ties out of total possible ties) alleviates concern that 
NetInf will not have enough data to compute a network. The dataset has a density of 4.8%, which 
implies that only about 5% of the maximum number of policy adoptions would be needed for 
NetInf to work properly. That translates to about 1,000 policy adoptions. Since there are 2,344 
policy adoptions in the dataset, NetInf has sufficient data to return a network.  
Reciprocity is low: only four edges display it. This indicates that actors do not frequently 
learn from those who have reached out to them, but rather that some states consistently lead, and 
others learn from those leaders. Patterns of states learning from each other in a reciprocal fashion 
are still possible but are not repeated often enough to support the prediction that it is a primary 
learning mechanism. This conclusion from observing the data is sufficient evidence to reject 
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Hypothesis 4 (the interdependence hypothesis of reciprocity) since including a term for 
reciprocity in an ERGM simulation would not likely produce a model that exhibits so little of it. 
Table 2 reveals patterns of cross-national leaders and followers among the three 
countries. The first column, Number of Edges, indicates the number of connections in the 
network that emanate from states and provinces in one country to states or provinces in either of 
the other two countries. For example, twenty-eight connections emanate outward from 
Australian states in the network.  
Table 2: Tie Statistics 
 Number of 
Edges 
Percent of total 
edges (231 edges) 
Percent of cross-national 
edges (40 edges) 
Percent of country 
dataset (28 edges) 
AUS to Aus 12 12/231 = 5.2% NA 12/28 = 43% 
AUS to Can 6 6/231 = 2.6% 6/40 = 15% 6/28 = 21% 
AUS to USA 10 10/231 = 4.3$ 10/40 = 25% 10/28 = 36% 
AUS TOTAL 28 28/231 = 12.1% 16/40 = 40% 100% 
 Number of 
edges 
Percent of total 
edges (231 edges) 
Percent of cross-national 
edges (40 edges) 
Percent of country 
dataset (20 edges) 
CAN to Can 16 16/231 = 7.4% NA 16/20 = 80% 
CAN to Aus 3 3/231 = 1.3% 3/40 = 7.5% 3/20 = 15% 
CAN to USA 1 1/231 = 0.4% 1/40 = 2.5% 1/20 = 5% 
CAN TOTAL 20 20/231 = 9.0% 4/40 = 10% 100% 
 Number of 
edges 
Percent of total 
edges (231 edges) 
Percent of cross-national 
edges (40 edges) 
Percent of country 
dataset (183 edges) 
USA to USA 163 163/231 = 70.1% NA 163/183 = 89% 
USA to Aus 8 8/231 = 3.5% 8/40 = 20% 8/183 = 4.4% 
USA to Can 12 12/231 = 5.2% 12/40 = 30% 12/183 = 6.6% 
USA TOTAL 183 183/231 = 79.2% 20/40 = 50% 100% 
Grand Total 231 99.9% 100% NA 
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Twelve of them are same-country connections from one Australian state to another (for 
example, Queensland to Victoria), ten of them project out from Australian states to U.S. states 
(representing instances where a U.S. state may be observing an Australian state), and six of them 
lead from Australian states to Canadian provinces. All together, Australian states project twenty-
eight outbound ties, twelve of which are between themselves and sixteen of which are with states 
and provinces in other countries. Looking further down the column shows that Australian states 
are also the recipients of ties from three Canadian provinces and eight U.S. states, for a total of 
thirty-nine ties in the network. 
The following column (Percent of Total Edges) indicates that twelve percent of outbound 
linkages emanate from Australian states, nine percent from Canadian provinces, and seventy-
nine percent from U.S. states. As mentioned above, it is possible that the fact that no legislation 
regarding topics relevant only in parliamentary governments is included in the dataset may be 
artificially deflating the number of outbound ties from Australian states and Canadian provinces. 
However, dividing these totals by the number of states or provinces in each country reveals that 
Australian states actually have slightly more ties per state (four) than either U.S. states (3.66 per 
state) or Canadian provinces (1.5 ties per province). These totals suggest that Australian states 
and U.S. states are comparable in terms of average outbound ties, i.e., the number of 
circumstances where a state may be observed by other states in the policy formation process.   
Looking at the third column (Percent of Cross-National Edges) indicates that forty 
percent of the cross-national ties in the network emanate from Australian states, ten percent from 
Canadian provinces, and fifty percent from U.S. states. It also indicates that Australian states and 
U.S. states are each recipients of about 27.5% of cross-national ties, while the Canadian 
provinces are recipients of about forty-five percent of ties. By this indication, Australian states 
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and U.S. states tend to be observed frequently and may sometimes look abroad as well. On the 
other hand, Canadian provinces do not seem to be studied very often but seem to observe what is 
happening abroad more often. This provides empirical support for the finding in Rabe 1999 that 
Canadian provincial bureaucracy stifles policy entrepreneurialism.  
It is interesting that three of the four Canadian-province-led ties lead to states in 
Australia, not states in the United States. In fact, the only Canadian-to-U.S. tie was British 
Columbia to Utah. This implies that U.S. state lawmakers do not look as often to Canadian 
provinces as they do to other sources, perhaps because the Canadian constitution limits what 
provinces can legislate on to far fewer policy topics than for which the U.S. state governments 
are authorized to legislate.34 The final column suggests that the U.S. states and Canadian 
provinces are similar in that the majority of their outbound ties are to same-country states and 
provinces. However, only forty-three percent of Australian states’ outbound ties are to states in 
the same country. Overall, these findings suggest that U.S. states are both frequently observed 
and also look abroad on a regular but limited basis, that Canadian provinces look abroad more 
often but are little studied by others, and that Australian states both look abroad rather frequently 
and also may be observed more often than the Canadian provinces.  
The dataset has thirty-eight states that have a cross-national edge. Figure 2 extracts these 
connections out of the overall network to make them more visible without the same-country ties 
that make examination more difficult. The network illustrates policy diffusion patterns radiating 
outward from a few wealthier, more innovative central actors like California and New South 
Wales, to several provinces and states like the Northwest Territories and Kentucky that have 
smaller governments and tend to be less wealthy. Essentially, a few leaders form a core inner  
 
34 For example, Canadian states do not legislate on criminal code issues, but this represents a significant volume of 
legislation for Australian and U.S. states. 
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Figure 2: 55-Policy Dataset (Cross National Ties Only) 
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network and are surrounded by smaller states who seem to be looking to policy leaders for 
solutions. The central ring of leaders connected to each other provides support for the finding in 
Shipan and Volden 2014 that policymakers in larger states are better equipped to learn from 
other states. However, the linkages of smaller states also offer support for Hypothesis 2: that 
actors in small states likely observe larger states for policy ideas. Policymakers in smaller states 
may indeed be able to identify foreign leaders in a particular policy area and benchmark the 
foreign policy against that of local leaders and use it in addition to that of advice from local 
leaders. One example of this is Nevada, a state with a citizen legislature that meets biannually 
and with a GDP that places it 32nd out of 50 U.S. states35 choosing to partner with Queensland to 
improve in policy areas such as water management, mining and extraction, and best practices for 
dry climates. (Trade and Investment Queensland) Globalization and the reduced costs of internet 
research and remote communication have likely played a significant role in this. 
As in the all-state dataset, this graph displays very low reciprocity. This suggests that 
policy leaders focus on producing their own work, and a positive externality from this is that 
they give actors in smaller states models that are more innovative or comprehensive than what 
they might produce on their own. Lawmakers in smaller states that might not have the resources 
to research and develop their own policy therefore have an incentive to study what both local and 
foreign leaders are doing. Actors in large states also appear to observe other large states, but not 
in a manner indicating great reciprocity due to the lack of two-way relationships (denoted by 
linkages with arrowheads on both ends). This indicates that policymakers study each other for 
different policies over time as the need arises, but that legislators reaching out for advice on one 
topic do not increase the likelihood that legislators in the observed state will reach out to the 
 
35 2019 current dollars. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
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borrowing state in the future to ask questions on a different subject. One possible explanation for 
this is that it is much harder to build reciprocity between foreign counterparts in legislatures, 
which are composed of many actors, than it is for reciprocity to form in executive branch 
relationships between just two actors and which can be sustained for many years, such as the 
rapports established between several U.S. state governors and Canadian province premiers. 
(Rutan 1981, Boyd 2017)   
One way to probe this explanation in more depth would be to test whether reciprocity is 
greater in networks of policy diffusion between executive branches of states in different 
countries, as premiers and governors are often in office for much longer than legislators and this 
may foster the development of reciprocal connections. Rutan 1981 notes that collaboration 
between the state of Washington and the province of British Columbia tends to wax and wane 
with the strength of the relationship between the state’s governor and the province’s premier. 
Comparing levels of reciprocity in networks of cross-national legislature policy adoptions to 
cross-national executive branch policy adoptions would shed more light on this assessment.  
I next run ERGM models to test Hypothesis 3, that actors with more ties (representing 
more diffusion connections) are more likely to incur ties than actors who do not have ties. 
Following the steps outlined at the end of the Methods section, the model includes variables 
accounting for Sharing a Border, being in the Same Country, the number of incoming ties (called 
In-Degree), Out-Degree (the number of outgoing ties, i.e., instances in which a state is 
potentially a model under observation by another state), and Edgewise Shared Partners (a 
measure of transitivity, i.e., the extent to which state A, after forming a tie with state B, is likely 
to form ties with all of the states that state B has ties with). The last three variables are 
geometrically weighted to make sure that outliers do not skew results.  
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I expect Sharing a Border and being in the Same Country to both be positive, as they 
relate to geography, which is still an important facilitator of policy diffusion. However, I also 
expect the network interdependency variables to be significant to represent how actors influence 
other actors, and that this in turn affects who is likely to practice cross-national policy diffusion. 
I predict that the coefficient on geometrically weighted In-Degree will be positive, to represent 
that the likelihood of adding an additional diffusion tie increases based on the number of 
diffusion ties a state already possesses. I add Out-Degree (the number of outgoing ties) and 
geometrically weighted Edgewise Shared Partners (the number of mutual connections that exist 
for any two actors sharing a tie) to improve model accuracy, but do not generate specific 
hypotheses for them. I run simulations for both the all-edge dataset and the cross-national-only 
dataset.  
Reviewing the Goodness of Fit statistics before examining the model results reveals that 
the statistics are satisfactory, with the line representing both observed networks falling within the 
confidence intervals for the simulated networks.  This means that the variables theorized to be 
important in forming these networks are indeed likely to be present. The charts of the Goodness 
of Fit statistics for both models are included in Appendix I.  
Inspecting the results of the ERGMs in Table 3  yields support for theories of actor 
interdependence. Geometrically Weighted In-Degree is highly significant in the 55-policy 
dataset, thus providing support for Hypothesis 3. The positive sign on the coefficient indicates 
that the probability of garnering an additional inbound tie increases with the number of incoming 
ties already possessed by a state.  
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Table 3: Exponential Random Graph Modeling (ERGM) Results 
 
In terms of policy diffusion, this implies that each diffusion connection possessed by a 
state increases the likelihood of it forming an additional connection.36 The inbound nature of the 
ties is important because it represents the active side of policy diffusion where lawmakers in a 
state going study the policy of another state, thereby creating an “inbound” connection from a 
foreign state back to the home state. Lawmakers in the home state must actively search for, and 
bring in policy, whereas actors in the state they adopt from can be completely passive in (or even 
unaware of) the transaction of being observed and studied. This may explain why Geometrically 
Weighted Out-Degree is significant but negative for both models. In policy terms, this suggests 
that, while state policymakers actively raise their In-Degree “score” by seeking more examples 
from abroad, it is rarer for these actors to actively promote their policies to be emulated by other 
legislatures.37 It also indicates that state legislatures that borrow policy do not necessarily share 
 
36 See Appendix IV for additional discussion and interpretation of the concept of In Degree. 
37 Isolated instances exist of states working to export their policies, such as Quebec promoting its inclusion in 
French language books in American universities and Germany and German states working to spread their renewable 
energy policy (Chapelle 2014, and Steinbacher 2018). However, exporting policies is still not common between sub-
national governments like states and provinces. 
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their findings with other states, as doing so would presumably increase the number of emulators 
and outbound ties. Learning about the best practices of states in other countries may still be a 
rather solitary process. Even if policymakers in one state wanted to share their success with 
looking abroad, the lack of forums that share cross-national information compared to the number 
of comparable sources for sharing domestic-only best practices suggests that any information 
publicized about such successes would be scattered and decentralized. 
The positive term on Edgewise Shared Partners in the 55-policy dataset means that a 
state is more likely to form a tie with another state, the more ties that it has in common with 
other states. This is an alternate measurement for clustering or transitivity, and the fact that it is 
significant provides support for the assertion that there is more transitivity than can just be 
explained by the exogenous attributes of sharing a border and being in the same country. It does 
not have a large effect, perhaps because the overall measure of transitivity for these two 
networks was lower than the levels of transitivity often associated with social networks. It drops 
out all together in the model of only cross-national ties. 
The exogenous attribute variables provide additional insight into cross-national diffusion. 
Edges is an intercept term that represents the density of the network and indicates that the 
conditional log odds of any tie existing in the network is -2.614 for the 55-policy dataset. It 
means that the probability of a tie between any two actors is quite low, given the proportion of 
actual ties that exist (fewer than 5%) out of the large number of potential ties is also quite low. In 
the 55-policy model, the country of each state in a potential dyad was not significant, but 
whether they share a border is significant. This fits the expectation that geography explains some 
of the variation in observed policy diffusion. The negative sign represents the characteristic that 
the majority of edges are between states that do not share a border – thirty out of 231 edges are 
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between contiguous states, or approximately 13%. This is comparable to the original finding in 
Desmarais et al. 2015, who found that between 10-20% of the ties in their networks were 
between states that shared a border. Therefore, although sharing a border is a significant factor, 
this finding supports the conclusion that state policymakers are clearly looking beyond local 
borders in their policy adoption patterns. 
The model built exclusively of cross-national ties enables a test of the hypotheses for 
which there is no risk that connections between states in the same country are driving the results. 
Same-country ties account for eighty-three percent of the connections in the full network. 
Although the network of cross-national-only ties is very small and therefore loses precision, it 
provides a useful robustness check to ascertain whether the findings in Model 1 can be 
generalized to cross-national policy diffusion. For the model built exclusively of cross-national 
ties, Country and variables relating to Edgewise Shared Partners were dropped because they no 
longer aid model convergence. The findings for Out-Degree and Edges hold, but the coefficient 
for Borders is no longer significant. This is not surprising given that the dataset is composed 
expressly of cross-national ties. In-Degree is no longer quite statistically significant but is still 
positive. Forty cross-national ties probably do not give enough opportunity for In-Degree 
patterns to present, but a larger dataset would likely reveal a similar In-Degree pattern among 
purely cross-national ties as among the complete dataset.            
Conclusion 
This chapter investigates the reasons that prompt state policymakers to look at policy 
examples in foreign state legislatures and theorizes about the patterns by which such diffusion is 
likely to occur. Approximately seventeen percent of ties formed in the policy adoption networks 
in this study were between states in different countries. This supports Hypothesis 1: that cross-
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national diffusion occurs between states and provinces of many types. About half of those ties 
went from the U.S. states to abroad, and about a quarter came from abroad to the U.S. states, 
with the final quarter flowing between Australia and Canada. Instead of the networks of the three 
countries’ diffusion patterns being entirely isolated, they were interwoven in a way that suggests 
that policymakers from states in all three countries learn from each other. Although the algorithm 
cannot prove that ties between states represent instances of diffusion where legislators were 
specifically contacting legislators in other countries to learn from them, the ties produced 
represent policy adoption patterns between states that persist over time, and which would be 
unusual if there were absolutely no observation at all between states.  
Studying the network composed solely of cross-national ties reveals support for 
Hypothesis 2, that small states are likely to form attachments to large states that are policy 
drivers. The network displayed a pattern of leading policy generators forming a core, and policy 
observers creating a periphery. Testing the full network and the cross-national-only networks for 
actor interdependence generate results that provide preliminary support Hypothesis 3: having 
more inbound policy ties increases the likelihood of securing future inbound ties, i.e., adoptions 
of policies of states in other jurisdictions.  Lastly, no support was found for Hypothesis 4, that 
states form reciprocal ties on a regular basis. This indicates that perhaps state lawmakers seek 
outside influence on a regular basis but are not inclined to specifically observe policies from a 
foreign state whose policymakers have reached out to, or learned from, them in the past.  
This chapter finds patterns indicative of cross-national diffusion at a 95% confidence 
level, and that further examination of cross-national sub-federal policy diffusion is warranted to 
better understand the mechanisms associated with increased or decreased likelihood of its 
occurrence. This study and further studies using these methods would contribute to the network 
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analysis and policy diffusion literatures because cross-national sub-national learning is one of the 
least-studied circumstances where diffusion occurs, and better understanding of the 
characteristics of interdependency that promote cross-national diffusion may improve scholarly 
understanding of how lawmakers decide which peers to study when formulating policy. This 
chapter makes a first attempt at answering this question and provides evidence that, although 
globalization itself might not cause cross-national policy diffusion, the two likely coincide 
strongly. The cost of learning from others who are far away has dropped, both because 
information is more available and because it is easier to communicate electronically and in 
person. Access to the internet, cloud computing, metadata analytics,38 and advanced 
communication platforms have all enabled legislators to efficiently learn about which policies 
around the world are successful. 
Though raising many additional questions, the results begin to suggest how policies 
might be borrowed across international borders. Wealthier, more innovative leader states from all 
three countries tend to be at the center of the network, which suggests that the cross-national 
network of policy diffusion follows a similar pattern of looking to leaders for policy ideas that 
was tested on only U.S. states in Boehmke et al. 2017. Leader states may drive the majority of 
generalized policy diffusion that covers a wide range of topics germane to all sub-national 
jurisdictions, such as emergency response legislation, education reform, senior citizen care, etc.  
At the same time, connections between leader and non-leader are evident, as well as 
connections between multiple smaller states that presumably arise on policy topics of interest 
specifically to the states and provinces with those connections. For example, linkages in the 
 
38 For example, the 2013 Enterprise Information Management System instituted in the state of Michigan required all 
agencies to share their data to “enhance services to residents and agencies…[in order] to improve statewide 
outcomes overall.” (PEW 2018) Streamlining data in this way can accelerate the sharing of best practices across 
departments and, ultimately, across jurisdictions. 
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network between Louisiana, the Northern Territory, and the Northwest Territories may represent 
familiarity that has arisen over time due to the oil and extraction industries that form a significant 
part of the economy in each of these states and provinces. Sister State Agreements provide 
another example of an institution that might facilitate this type of same-profile cross-national 
diffusion, as states often partner with states that they are similar to in some aspect.39 Taken 
together, the prevalence of the more innovative leader states at the center of a network of both 
large and small states, as well as smaller offshoots of the network that show some connections 
between smaller states suggest that cross-national diffusion may be driven in part by wealthier 
states with more cross-national connections, and also in part by states of all sizes seeking out 
states in other countries who share a similar economic or geographic profile and who may 
therefore be a useful contact for a specific policy area. Future studies can work to investigate 
further the conditions under which one or both of these drivers may influence policy diffusion 
outcomes.  
This chapter conducts one of the first studies of the network interdependencies of state-
level governance. This is valuable because diffusion is an example of actor interdependence 
where the decisions of one actor are influenced by another, and this seems to characterize 
policymaking in many situations. For example, an article from Governing Magazine noted that  
“For the most part, states are pretty strategic about where they seek trade 
deals and where they send their governors… They keep digging in places where 
they’ve made connections in the past. If a state has already landed a major 
 
39 In addition to the example of Nevada and Queensland mentioned earlier, other examples including Alabama (27th 
out of 50 in terms of U.S. state GDP in 2017) partnering with Brandenburg, Germany (11 th out of 16 in terms of 
German Land GRP), (German Federal Statistical Office) and Vermont partnering with the prefecture of Tottori, 
Japan, which is described as “a fairly rural, mountainous coastal district…with roughly the same population as 
Vermont.” (WPTZ Burlington) 
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company from South Korea, for instance, it makes sense to go after more Korean 
companies. There can be network effects, with other suppliers or other companies 
from the same sector deciding to tag along. Once a company is established and 
enjoys success in a state, it might vouch for that state back home… Building up 
existing networks makes more sense for economic development directors than 
trying to tap into whatever country or region seems hot at a given moment [even 
though]...That’s not to say that state officials don’t look for new opportunities.” 
(Greenblatt 2018) 
This excerpt indicates that states from an interdependent network when pursuing trade 
deals, and such behavior likely extends to other areas of policymaking as well. Network analysis 
is specifically designed to test for the presence of interdependencies such as these among states 
or state legislatures. It therefore offers a promising opportunity to learn more about the behaviors 
and interdependencies of state legislators between themselves and with respect to other 
governments both at home and abroad. Further research could also investigate the specific effects 
of globalization on cross-national policy diffusion, including the change in diffusion patterns 
over time and the effect of technology and professional organizations on diffusion rates. Lastly, 
these findings indicate previously unconsidered resourcefulness of state legislators in crafting 
policy. In the service of their constituents, legislators are, perhaps, even more creative, and 
diligent, at discovering solutions than previously understood. This suggests that a prudent 
direction for Chapter III is to begin an investigation into some of the institutional features in 
state-level governments that promote or hinder the efforts of legislators to learn about policy 
options in states and provinces abroad.  
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CHAPTER III 
Term Limits, Legislative Institutions, and Cross-National Policy Diffusion 
 
 
Abstract 
Term-limited state legislators are incentivized to pass legislation that will make them 
competitive for careers after they leave the legislature. (Lewis 2012) However, term-limited 
legislators are also at greater risk than their non-term-limited counterparts of proposing 
legislation that will not pass due to either a) duplicating other proposals or b) being poorly 
written. (Kousser 2005) I theorize that this motivates term-limited legislators to look abroad for 
policies because policies from states in other countries have a higher chance of being novel 
(decreasing the risk of proposal failure from duplication), and provide a model for legislators 
who are inexperienced at drafting legislation to imitate. I hypothesize that the likelihood of 
passing legislation that originates in states in foreign countries increases when term limits are in 
place. I use generalized linear mixed models to test this on a dataset of twenty policies that 
originate in U.S. states, Canadian provinces, and Australian states. The results indicate that term 
limits are not a strong driver of cross-national policy adoption but that the proportion of foreign 
states that have already adopted the policy is positively associated with adoption in both term-
limited and non-term-limited states.  
 
 
 70 
 
International Sub-federal Policy Diffusion 
 The legislatures of the fifty states of the United States are avid producers, innovators, and 
borrowers of policy, and there is substantial research into how policy spreads between them. Yet 
the U.S. states also have a long history of adopting policies that originated beyond U.S. borders. 
For example, U.S. states adopted several policies in the 19th and early 20th centuries that 
originated in either Canadian provinces or Australian states, each of which continues to affect 
societal outcomes today, such as the Australian ballot system, workers compensation, and the 
merit system of appointment. It would be difficult to imagine a modern democratic system today 
that lacks these innovations.  
The phenomenon of U.S. states adopting policies from states in other countries continues 
into the current era. During the twentieth century, the first state lotteries appeared in Australian 
states several decades before appearing in American states. (Australian Gambling Report) 
Australian state parliaments also led the way at the state level in the 1970s with mandatory 
seatbelt laws. (Conybeare 1980) This policy spread to Canadian provinces and European 
countries before becoming widespread in the United States. Alberta was the first province or 
state in Australia, Canada, or the United States to deregulate their electricity market, and was 
soon followed by several U.S. states. (“Energy Deregulation in Alberta”) These examples 
indicate that policy proliferation at the sub-national level occurs internationally and may even 
occur by both learning and emulation rather than mere simultaneous yet independent adoption.40  
 
40 For instance, a potential example of emulation is that most of the laws requiring mandatory bicycle helmets for 
minors were passed in the United States within three years of each other and within five years of the first states in 
Australia to adopt the policy, suggesting that some states may have adopted based on an ideological stance or a 
desire to emulate other states rather than based a substantial amount of published research on the primary effects of 
the law (whether or not helmets reduced injuries and fatalities), as well as its secondary effects (whether it also 
reduced the number of children who rode bicycles at all). 
 71 
 
What internal factors make a state in the United States more likely to adopt policy from a 
state in a different country? In this chapter I theorize that term limits are an institutional feature 
of some U.S. states that encourage legislators to adopt foreign policies through reducing 
legislator experience and increasing motivation to pass unique policies that are pre-formatted and 
which have the best chance of being noteworthy to the public. Relying on policy ideas from 
states and provinces in other countries should eventually result in increased volumes of policies 
adopted from foreign jurisdictions as inexperienced legislators gain seniority when term limits 
force more senior policymakers to leave. Using a generalized linear mixed model that includes 
both state and policy random effects, I explore facets of this theory by testing how policy origin 
source and proportion of foreign adopters are associated with the likelihood of passing a policy 
that originated in a foreign country. The results provide only partial support for the theory that 
term-limited state legislatures pass foreign-origin policy more than their non-term-limited 
counterparts and also suggest that both term-limited and non-term-limited legislatures have a 
higher likelihood of adopting a policy of foreign origin as the proportion of foreign states that 
have adopted the policy increases. These findings suggest that effect of term limits may differ in 
the same-country and cross-national diffusion processes and provide guidance in helping to 
refine the list of plausible mechanisms for cross-national policy diffusion at the state level. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In Section Two I explore the causal mechanism 
theorized to drive legislators in term-limited states to investigate and propose legislation based 
on policies that originate in foreign countries. I then theorize how increased incentives for 
observing policy from states in foreign countries at the legislator level might aggregate up to 
changes in legislative outcomes at the state level. In Sections Three and Four I lay out the data 
and the model. Section Five presents the results of several generalized linear mixed models that 
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test the hypotheses and examine predicted probabilities. In Section Six I conclude with policy 
implications and suggestions for further research. 
The Effect of Term Limits on Legislator Incentives and Cross-National Sub-National 
Policy Diffusion 
 Between 1990 to 1996, twenty-one states voted by referendum to enact limits on the 
length of terms that state legislators could serve. Fifteen states still have term limits as of 2019, 
with most of the limits going into effect between 1996 and 2002. (NCSL) Not all term limits are 
equally severe. Representatives in Michigan undergo a lifetime ban on service after six years in 
the House and eight years in the Senate. But legislators in Louisiana may return to either the 
house or legislature as often as desired so long as they observe a two-year break between 
campaigns. Six states have lifetime bans like Michigan, and nine states have consecutive bans 
like Louisiana. Appendix V presents a map of states that have enacted lifetime and consecutive 
bans, as well as states that have repealed term limits. (PEW 2016)  
Studies show that term limits change the incentives of legislators who operate under their 
purview. Fenno 1973 observes that legislators are generally driven by three priorities: to keep 
office, to gain power within the legislature, and to affect policy. Term limits shift the operating 
procedures of the legislature and alter the incentive for legislators to pursue these priorities. First, 
term limits reduce or eliminate the possibility of keeping a legislative seat for more than a few 
terms. This reduces the incentive to devote resources to re-election activities and increases 
incentive to devote resources to activities that will ensure the legislator can get a good job after 
being required to leave office. (Swift and VanderMolen 2016, (201)) Scholars point to the ability 
to pass legislation as one of the clearest ways that legislators claim successes that may help them 
land a good job after exiting the legislature. (Kousser 2005, Miller et al. 2018) Thus, term limits 
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affect legislator behavior by increasing the incentive to pass legislation they can point to in 
subsequent career searches.  
Term limits also increase legislator incentive to gain power within the legislature for two 
reasons. The first is that term limits make it easier for incoming members to gain power because 
they increase the chance for any single legislator to gain power because leaders are required to 
leave office after a relatively short amount of time instead of becoming entrenched at the top.41 
Mandated turnover provides opportunities for junior legislators to gain power quickly and pass 
more legislation, which will be helpful in subsequent career searches. The second way that they 
increase incentive to gain power within the legislature is that a legislator’s ability to pass 
legislation improves if he or she has a more powerful position in the legislature which, as 
mentioned in the previous paragraph, assists with subsequent career searches. Kousser 2005 
(147) finds that leaders in the majority party passed two more bills per session on average than 
they did before term limits, but the success rates of junior members in the minority party 
decreased by 1.6 bills per session.  
 Term limits therefore primarily mediate the incentives of legislators by increasing the 
benefits of passing legislation and gaining power within the legislature. However, while term 
limits increase these incentives, they simultaneously reduce the capacity of legislators to 
accomplish these objectives. Kousser 2005 finds that the volume of bills proposed has increased 
in term-limited legislatures, but the proportion of bills passed annually has not changed. He notes 
that veteran staffers theorize that this dynamic arises due to inexperienced legislators proposing 
 
41 Indeed, Kousser 2005 (33) explains that removing entrenched leaders was the primary impetus that galvanized the 
term limits movement, noting that California Assembly Speaker Wille Brown “provided much of the political 
ammunition behind the push for term limits in 1990. Brown had led the lower house for a decade by that time and 
had grown so powerful that he once referred to himself as the ‘Ayatollah of the Assemblies.’ Yet Brown’s strong-
arm tactics, his links to rich interest groups, and the growing atmosphere of partisanship in his assembly made the 
house vulnerable to a reform initiative. ‘The real progeny,’ Republican political consultant Tony Quinn said of 
Brown’s reign, ‘was term limits.’” 
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the same policies as other members of their cohort. This leads to many more duplicate bills dying 
before reaching a vote. Sarbaugh-Thompson et al. 2006 supports this conclusion with a finding 
that term limits foster conditions that increase the risk of duplication because term-limited 
legislators come to rely on narrower, more partisan networks once entering the legislature. This 
reduces legislator knowledge of activities outside of their network and puts them at risk of 
proposing legislation that is already being prepared by fellow legislators in different circles. 
Another possible explanation is that the constant influx of new and inexperienced legislators 
means that many of the bills proposed are badly written and are eliminated during the legislative 
process due to poor craftsmanship. 
I theorize that term-limited legislators look abroad for policy ideas to overcome the two 
obstacles they face to passing more legislation and gaining power within the legislature. The 
shift induced by term limits toward gaining power and passing laws incentivizes legislators to 
look abroad for policy ideas more often than they would otherwise for three reasons. The first 
reason is that looking abroad for policy ideas decreases the risk of proposal failure through 
duplication by providing a source of novel and unique policy ideas. Legislation from states and 
provinces in other countries may reflect different norms, traditions, and problem-solving 
approaches to policy topics of interest. A legislator may have a better chance of standing out and 
getting legislation passed if he or she proposes a policy that may be common elsewhere but 
which is novel in the United States and not likely to be at risk of duplication. Even if every term-
limited legislator looks abroad there will be plenty of sources of policy inspiration and therefore 
risk of duplication is still much lower than previously.  
Getting legislation passed in turn gives the legislation sponsor a better chance of 
garnering recognition in the legislature, which may lead to a better position within the legislature 
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and an improved opportunity of securing a desired career after leaving legislative office. 
Strategic legislators may be aware of the unique challenges they face from term limits for their 
chances of passing legislation and may actively seek ways to alleviate this disadvantage. 
Looking abroad for novel policy ideas is one such way to do this. By looking for policy ideas in 
places where few others look, a legislator can reduce the likelihood that someone else will 
propose the same piece of legislation. Although some policies of foreign origin may only be 
relevant to their jurisdiction, states and provinces in other countries have a history of passing 
legislation that is both applicable in U.S. states and which may also be considered novel and 
innovative. A foreign jurisdiction may therefore provide a useful cache of policy ideas from 
which to draw on. 
The second way that looking abroad for policy may increase a legislator’s chance of 
success is that policies of foreign origin provide a source of pre-formatted legislation that saves 
inexperienced legislators from crafting completely new policy. Lewis 2012 notes that legislators 
under term limits are less experienced with legislative procedures. While foreign-origin 
legislation will need some adjustment to be applicable and consistent with the laws of the 
legislator’s state, it also has the advantage of already being crafted such that all of the core ideas 
important to the success of the policy are theoretically in place. An inexperienced legislator may 
find this preferable to drafting a completely new legislation or looking to a neighboring state. 
To summarize, term limits shift motivations for state legislators to focus more heavily on 
finding a good career after they are termed out of office, which in turn increases their incentive 
to pass policy and gain power in the legislature. These shifting incentives caused by the 
imposition of term limits are likely to alter behavior of the comparatively less experienced 
legislators in term-limited states to search for novel and pre-formatted legislation with a higher 
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chance of passage in order to gain power in the legislature and garner legislative victories that 
can be used in subsequent career searches. Lastly, term-limited legislators are more policy-driven 
than non-term-limited legislators. (Sarbaugh-Thompson et al. 2006) Herrick and Thomas 2006 
find that “term-limited legislators were less likely than their counterparts to run for office for 
personal goals and more likely to be motivated by issues.” Taken together, these shifting 
incentives generate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood of adopting a policy that originated in a foreign state or 
province increases in states with term limits.  
 The ways in which term limits are theorized to alter legislator incentives to borrow 
foreign legislation also have important ramifications for legislator incentives to not just borrow 
but learn from states passing policies in foreign countries. On the one hand, an increased 
motivation to affect policy should increase the incentive to learn about how well or poorly that 
policy is doing in states that have already passed it, i.e., foreign states. Yet the drive to quickly 
find and pass unique legislation decreases incentive to wait and learn from it. Term-limited 
legislators are more rewarded for quickly passing legislation than for waiting to learn from other 
states where the policy has passed, as waiting to learn more would likely reduce the amount of 
legislation they are able to pass in their career. (Miller et al. 2018) This motivation serves to 
decrease incentive to learn about these policies as they are being passed in other jurisdictions in 
favor of simply locating a policy and taking it home as quickly as possible. 
The change in legislator incentives to seek out and propose foreign legislation after term 
limits are enacted provides the basis for an additional hypothesis about how term limits are 
associated with opportunities to learn about policy. Term-limited legislator incentives to find 
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unique policy and pass it as quickly as possible decrease the incentive to wait long amounts of 
time to learn about policy success. When aggregated up to the state level, this should result in 
term-limited state legislatures passing policies from foreign jurisdictions when fewer foreign 
jurisdictions have passed it, compared to non-term-limited states. This idea is captured in 
Hypothesis 2:  
Hypothesis 2: Term-limited legislatures should pass policies of foreign origin sooner 
than non-term-limited legislatures, leading to an inverse relationship between term limits and 
the proportion of foreign states that have adopted the policy of foreign origin. 
This does not mean that term limits should increase the overall volume of legislation; 
Kousser 2005 notes that term limits are not associated with a change in the volume of legislation 
passed. However, the mediating effect of term limits on legislator behavior should increase the 
passage rate of bills inspired by foreign states. The relative inexperience that legislators who 
examine foreign-origin policy when crafting bills means that the proportion of foreign-inspired 
legislation probably will not increase immediately. Over time however, legislators relying on 
foreign-origin policies may find them more novel and durable to scrutiny, and therefore less 
likely to be culled due to duplication or poor craftsmanship. Legislators should come to rely on 
foreign-origin policies more often as a source of inspiration as they find success with foreign-
origin policies and gain seniority in the legislature. This would result in both a higher proportion, 
and higher absolute volume of passed legislation coming from states in foreign countries.  
To summarize, term limits decrease legislator efforts to keep office beyond the legislated 
limit, increase their motivation to gain power within the legislature, and are associated with 
changing the composition of legislatures to include a higher proportion of legislators who are 
 78 
 
more policy-driven than their predecessors. The shifting priorities of legislators resulting from 
term limits increase motivation, particularly among junior members and members in the minority 
party, to look for policy from states in other countries in order to find pre-written legislation that 
is less likely to be duplicative than widely circulated domestic policy ideas. This increases a 
legislator’s chance of having their bill passed, which bolsters their opportunity to gain power 
within the legislature and pursue a successful career after being termed out. These changed 
incentives should translate into a higher likelihood of passing policies of foreign origin when 
term limits are in place and a higher likelihood of passing policies of foreign origin when 
comparatively fewer foreign states and provinces have passed the policy.  
Data 
To test Hypothesis 1, I use a binomial indicator of whether a policy was Adopted in any 
year from 1979 to 2015 as the dependent variable. The data is comprised of ten policies 
originating in the United States, and ten policies originating in a state or province in either 
Australia or Canada. The years for each policy in the dataset begin at the first year the policy was 
adopted in a state or province. For each policy in each state, the range of years ends when the 
state chooses to adopt the policy. There are a total of 16,441 observations. Appendix VI provides 
brief descriptions of the policies, which were found in the Boehmke and Skinner 2012 dataset, 
and descriptive statistics are available in Appendix VII.  
The foreign-origin policies are policies where evidence suggests that the policy 
originated outside of the United States. These policies were not selected at random but rather 
extracted from the dataset of 188 policies used in Boehmke and Skinner 2012 which, although 
theorized by those authors to be a dataset that is broadly representative of state-level policy 
areas, may not be fully representative of all policies that originated in foreign states or provinces 
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and which were subsequently adopted by U.S. states. Specifically, they may only be the policies 
that are comparatively more widespread and therefore noticeable enough to be easily collected 
by researchers scouring U.S. state-level policy databases. There may be additional policies that 
originated in foreign jurisdictions but which were not widely adopted. An analysis based on 
policies that lawmakers proliferated the furthest may therefore underrepresent the true extent of 
cross-national policy diffusion and limit the extent to which inference can be made about the 
effect of term limits.  
Another dimension on which the selection of cases may be biased is the overall 
conservativeness or liberalness of policies from states in foreign jurisdictions. This may affect 
which U.S. states are likely to adopt these policies in addition to whether term limits are in place. 
Although data measuring the relative liberalness or conservativeness of state-level policies 
across international boundaries is scant, it may be the case that U.S. states are more predisposed 
to learn about the policy developments in foreign counterparts that share their ideology. As 
discussed in Chapter I, there are some examples of fairly liberal U.S. states electing into self-
governing state-level climate change agreements with other fairly liberal states.42 This would 
harm the ability to draw inferences from the analysis by creating the possibility that a policy’s 
political position drives whether a state will adopt it. It would thus be concerning if the policies 
of foreign origin in this dataset were written around topics with an extremely liberal or 
 
42 For example, states like California, Connecticut, and Maine are drawn into closer contact with left-leaning sub-
national jurisdictions in other countries through agreements such as the Declaration of the Federated States and 
Regional Governments on Climate Change, as mentioned in Chapter I. The first six states to pledge to uphold the 
Paris Climate Agreement standards were California, Connecticut, Minnesota, New York, Oregon, and Vermont, 
putting them in closer contact with more liberal states and countries abroad that are similarly committed to the 
Agreement. (Ecosystem Marketplace) Lastly, the majority of the ten states that currently participate in the Regional 
Greenhous Gas Initiative (RGGI) (Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont) vote predominantly for Democratic presidential candidates. 
Participating in or being an observer to RGGI likely fosters more communication with Canadian provinces Quebec, 
New Brunswick, and Ontario, which are Observers to the initiative. 
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conservative slant, such as stringent emissions targets or permissive resource extraction rights. 
However, none of the policies in the dataset are explicitly liberal or conservative in nature, and 
Chapter I also listed many examples of cross-national policy adoption that were nonpartisan. 
Therefore, although it will be important to assess the extent to which a state’s liberalness or 
conservativeness is associated with its likelihood of adopting a policy and control for policy 
random effects, it is expected that the political nature of policies of foreign origin will not 
compromise the analysis.  
The ten policies that originated in the United States were randomly drawn from a list of 
twenty-five policies listed in the Boehmke and Skinner 2012 dataset which proliferated in years 
for which covariate data was available. Like the foreign-origin policies, these data may also be 
biased from the perspective that the policies compiled by Boehmke and Skinner are not 
representative in some way.43 One possibility is that the proportion of foreign adoptions of the 
U.S.-origin policies is higher in the subset than in the twenty-five possible policies in the 
Boehmke and Skinner 2012 dataset.44 This means that the policies selected may overemphasize 
the number of foreign states to adopt policies by about one state on average, or three states at the 
median. However, it is also possible that these policies underrepresent the spread because policy 
adoption dates could not always be located. For example, evidence suggests that zero tolerance 
alcohol legislation exists in Manitoba, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, but because an official 
date could not be found, these observations are not counted in the dataset. (The Globe and Mail) 
As it is currently not possible to ascertain the direction of bias in foreign adoptions, care must be 
 
43 For example, political ideology, degree of proliferation, relevancy to foreign states and provinces, ease of finding 
them during research, etc. 
44 The average number of foreign states to adopt the ten policies in the dataset was 4.7, and the median was 4 (max 
13, min 0). The average number of foreign adoptions of the other 15 policies was 3.67, and the median was 1 (max 
20, min 0). 
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taken when assessing the external validity of the findings in this chapter. However, future studies 
will benefit from the ever-expanding state-level policy databases in development right now, such 
as the 700-policy dataset by Boehmke et al. 2018 that comes much closer to rendering a broad 
and representative sample of state-level legislation in a useable format.  
The independent variables are Term Limits, whether the policy is of Foreign Origin, the 
Proportion of Foreign Adopters, and the interactions of these variables. Data on Term Limits 
comes from the website of the National Conference of State Legislatures and measures when 
term limits first take effect. Sarbaugh-Thompson’s continuous variable for Term Limits is 
included as a robustness check, with higher values indicating higher proportions of turnover. 
Following Kousser’s expectations that term limits do not affect overall volume of bill passage, 
the Term Limits variable is not expected to be significant by itself. However, when interacted 
with Foreign, the coefficient is expected to be positive to increase the chances of policy 
adoption. 
Proportion of Foreign States Adopting is the proportion of all Canadian provinces and 
Australian states that have adopted a policy in a given year. Following the expectation outlined 
in Hypothesis 2, the interaction of Term Limits and Proportion of Foreign Adopters is expected 
to be negative. For non-term-limited states, the expectation is that this should be positive for 
policies of Foreign Origin, when studying policy outcomes in states in other countries is the best 
way to learn the effects of a policy. I do not expect it to be significant for policies of domestic 
origin, where Neighbors Adopting the Policy is more important.45  
Variables that might affect the outcome variable include Legislative Professionalism, 
proportion of Neighboring States Adopting, Citizen Ideology, and State Ideology. Squire’s 
 
45 It is worth noting that four term-limited states share a water or land border with Canada, a fact that may make 
legislators in those states more motivated to observe legislation in Canadian states and provinces. 
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measure of Legislative Professionalism is a proportion that ranges from 0 to 1 for each 
legislature in each year measuring to what extent a state legislature matches the professionalism 
of the U.S. federal Congress. (Squire 2007, Squire 2017, Mooney 1994) The expectation for 
Legislative Professionalism is that it will not be significant in the full dataset of policies, because 
I expect that all states will legislate in all policy areas regardless of professionalism level, and 
that Legislative Professionalism should not therefore be statistically associated with likelihood of 
passing a policy. Neighboring States Adopting is the proportion of states bordering the state 
under observation which have already adopted the policy for the year in question. It is expected 
that likelihood of adoption will be positively correlated with this variable, as geographic 
proximity is important in policy diffusion. (Nicholson-Crotty and Carley 2016) Citizen Ideology 
and State Ideology are originally measured on a scale of zero to one hundred, with zero being the 
most conservative and one hundred being the most liberal. (Berry et al. 1998) To make these 
numbers computationally tractable they are centered and scaled into standard deviations around 
zero.  
As discussed above it is important to control for these variables as a state’s ideology can 
affect the likelihood of its legislators passing policies that are particularly conservative or liberal. 
(Grossback and Peterson 2004) However, since the liberal and conservative degree of the 
policies in this dataset is not quantified, there is no ex ante expectation as to the direction of the 
variables of Citizen Ideology and State Ideology. Covariate data extends back to 1960 but less 
than five percent of the policy adoptions in the dataset occurred during these years. This lack of 
variation impedes the model’s explanatory power and these years were thus dropped. A year 
covariate is added to account for the effect of time. 
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Model Specifications 
I use a generalized linear mixed model fit by maximum likelihood (Laplace 
Approximation) to fit pooled event history models that include State and Policy as random 
effects to account for the possibility that the likelihood of any policy being adopted varies by 
both state and policy. Allowing state and policy to vary as random effects is especially important 
to account for factors affecting the likelihood that a policy originating in states in foreign 
countries will be adopted by U.S. states. For example, state laws about graduated drivers 
licensing arrived in the United States fairly quickly after foreign adoption, perhaps due to policy-
level effects such as widespread availability of data on the efficacy of this type of policy. On the 
other hand, primary seatbelt laws did not enter the United States until fourteen years after they 
were implemented in Australia, potentially due to the stringent anti-helmet and individual rights 
lobbies that, driven by motorcycle culture, were already firmly established in some particular 
states in the United States like California. (Jones and Bayer 2007) Many other state-level effects 
might affect the likelihood of adoption, such as the degree to which executive agencies or 
nonprofits handle a policy area and act as a substitute for policy from the legislative branch. 
Incorporating state and policy as random effects therefore allows the model to account for 
multiple such unseen factors that may affect the likelihood of a specific policy being passed in 
the United States.  
Figure 3 shows the number of adoptions made by U.S. states of the domestic-origin and 
foreign-origin policies in the dataset. There are 559 out of 1000 possible adoptions. The number 
of adoptions of policies that originated in a foreign jurisdiction is almost identical to the number 
of adoptions of policies of domestic origin (276 and 283 out of a possible 500, respectively). The 
domestic policy adoption dates center around 1999 and have four local maximums at 1986, 1997, 
1999, and 2006. The increased volume of policy adoptions in the 1990s may reflect a change in 
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legislature activity or protocol around this time (one possibility points to the rise of internet use 
and e-governance generating a spike in activity) but is likely also due in part to the Boehmke and 
Skinner 2012 dataset having more policies from the 1990s and 2000s than other eras, leading to 
an increased number of adoptions in that time period. The left skewed distribution of adoption 
dates therefore demonstrates the importance of controlling for time in the dataset. In particular, 
time splines are very helpful to account for the nonlinear effect of time on policy adoptions. 
(Buckley and Westerland 2004) Several time spline models are used for testing and return 
uniform results across models.  
 
Figure 3: Policy Adoptions by Year (1979 - 2010) 
 
Apart from the surge of domestic policy adoptions between 1998-2002, the distribution 
of adoptions of domestic-origin and foreign-origin policies align very closely. A Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test confirms that the distributions are similar, with a p-value of 0.046. The surge of 
adoptions may be caused specifically by the fact that almost all adoptions of individual 
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development account laws and almost half of all adoptions of laws mandating insurance 
coverage for clinical trials occurred in this window, instead of following a more gradual adoption 
cascade over several years. The inclusion of policy random effects helps to control for and 
minimize any impact these policies might have on the overall analysis.  
Results 
 I begin by testing variables on just the domestic-origin policies and just the foreign-origin 
policies to examine non-interacted variable effects in each policy category. Table 4 shows that 
Term Limits are marginally significant in models using foreign-origin policies, indicating that 
Term Limits may be associated with increased likelihood of adopting policies of foreign origin, 
which would provide support for Hypothesis 1. The significance of this result is robust to using 
year fixed effects in Model 2; however, it disappears when using the continuous Sarbaugh-
Thompson variable to measure Term Limits or when using a time spline with three knots (p = 
0.13). The result also disappears when using year fixed effects, time splines, or a continuous 
measurement for Term Limits in Model 4. The attenuation of results when robustness checks are 
included suggests that additional factors play a role in the adoption of policies of foreign origin. 
Models 3 and 4 test how the effect of the Proportion of Foreign Adopters differs between 
domestic-origin policies and foreign-origin policies. The coefficient on Foreign Adopting in 
domestic policies (Model 3) is negative and not significant, which would suggest that the 
proportion of foreign states and provinces that have adopted a policy of domestic origin is not 
associated with any change in likelihood of a U.S. state adopting the policy. This is 
understandable from the perspective that, when considering whether to adopt a policy that began 
in another U.S. state, and U.S. state legislators might prioritize studying outcomes at home and 
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may not be likely to find many examples of foreign states and provinces that have adopted the 
policy anyway.  
Table 4: Domestic-Only and Foreign-Only Dataset Models 
 
On the other hand, the coefficient for Proportion of Foreign States Adopting is positive 
and large in magnitude in the foreign-origin policy dataset (Model 4). This is robust to year fixed 
effects, time splines, and a continuous variable measure of Term Limits. The positive coefficient 
means that U.S. states in the aggregate are increasingly likely to adopt policies of foreign origin 
as the proportion of foreign states that has adopted them increases. Following the interpretation 
in Miller et al. 2018, this is a sign that legislators in U.S. states may pay more attention to the 
policy history in foreign states and provinces when considering whether to adopt a policy that 
originated abroad, and may also study policy outcomes to determine if the policy’s success can 
be measured. This would be an example of learning in international sub-federal policy diffusion. 
Breaking the Foreign Adopting variable into its Australian and Canadian components indicates 
that Canadian adoptions of domestic policies are positively associated with adoptions, but there 
is no statistically significant association with Australian adoptions (see Appendix VIII). 
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Table 5 combines the datasets of foreign-origin and domestic-origin policies to examine 
overall trends and uses both the dichotomous and continuous variables for indicating whether 
Term Limits are in place. The interaction of Term Limits and a policy being of Foreign Origin is 
statistically significant in Model 1 and robust to using year fixed effects and time splines. 
However, the significance disappears when using the continuous measure (p = 0.14).  
Table 5: Association Between Term Limits and Policy Adoption 
 
The lack of statistical significance in the continuous variable measure means this 
provides only mixed support for Hypothesis 1, but all variables are signed as hypothesized and 
may therefore provide some support for the theory that likelihood of adopting a policy of foreign 
origin is higher in term-limited states than non-term-limited states. If the coefficients were 
statistically significant, the log odds of adopting a policy of foreign origin would be 0.620 lower 
(about 85%) than the log odds of adopting a policy of domestic origin in Model 1.  
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Although it is possible that the policies selected may be driving the results, this does not 
seem likely as the number of observations is large (over 16,000) and the number of policies 
studied (twenty) is high compared to studies that have only examined one policy. (Berry and 
Berry 1990, Doyle 2006, Mokher and McLendon 2009) Rather, it appears that the operative 
issue is the measurement of Term Limits. The continuous measure provides very valuable insight 
because it is a much better reflection of the extent to which the mediating effects of term limits 
affect legislators in their ability to keep office, and the proposed effects of term limits on 
legislator incentives are critical for the theory of why term-limited legislators would 
subsequently be motivated to look abroad. For example, in a state like Louisiana where 
legislators can cycle through houses of the legislature, the motivation to keep office is hardly 
decreased at all, thus eliminating the primary driver by which term limits are theorized to affect 
legislator interest in studying policies abroad. On the other hand, in a state with more stringent 
measures that truly mean the end of a policymaker’s legislative career when they are term-
limited out, the proposed effect should be very strong. These nuances are lost in a dichotomous 
measure of Term Limits, and thus may lead to spurious conclusions of significance. When using 
a more accurate measure, Term Limits do not appear to impart a very substantial effect on the 
adoption of policies of Foreign Origin.  
Turning to Models 3 and 4, the coefficients related to Proportion of Foreign Adopters 
suggest that this variable is an important consideration for all states adopting a foreign-origin 
policy and is not conditional on whether a state has implemented term limits. The coefficient on 
Foreign Adopting * Term Limits is negative, in line with the prediction for Hypothesis 2 but not 
statistically significant. On the other hand, the coefficient for Proportion of Foreign Adopting by 
itself is significant for both the dichotomous variable and the continuous variable measure of 
 89 
 
Term Limits and is robust to using year fixed effects and time splines. This implies that, all else 
being equal, the likelihood of adopting any type of policy is positively associated with the 
proportion of foreign adopters that have adopted the policy, both for states with term limits and 
for states without Term Limits. Examining the association between likelihood of adoption and 
proportion of Australian and Canadian adoptions (see Appendix VIII) reveals similarly positive 
and statistically significant coefficients for both Australia and Canada, with the coefficient for 
Canada being about 2.5 times larger.  
Examining the results in Models 3 and 4 by policy origin location makes it possible to 
ascertain the extent to which the proportion of foreign adopters is associated with increased 
likelihood of a U.S. state adopting a policy of domestic origin or a policy of foreign origin. The 
models in Table 6 do this by examining the effect of Proportion of Foreign Adopters for 
domestic policies in states with and without Term Limits (Models 1 and 2), as well as for foreign 
policies in states with and without Term Limits (Models 3 and 4).  
Table 6: Effect of Foreign Adoptions when Term Limits are in Place (Active Years Only) 
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Separating the policies by foreign and domestic origin reveals the reason for the finding in Table 
5 that likelihood of adoption increases with Proportion of Foreign Adopters for all policies. As in Table 
5, Models 1 and 2 indicate that the coefficient for Proportion of Foreign Adopters is not significant for 
states adopting domestic-origin policies, regardless of Term Limits status. However, Models 3 and 4 
display positive and statistically significant coefficients of great magnitude for Proportion of Foreign 
Adopters when policies are of Foreign Origin. This clarifies the finding from the Proportion of Foreign 
Adopters coefficient in Table 5 by indicating that the effect of foreign states and provinces adopting a 
policy is only associated with increasing the likelihood of a U.S. state adopting the policy when the policy 
is of Foreign Origin. 
The coefficients on the Foreign Adopting variables in Models 3 and 4 also clarify the null 
finding on the interaction of Term Limits and Foreign Adopting in Table 5. Here the coefficients 
show support for the idea that the Proportion of Foreign Adopters of a policy is important both 
for states with term limits and states without term limits. In contrast to Hypothesis 2, this 
suggests that observing policy outcomes in foreign states and provinces provides useful 
information to both term-limited and non-term-limited legislators in U.S. states when 
considering whether to adopt a policy. The log odds of adopting a policy of Foreign Origin when 
all foreign states have adopted it are about 2.5 times as large in term-limited states as they are in 
non-term-limited states. The larger coefficient value in Table 6 for term-limited states adopting 
Foreign Origin policies indicates that term-limited states are more likely to adopt foreign 
policies after more foreign states have adopted than are non-term-limited states are. This could 
represent more learning from term-limited states, or it may mean that term-limited state 
legislators are simply not discovering foreign policies or converting them into policy as quickly 
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as non-term-limited state legislators. The model does not converge with year fixed effects, but 
the finding is robust to using time splines.  
Examining proportion of Australian and Canadian adoptions (listed in Appendix VIII) 
indicates that proportion of adoptions of states and provinces in both countries is positively 
associated with adoption by term-limited states (with the effect being larger for the nearby 
Canadian provinces). Overall, these findings suggest an explanation for the null finding of the 
interaction of Proportion of Foreign Adopters and Term Limits in Table 5 and indicate that, in 
contrast to the prediction in Hypothesis 2, term-limited policymakers do not seem to adopt 
policies of foreign origin significantly sooner than their non-term-limited counterparts. This 
suggests that legislators in term-limited states may not be driven to adopt policies of foreign 
origin noticeably faster, i.e., during times when few other foreign states and provinces have 
adopted where limited data on success outcomes is available. 
Two more coefficients are noteworthy here. The models also show that, while Legislative 
Professionalism is an important factor for non-term-limited U.S. state legislators when 
evaluating whether to adopt a policy of foreign origin, it is not significant for term-limited states. 
This means that the likelihoods of highly professional term-limited state legislatures adopting is 
not distinguishable from the adoption likelihoods of low professionalism state legislatures, 
suggesting a diminished effect of Legislative Professionalism with respect to adopting foreign-
origin policies when term limits are in place. Lastly, while the Proportion of Neighbors Adopting 
is positive and significant for states without term limits whose legislatures are considering 
whether to adopt a policy of Foreign Origin, it is not statistically significant for term-limited 
states. Legislators in states without term limits may continue to rely on the experiences of their 
neighbors when evaluating whether to adopt a policy of Foreign Origin, while policymakers in 
 92 
 
states with term limits seem to rely less on the experiences of their neighbors and more on policy 
outcomes in other foreign states where the policy has been adopted. This supports the findings in 
Miller et al. 2018 and indicates that the domestic effects of Term Limits discovered in that study 
are in effect here as well, and points to a different policy learning processes for domestic 
compared to foreign policies. It may be that term-limited legislators are less motivated to study 
their peers when passing policies of domestic origin but are required to conduct a certain 
threshold level of research for a policy of foreign origin for which neighbor experiences are not 
consulted. 
Citizen Ideology, State Ideology, and Year behave consistently across models. Citizen 
Ideology and State Ideology waver between significance and non-significance, and their 
magnitudes generally present very small changes in the log odds of a policy being adopted. The 
sole exception is Citizen Ideology in Model 4 in Table 6, where a one-standard-deviation change 
in Citizen Ideology to being more liberal (i.e., a very large change) is associated with a 147% 
increase in the odds of adopting a policy. The coefficient for Year is significant and negative 
across all models save Model 4 in Table 6, indicating that the log odds of adopting a policy 
generally decrease as time progresses. The effect never represents more than a 33% decrease in 
the likelihood of adopting a policy, and in seven out of twelve models represents less than a 10% 
change in odds. 
Predicted Probabilities 
Figure 4 and Figure 5 visualize how the likelihood of adopting a policy changes for states 
where Term Limits are in place as the proportion of foreign jurisdictions that have adopted the 
policy increases. This contributes to an understanding of the extent to which term-limited states 
are more or less likely to adopt before non-term-limited states, thus indicating whether term-
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limited legislators may be engaging in more aggressive cross-national research. Figure 4 shows 
the predicted probabilities of adopting a policy for term-limited and non-term-limited states as 
the proportion of foreign adopters increases from zero to one for domestic-origin policies in the 
dataset (i.e., policies that were developed in the United States).  
 
Figure 4: Predicted Probabilities for Probability of Adoption when Term Limits are in Place 
(Domestic-Origin Policies Only) 
 
The figure demonstrates that, for policies of U.S. origin, states without Term Limits are 
slightly more likely to adopt a policy as the Proportion of Foreign Adopters increases. This 
suggests that states without term limits adopt policies that are developed in the United States 
somewhat later, perhaps because they are waiting to observe success outcomes. The very slight 
slope indicates that, while positive, the Proportion of Foreign Adopters is not a strong predictor 
of the Probability of Adoption. This seems understandable, as the influence of foreign adopters 
should be smaller in the contemplation of adopting policies of domestic origin. 
On the other hand, the right side of the graph indicates that for non-term-limited states, 
the probability of adopting a policy of domestic origin decreases as the proportion of foreign 
jurisdictions adopting the policy increases. If statistically significant, this finding would align 
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with that of Miller et al. 2018, that term-limited states adopt policies significantly sooner than 
their non-term-limited counterparts. The strong negative slope indicates that by the time a policy 
of domestic origin proliferates to states and provinces in other countries, the likelihood of an 
additional term-limited state adopting would be very low.  
In contrast, Figure 5 shows the predicted probability of adoption for term-limited and 
non-term-limited states for policies of Foreign Origin. Although not statistically significant, the 
clear trend is the same for both states with Term Limits and states without Term Limits: the 
likelihood of adopting a policy of Foreign Origin increases with the Proportion of Foreign 
Adopters. It may the case that the number of foreign states that have adopted is important when 
few U.S. states have adopted the policy, and less important when several of a state’s neighbors 
have adopted the policy. Substantively, this suggests that term limits do not consistently drive 
term-limited states to adopt policies of foreign origin before states where term limits are not in 
place, which reduces support for the theory that term-limited legislators are driving research of 
policies that originate abroad.  
Figure 5: Predicted Probabilities for Probability of Adoption when Term Limits are in Place 
(Foreign-Origin Policies Only) 
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Figure 6 displays how the likelihood of adopting a policy of domestic origin changes for 
term-limited and non-term-limited states as either the Proportion of Neighboring States or the 
Proportion of Foreign States adopts the policy. Both the proportion of Neighboring States 
Adopting and the proportion of Foreign States Adopting can suggest information about the 
importance of other states’ policy success outcomes to a state considering whether to adopt a 
policy.  
Figure 6: Predicted Probabilities for Proportion of Neighbors Adopting (Domestic Policies) 
               Non-Term-Limited States    Term-Limited States 
 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the information provided by foreign state adoptions should be less 
important for term-limited states where legislators are looking to borrow innovative policy ideas 
without waiting to examine success outcomes. The following graphs provide insight into the 
relative importance that term-limited and non-term-limited U.S. state legislators might place on 
the value of information about policy success outcomes provided by foreign adopters when no 
neighboring states have adopted compared to when all neighboring states have adopted.  
The figure on the left indicates that, when no neighbors have adopted a policy of 
domestic origin in a non-term-limited state, the state’s likelihood of adoption in increases with 
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the Proportion of Foreign States that have adopted the policy. This indicates that to some extent 
states may be able to use success outcomes in states in foreign countries for gauging when a 
policy of domestic origin will be suitable for home use and there are no neighbors to study. The 
effect becomes strongly negative when all neighbors have adopted, indicating a high likelihood 
that the non-term-limited state will already have adopted the policy for each marginal adopting 
foreign state, which in turn indicates much less likelihood that the non-term-limited state is 
studying and observing the policy outcomes in the foreign states that have adopted the policy.  
In contrast, the predicted probabilities of adoption of domestic policies for term-limited 
states (the right-hand figure) are negatively associated with the Proportion of Foreign Adopters 
regardless of the number of neighbors that have adopted. The direction of this relationship is in 
line with the finding in Miller et al. 2018 that term-limited states are likely to adopt policies of 
U.S. origin before many of their neighbors. This suggests therefore that the policy adoptions in 
foreign jurisdictions would not factor heavily into likelihood of adoption. 
Figure 7 shows how the proportion of Neighboring States Adopting a policy of Foreign 
Origin mediates the effect of Proportion of Foreign Adopters for term-limited and non-term-
limited states. For non-term-limited states, the effect is strongly positive when no neighbors have 
adopted, and the negative slope after all neighbors have adopted is much shallower than for the 
set of domestic policies. This indicates that the likelihood that a non-term-limited state will have 
already passed the policy with each marginal foreign adopter is much smaller than the 
comparable likelihood for a policy of domestic origin. This, in turn indicates that non-term-
limited states may be studying the policy outcomes in foreign states more carefully when the 
policy originated in a foreign jurisdiction. 
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On the other hand, the predicted probabilities of adoption for term-limited states, 
although not significant, are positively associated with the Proportion of Foreign Adopters 
regardless of how many of a state’s neighbors have adopted the policy. This supports Miller et 
al’s 2018 finding that term-limited states do not appear to be observing their neighbors, but 
provides evidence against Hypothesis 2, that term-limited states are predicted to adopt policies of 
foreign origin faster than non-term-limited states (i.e., when a lower proportion of foreign states 
and provinces has adopted).  
Figure 7: Predicted Probabilities for Proportion of Neighbors Adopting (Foreign Policies) 
               Non-Term-Limited States    Term-Limited States 
 
Overall, these results point to a scenario where both term-limited and non-term-limited 
states observe and potentially learn from their foreign counterparts when considering whether to 
adopt a policy of Foreign Origin. Having Term Limits in place is not statistically significantly 
associated with adopting policies of Foreign Origin sooner than states where Term Limits are not 
in place. However term-limited state adoption patterns suggest the possibility that, similar to 
their counterparts in non-term-limited states, term-limited legislators may value learning about 
policy outcomes in the foreign context when determining whether to adopt them at home. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter explores how the state-level institution of term limits is associated with a 
state legislature’s proclivity to adopt policies of foreign origin. U.S. states are leaders in policy 
invention, and yet it is evident that some policies originate in other parts of the world and are 
subsequently borrowed by U.S. states. The theory of this chapter is that implementing term limits 
leads to a higher likelihood of adoption of state-level policy from other countries because term 
limits motivate legislators to pass more bills while hindering their ability to craft quality 
legislation. These dual effects prompt legislators to seek ready-made policies abroad that are 
unique and easily marketable, and which therefore have a higher likelihood of passage due to 
decreased chance of duplication and decreased chance of poor craftsmanship since the policy is 
already a law elsewhere that can be imitated. These factors in turn decrease legislator incentive 
to take the time to learn from the outcomes of foreign-origin policies in foreign jurisdictions, 
because legislators are more rewarded for passing policy than waiting for signs of a policy’s 
success before borrowing it. 
A generalized linear model fit by maximum likelihood tests the hypotheses that Term 
Limits are associated with an increased likelihood of adopting policies generated in states in 
other countries, and that the likelihood of adoption is negatively associated with Proportion of 
Foreign Adopters when Term Limits are in place. The analysis finds marginal support for the 
theory that Term Limits are associated with an increase in the adoption of foreign policies. Using 
the dichotomous measure of Term Limits indicates that the likelihood of adopting a policy 
decreases when the policy is of Foreign Origin, and that the likelihood of adopting the policy 
decreases by about 84% less for term-limited states than for non-term-limited states. This finding 
disappears when using the continuous measure of Term Limits and suggests that institutional 
factors other than Term Limits may drive the discovery and adoption of foreign-origin policies in 
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U.S. state legislatures. One reason for this may be the policies drawn from the Boehmke and 
Skinner 2012 dataset for inclusion in the analysis. It is possible that these policies are unique in 
some way that obscures the effects of Term Limits – for example, if term-limited states were for 
some reason less likely to pass the policies in this dataset than non-term-limited states.  
However, two considerations lend support to the model results being valid. The first is 
that the sample size is fairly large both in terms of observations and also in terms of number of 
policies studied. There also do not appear to be any meaningful differences in adoption rates for 
these policies compared to any other policies in the Boehmke and Skinner 2012 dataset, 
alleviating concerns that the policies used for this analysis may differ in a way that affects 
results. The second consideration is that the results largely confirm the findings of Miller et al. 
2018 with respect to the behavior of term-limited states when adopting policies of domestic 
origin. Results in this paper (particularly from Table 6) support the finding from Miller et al. 
2018 that term-limited states adopt policies before neighboring states and are therefore both less 
able and less likely to study policy success outcomes in other states before writing their own 
legislation. It therefore appears that the institution of term limits may play a role in how state 
legislators determine the amount of research to conduct when borrowing a policy from another 
state in the same country, but that additional considerations may be important when determining 
whether to borrow a policy from abroad. 
The analysis of foreign adopters found that the association between the Proportion of 
Foreign Adopters and likelihood of Policy Adoption is positive and significant for policies of 
Foreign Origin for both term-limited and non-term-limited states. This finding is in contrast to 
the hypothesized relationship between Proportion of Foreign Adopters and likelihood of foreign-
origin policy adoption for term-limited states, which was that term-limited state legislatures are 
 100 
 
more likely to adopt policies of Foreign Origin before many foreign states have adopted them. 
This hypothesis was generated from the theory that term-limited legislators are more interested 
in passing novel legislation than studying policy outcomes in many states to find out what policy 
instruments work best. However, it seems that other dynamics are at play in the process of cross-
national policy transfer.  
One possible alternative explanation is that legislators in term-limited legislatures need to 
study the study policy outcomes of policies worth borrowing that come from other countries and 
pursue legislation that is based on learning from those examples. Another possibility is that term-
limited legislators do not study outcomes at all but rather discover the policies later, after a 
higher proportion of foreign states have adopted. If either of these alternative explanations is 
correct, it suggests that term limits are not the mechanism of interest driving cross-national 
policy diffusion at the state level. Further investigation could work to ascertain whether the later 
adoptions of term-limited legislators demonstrate evidence of learning, or merely that they are 
just slower to find and adopt policies. Jansa et al. 2019 found that term limits were not a 
significant predictor of copying legislative text, but that legislative professionalism is 
significantly associated with less text copying between state laws in a domestic context. It would 
be insightful to examine this and other institutional factors which cut across term-limited and 
non-term-limited states that might better explain cross-national policy adoption patterns. 
A final productive avenue of study prompted by the results of this chapter would be to 
examine the policy research process at the level of the individual legislator to better understand 
exactly what motivations propel legislators to conduct foreign research, and which methods are 
preferred for such study. Although this analysis does not reveal strong evidence for the 
motivations of term-limited legislators to seek out policy ideas from states in other countries, it 
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takes a valuable first step at theorizing about what drives cross-national policy learning at both 
the institutional and the legislator level. Pinpointing the most relied-upon patterns and methods 
to engage in global policy diffusion will provide greater insight into the sub-national legislative 
processes of the 21st century.  
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CHAPTER IV 
Text Analysis of Legislation in Australian States, Canadian Provinces, and U.S. States 
 
 
Abstract 
How do lawmakers change state-level policies they borrow from foreign sources, and 
how are lawmakers’ capacities for cross-national research and policy adaptation affected by the 
legislative institutions of their state? In this chapter I theorize that policies borrowed across 
international borders display lower yet still meaningful amounts of similarity compared to 
policies borrowed from within the same country, and that internal state institutions associated 
with legislative professionalism increase state capacity for international study but decrease 
similarity of policy content. Using a dataset of policies adopted in Australian states, Canadian 
provinces, and U.S. states, I run Heckman selection models to compare Textual Similarity of a 
policy borrower’s legislation to the law of the policy originator when borrower and originator are 
either both from the United States or the originator is not from the United States. I find evidence 
that text copying does seem to occur between states in different countries, though to a lesser 
extent than between states in the same country. I also find evidence that Textual Similarity is 
positively associated with Legislative Professionalism in a domestic context but that the 
association between these variables in a foreign context is mixed, suggesting a complex 
relationship between professionalism and cross-national policy adaptation.  
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Introduction 
In addition to borrowing policies from neighbors and ideological counterparts, state 
lawmakers also borrow policies from states and provinces in other countries.46 Pertaining to 
everything from animal cruelty to zero tolerance alcohol laws, policymakers sometimes borrow 
policies from vast distances which come to play a significant role in everyday 
life. Understanding how and why policymakers look abroad is therefore important to a complete 
understanding of the process of policy diffusion at the state level in the United States and its 
consequences for many of the laws and policies that shape everyday life in America. 
This chapter investigates two specific research questions on this subject. First, how does 
policy content change when the state borrowing a policy comes from a different country than the 
state that first passed it? Answering this will illuminate the extent to which legislators consider 
policies crafted abroad to be immediately adaptable or, on the other hand, the amount of change 
required to modify a policy for domestic use. Second, how do the borrowing state’s legislative 
institutions affect the similarity of the new content to the foreign legislation? This is important 
because the extent to which policymakers can capitalize on successful policies of other states 
speaks to their ability to improve the lives of citizens in their home state, as well as the extent to 
which foreign policy concepts impact daily life in the United States. 
 
46 For examples, see Matthews and Kenny 2008 (51), Narassimhan et al. 2018 (984), Rabe 2004 (160), Rabe and 
Borick 2012 (379), Wagenaar et al. 1988 (51), Gilardi et al. 2014 (8). 
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The chapter proceeds as follows. I first discuss the challenges posed by cross-national 
learning that suggest why policy similarity between states in different countries is likely to be 
lower than that of policies from two states in the same country, even when persuasive arguments 
exist for why a specific foreign policy example is worth studying or emulating. I theorize that a 
state legislature’s Legislative Professionalism shapes the content of cross-nationally diffusing 
policy by affecting the number of policy clauses introduced from both internal and external 
sources. I then test hypotheses formulated from this theory on a dataset of four policies that 
originated in states and provinces in Australia and Canada, and four policies that originated in 
U.S. states. The dependent variable is Textual Similarity of the policy borrower’s legislation to 
the law of the policy originator in either the United States or a state or province in Australia or 
Canada.  
I find that while the texts of U.S. policies borrowed from Australian or Canadian sub-
national jurisdictions are still more similar to their domestic counterparts, textual and thematic 
similarity between states in different countries is also present, suggesting that policymakers find 
both policy ideas and sometimes even policy language from states in other countries to be 
suitable for home use. I find mixed results for the effects of Legislative Professionalism when a 
policy comes from a foreign source, which alludes to a puzzle in the literature about whether 
highly professional states should pass policies of higher or lower similarity to their predecessors 
and that the answer may depend on several factors. I conclude with a discussion of implications 
and avenues of research to further investigate both the question of legislative professionalism 
and other ideas that may illuminate the processes of cross-national policy diffusion. 
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Drivers of Policy Content in the Foreign Context 
Policy transfer between states in foreign countries arises through sponsored trips, 
networking, professional organizations, and site visits that have come to be known as “policy 
tourism.” (Cook and Ward 2011) However, research during the process of drafting legislation is 
probably the most consistent method by which lawmakers discover and learn from a policy of 
foreign origin, as legislators generally conduct intensive research when drafting bills. (Mooney 
1991, Bogenschneider et al. 2019) Carley and Nicholson-Crotty 2018 find that legislators are 
likely to consult a wide variety of sources in this process. When the policy is of foreign origin, it 
seems likely that policy research will include some measure of policy outcomes in that foreign 
jurisdiction. For example, when an innovative law is passed, it is likely that the state to first pass 
that policy will be studied by future borrowers due to such possible reasons as the jurisdiction 
having garnered recognition for their innovative policy,47 the greater number of studies available 
due to the length of time the policy has been active in the state or province that first passes it,48 
and the increased likelihood that that state or province may have developed a comparative 
expertise in that area due to having worked with the policy the longest.49 Examples such as the 
 
47 Examples include knowledge of the first state to legalize same-sex marriage (Massachusetts), recreational 
marijuana (Colorado), assisted suicide (Vermont), and prostitution (Nevada) is widespread even among the general 
public, and the laws of those states may have served as models in both the United States and in states and provinces 
in other countries where the policy was later adopted. Instances where legislators in states and provinces abroad 
were the first to enact an important policy (for example, Victoria’s motorcycle helmet law in 1960, or the 
eponymous Missouri Plan that was subsequently adopted in Ontario and elsewhere (Volkcansek 2009 (792)), while 
not as memorable to the public as more contentious issues, may be well known among policy experts even beyond 
the country in which they originated. 
48 Policymakers pay attention to which policies succeed and which fail when crafting their own bills. (Shipan and 
Volden 2014, Nicholson-Crotty and Carley 2016) This is particularly true in instances where legislation is adopted 
in many states before much data is available. For example, two-thirds of the states that passed legislation on 
mandatory bicycle helmets for minors did so within three years of each other (1992 – 1995) before very much U.S. 
state data was available on the effectiveness of this legislation. In these circumstances, studies on policy success like 
The Introduction of Compulsory Bicycle Helmet Wearing in Victoria, published in 1992 by Leicester et al. (and 
presented as a conference report the year previously) was one of the only studies on the efficacy of the law by the 
time many of the U.S. state laws were passed. 
49 For example, California is widely recognized as a renewable energy pioneer and has developed the infrastructure 
to send delegations to provide foreign sub-national consultations (for example, to British Columbia in 2006) and 
create emissions trading systems technological agreements with Chinese provinces (Boyd 2017 (553); Narassimhan 
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widely copied Quebec Plan to reintroduce liquor into U.S. states (Dupré, R. 2008), Victoria’s 
primary seatbelt law (Grey 1985), and others demonstrate that policy leaders in foreign locales 
are studied very closely when legislators in the home state or province are inclined to do so.  
However, when a state looking to borrow a policy is in a different country than the state 
where the policy originated, the shared policy content between originators and borrowers is 
expected to decrease, even if there are many compelling reasons to study policy outcomes 
abroad. Two forces drive this. The first is the need to comply with different federal regulations. 
For example, Canadian federal environmental legislation is generally less comprehensive than 
U.S. federal environmental legislation. (Nemetz 1986 (607), Cattanach and O’Connor 1992 
(466)) Policy text that U.S. state lawmakers borrow from Canadian provinces in environmental 
matters must likely be modified to comply with stricter federal regulations in the United States.  
An example of this is hazardous waste legislation: stronger federal regulations exist in the 
United States in this area than in Canada, especially the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act, which “provides uniform national standards and permit guidelines for hazardous waste 
management.” (Rabe 1991 (186), Brun 2019) Yet Canadian provinces Alberta and Manitoba 
developed hazardous waste siting policies that have been studied and emulated to some extent by 
states in the United States. (Rabe 1991 (189), Rabe et al. 1994 (16)) Any U.S. state legislatures 
borrowing some portion of legislation from a Canadian province in this area would most likely 
need to alter it to comply with more stringent U.S. federal statutes in a way that they would not 
have needed to consider if they had chosen to emulate a U.S. state’s policy instead. Second, 
language norms in each country should affect the specific words used in policy text. 
Policymakers from states in two different countries may use different spelling (if using British or 
 
et al. (2018 (984)). Policy originators who achieve specialization in the areas in which their legislatures pioneered 
innovations may be sought out for advice even after many other state legislatures have also adopted the policy. 
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Canadian versus American English, or standard French versus Québécois) and disparate phrases 
are used to describe the same concept.50 Therefore, although the incentive to study the policies of 
the foreign states and provinces that are early adopters transcends national boundaries, federal 
compliance and differing linguistic norms suggest a clear effect on policy similarity:  
Hypothesis 1: The text of a policy borrowed from a state in a different country should 
display lower policy similarity to the original text than a policy borrowed from a state in the 
borrowing state’s home country. 
The institutional context in which legislators research and draft legislation is also likely 
to influence how policy ideas from abroad are synthesized into final bills. Even when the policy 
is foreign, all legislators should have sufficient access to legislative text through the internet (or 
through the legislative research agency, the library, and professional organizations in the era 
before internet) to conduct at least basic research on a policy topic of interest. However, highly 
professional legislatures are known for conducting more thorough research during bill formation 
(Mooney 1993 (192), Kousser 2005) and have the capacity to study far more examples than are 
observed by legislators in less professional states.  
This dichotomy between more and less professional states occurs for several reasons. For 
one, less professional legislatures have fewer of the resources that enable them to conduct more 
thorough study. They tend to have lower staff levels and shorter session lengths that shift 
legislator priorities to legislation that is most urgently needed for the state to continue to 
function, such as appropriations bills. For another, it is also possible that legislators in less 
 
50 For example, it is common to use the phrase “novice driver” in Canada where “student driver” is more common in 
the United States. Rabe 1991 (204) also points out that “individual provinces and states tend to define hazardous, as 
opposed to solid or radioactive wastes, in somewhat differing ways.”  
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professional states find lower levels of research sufficient more often than their counterparts in 
more professional legislatures because less professional states generally produce legislation that 
is less technically complex. (Ka and Teske 2002)  
This increased capacity for and tendency toward additional research in more professional 
legislatures should result in legislation that is less like any of the original pieces of legislation 
that were studied, compared to legislation that is produced in a less professional legislature. 
Legislators in more professional states have more resources with which to study the policy 
originator than do their peers in less professional states. However, legislators in more 
professional states are also likely to have achieved similar levels of understanding and 
proficiency in far more policy examples due to their contacts, research resources at their 
disposal, and the time and staff levels that assist in the process of learning. The tendency to 
produce larger, more complex, and more innovative legislation should drive lawmakers in more 
professional states to utilize the larger array of research tools at their disposal to research more 
policies and research each policy in greater depth. Consulting many more examples suggests that 
the final legislation will borrow from many sources and be less similar to any one of them:  
Hypothesis 2: Higher levels of professionalism are associated with lower levels of policy 
similarity to the policy of the state in which the policy originated. 
When lawmakers are writing their state’s version of a policy that originated in a different 
country, the effect of these dynamics should be amplified. While most policymakers likely 
discover a policy’s origins in the course of basic research, more professional states develop 
greater access to foreign sources that will enable them to investigate policies of foreign origin far 
more comprehensively than policymakers in less professional states. Specifically, more 
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professional states have larger research bureaus, larger professional networks which may include 
foreign contacts, and more committees that provide legislators with increased time to research 
(Mooney 1993), including committees on foreign affairs.51 More professional states are more 
likely to study best practices (Shipan and Volden 2014), and a policy of foreign origin may have 
proliferated through several other foreign states before coming to the home country, which 
provides more examples to learn from.  
A hypothetical example illustrates this creation process. Suppose policymakers in the 
state of Indiana, which has a part-time citizen legislature, and the state of Illinois, which has a 
full-time legislature with well-staffed research agencies, are contemplating passing a policy that 
originated in South Australia. Policymakers might approach the task with a broad background 
investigation of the legislation with the goal of quickly finding reports on the success of the 
policy that will guide them in what will work best in their own states. This process is likely to 
include a discovery and review of the South Australia legislation for policymakers in both 
Indiana and Illinois, because, as the first policy passed, its background and evolution have likely 
been publicized more than many subsequent adopters, and also has more years of testable 
outcomes that can be analyzed. A policy research process like this would match the findings in 
Mooney 1991 (450—451), who found that 24.2% of the written information studied by 
satisficing legislators in the process of bill formation was from outsider sources, and that “in 
writing bills, then, legislators should need and have the time to use the complex and difficult 
information from outsider sources.”  
 
51 Committees that focus on foreign affairs are more common in professional states. Five of the twelve states that 
have a committee or subcommittee dedicated to international commerce or affairs (California, Illinois, 
Massachusetts, New York, and Wisconsin) are quite professional. Three of the seven less professional states with 
such committees (Arizona, Texas, and Hawaii) are either border states or heavily dependent on international 
partnerships. These committees likely facilitate the discovery of foreign best practices into the U.S. states.  
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At this point the policy research process likely differs for the two states contemplating 
this policy adoption. Legislators in Indiana working on a part-time schedule with limited staff 
have little incentive to conduct further research after finding a suitable working model. Their 
policy is likely to be based on a smaller number of sources found in a shorter period of research, 
including perhaps one or two seminal policies encountered as part of introductory research, and 
perhaps also a neighbor and an ideological counterpart or role model.  
On the other hand, legislators in Illinois have many more resources at their disposal and 
are likely to investigate far more examples in order to develop a more complex policy and verify 
that their intended policy model will be appropriate for use in Illinois. In addition to the same-
country sources of influence commonly identified in the policy diffusion literature, this likely 
includes more examples from abroad of subsequent adopters after the policy originator, in order 
to better understand the evolution of the policy and discover more policy instrument variations to 
get ideas about concepts that worked well and can be incorporated. This level of additional 
research requires more of the resources that are more often available in more professional states, 
including things like more staff and larger research agencies, more developed international 
committees and offices that might have contacts for reaching out and asking questions, and more 
session time to conduct research.  
Finally, lawmakers in more professional states tend to incorporate more policy 
innovations into finished legislation when adapting legislation from others. (Kousser 2005, 
Tolbert et al. 2008, Jansa et al. 2019) The task of modifying the policy to be optimal for 
domestic contexts, in part due to the obstacles arising purely from the policy being foreign, is 
likely to inspire more innovation in those states whose legislators have the wherewithal to do so 
and whose policies are generally more complex. Taken together, the motivation to innovate and 
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the wider research capacities that provide greater international access suggest that professional 
states will examine an even greater number of examples and produce a policy that is even less 
similar to any one of them when a policy is of foreign origin: 
Hypothesis 3: The inverse relationship between legislative professionalism and policy 
similarity is amplified in the when the policy originates in a state in a different country.  
To summarize, several grounds exist for which state policymakers might borrow 
language from policies of states in other countries. Even when a policy originates in a foreign 
state or province, examining that policy in its foreign context can be beneficial, suggesting that 
there should be some similarity in policy content even in policies from states and provinces in 
different countries. However, external and internal factors affect the similarity of policies that are 
spread across international borders. Externally, I expect that standardizing policies to align with 
federal regulations and the commonly accepted legal writing of the borrowing country will 
decrease similarity. Internally, I theorize that more professional states exhibit less policy 
similarity due to collecting and integrating more examples of best practices from a larger number 
of sources (as well as adding their own innovations), and that this effect is amplified in the 
foreign context. 
Data 
 The data for this study consist of 5,700 state-year-policy observations for U.S. states 
between 1979 - 2014, including 294 observations for a year in which a policy was adopted.52 The 
observations are for eight policies drawn largely from the Boehmke and Skinner 2012 dataset: 
 
52 As the number of years in which a policy was adopted also determines the number of observations for which a 
textual similarity score would be available, it is important to collect enough policies to yield approximately 300 
observations in order to conduct statistical analysis. Eight policies were sufficient for this task. 
 112 
 
four that originated in foreign states or provinces in Australia or Canada and four policies that 
originated in U.S. states.53 A background on each policy is available in Appendix IX. The 
policies were drawn randomly from the available policies that were suitable based on being 
passed in years covariate data was available. The same caveats mentioned in Chapters II and III 
apply given that the policies are drawn from a dataset of policies which is in turn a subset of all 
legislative policy topics that lawmakers contemplate collectively. Boehmke and Skinner note no 
reason to suspect the policies in their 2012 study are unrepresentative of the universe of policies, 
but policy sample size is low in this study and the policies that originate in Australian states and 
Canadian provinces may be nonrandom in some way. For example, if Canadian and Australian 
political ideologies are generally to the left of the United States, then lawmakers in left-leaning 
U.S. states may be more likely to pass those policies, and the policy adoption behavior (and 
therefore content similarity patterns) of more conservative states will be systematically 
underrepresented. 
To control for this, policy indicator variables are included and help account for inherent 
differences between these policies not captured by other factors (mandatory bicycle helmets and 
anti-bullying are the omitted foreign and domestic categories). Despite the small sample size, the 
policies included display significant variety along many dimensions that are important for 
analysis. Adoption dates vary over a range of thirty years, decreasing the risk that results are 
based on an attribute of a specific time period. The policies cover a variety of subjects and range 
in word length from 34 words to 79,812 words. This allows for wide variation in policy 
complexity. They range from fewer than half of all states adopting (twenty-one states adopting 
for both mandatory bicycle helmets for minors and school of choice laws) to all or virtually all 
 
53 Anti-bullying legislation was added at random from the NCSL website to provide an additional domestic policy 
for which legislation is available in Australia and Canada. 
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states adopting (graduated drivers licensing laws and anti-bullying legislation), which provides 
variation in the number of pieces of example legislation available. Taken together, the policies 
display wide variety along several important dimensions and should thus be suitable for a 
preliminary investigation. 
The dependent variable is a measurement of policy diffusion operationalized as Textual 
Similarity between the law of the first state to pass a policy, and the law of the state where it is 
later adopted. Out of the 5,700 state-year observations, 294 of the observations are years in 
which a state adopted a policy and therefore have a Textual Similarity score. The scores take 
values between 0 and 1 for each dyad, where high values indicate greater similarity between two 
documents. The observations are calculated in Quanteda (Benoit et al. 2018) using the cosine 
method, which is the “bag of words” approach that has been used in plagiarism detection. 
(Jiffriya et al. 2014, Saptono et al. 2018) Although not without problems54 this method is widely 
used to trace similarities in policy and has generally been considered suitably accurate.55 Several 
studies have shown that Textual Similarity scores point to text reuse when documents are more 
similar than is likely by chance, and that text reuse that is more significant than what chance 
alone would predict provides evidence of policy diffusion. (Smith et al. 2014 (183), Burgess et 
al. 2016 (57), Linder et al. 2018 (16), Gilardi and Wüest 2020 (4)) Thus, the dependent variable 
is structured to provide a measure of policy diffusion between each adopting state with the policy 
originator.  
 
54 For example, Li and Han 2013 note that in spite of the “proven effectiveness” of cosine similarity that renders it 
“good enough for most text mining applications,” they point out that it does not always account for how the distance 
between similar words in two texts under comparison may affect meaning. Grimmer and Stewart 2003 (272) suggest 
that the reason that cosine similarity performs well despite a lack of emphasis on word order is because “while it is 
easy to construct sample sentences where word order fundamentally changes the nature of the sentence, empirically 
these sentences are rare...In practice, for common tasks like measuring sentiment, topic modeling, or search, n-
grams do little to enhance performance.” 
55 See Garret and Jansa 2015, Wilkerson and Casas 2017, Jansa et al. 2010, Gilardi et al. 2020.  
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Table 7: Policies in the Dataset 
 
Following precedent in Jansa et al. 2019, higher levels of Textual Similarity between 
policies of an earlier adopter and a later adopter are interpreted as instances where the later 
adopter made fewer changes to the policy, and lower levels of similarity suggest instances where 
more changes, i.e., more innovations, were made to the policy. The policy diffusion literature 
conceptualizes innovation in terms of new policy provisions that are added by subsequent 
adopters to the original policy to result in a more complex piece of legislation (for a seminal 
example see Glick and Hays 1991).56 Adding more policy clauses that cover new and innovative 
topics bring new vocabulary into the text that decrease similarity scores. On the other hand, a 
state that does not add any new clauses and therefore largely emulates a previous policy is likely 
to produce a law that will be more similar to the previous document to which it is compared.  
 
56 Glick and Hays 1991 (837, 841), provided a comprehensive study on the connection between similarity of policy 
and innovation by measuring instances of innovation, which they describe as “the reinvention of policy during the 
diffusion process” in living will policies. They noted that this process occurs “by liberalizing existing provisions or 
by adding totally new provisions” and show that lawmakers created policies that become more and more different 
(i.e., less similar) based on the number of new and innovative policy ideas added to policies adopted by each 
subsequent state. 
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For all but the first few adopters there are of course many other policy examples to study 
in addition to just the policy originator, and a state legislator contemplating a policy will most 
likely examine several of them. This is a concern if the Textual Similarity score indicates that a 
state legislator studied the originator when in fact they borrowed from a local role model who 
first looked to the originator. An example would be if the policies of Iowa and South Australia 
are similar but Iowan legislators did not look to South Australia at all but rather looked only to 
Illinois, whose legislators did in fact adopt the policy based on the South Australian legislation.  
This is indeed a risk, but the previous section lays out several reasons for why 
policymakers in all adopting states have both the means and motivation to consistently observe 
policy originators in the process of research.57 This means that the risk of instances where 
similarity score is high but the borrower has never seen the legislation of the policy originator is 
hopefully quite low. Even if legislators rely primarily on the legislation of a domestic counterpart 
that references the text of the originator, at least they have seen the similar content in both 
original and modified source and can be aware of the provenance of the policy idea.58 Future 
studies could contribute greatly by advancing methods to identify the true source from which a 
state’s legislators borrow a policy concept when lawmakers have already spread the concept to 
more than one policy text. 
Another factor to consider is the extent to which legislators consider borrowing policy 
text from foreign sources to be riskier than borrowing text and ideas from domestic sources. An 
 
57 Lawmakers are likely to study the policy originator during their research no matter how many states have adopted 
in the intervening time period when an originator has achieved widespread recognition, conducted and published 
leading studies about success outcomes, become a center of expertise on the policy topic, or some combination of 
these phenomena. 
58 One additional factor that helps to make this variable yield a conservative estimate of general “level of foreign 
observation” is the fact that similarity scores should underestimate the extent of foreign influence because they 
ignore all of the non-systematic instances where a borrowing state observes additional foreign states besides just the 
policy originator, such as other states where widely publicized studies were issued or the text of a more professional 
state (like Ontario or New South Wales) that did not happen to adopt first. 
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argument can be made for either position. On the one hand, legislators may view policies from 
foreign jurisdictions as unusable because the policy outcomes in a foreign state or province relay 
very little information about what will happen at home due to differences that arise from being in 
different countries. If this is true, then policies borrowed from foreign locales increase political 
risk because legislators cannot predict how successful the policy will be in their own jurisdiction.  
On the other hand, the Canadian provinces and Australian states score highly on several 
measures that would make them credible examples that U.S. state legislators might point to as 
justification for how a policy from one of these states or provinces might improve quality of life 
at home. For example, six of the thirteen Canadian provinces (Alberta, British Columbia, 
Ontario, Northwest Territories, Saskatchewan, and Yukon) had median family incomes that 
placed them within the top 20 U.S. states in 2017, and the province with the lowest median 
family income (Nunavut, at $55,009) was higher than eighteen U.S. states.59  
Similarly, Australian and Canadian cities regularly dominate The Economist Intelligence 
Unit’s annual Global Liveability [sic] Ranking, with Vancouver taking the number one spot for 
seven years in a row between 2004 to 2010, before ceding first place to Melbourne from 2011 to 
2017.60 State legislators working on policies to improve quality of life in the big cities of their 
state would have an extremely credible reason to point to legislation in the foreign states and 
provinces that contain these cities to justify a proposed action. Therefore, although legislators 
may associate borrowing a policy of foreign origin with some risk due to being in a different 
country, there are many reasons to suggest that policies from foreign jurisdictions may also be 
 
59 Statista and World Bank. 2017 current USD. 
60 At least two Canadian cities and three Australian cities have made it into the top ten for every year since at least 
2015 by earning scores for “over 30 qualitative and quantitative factors across five broad categories of Stability, 
Healthcare, Culture and Environment, Education and Infrastructure.” (The Economist Intelligence Unit). No U.S. 
city made the top ten for any of the five years where information was available.  
 117 
 
used as a source of third-party credibility worth emulating in order to achieve the desirable 
outcomes that characterize the foreign state or province. 
Text was cleaned by removing stopwords and stemming, although numbers were kept for 
policies where age may be important, such as bicycle helmet laws for minors and graduated 
drivers licensing requirements. British spelling in the foreign policy originators was changed to 
American English to be comparable to the spellings used in the U.S. state policies (see Table 22 
in Appendix X for a list of changes). Text Similarity generally either slightly increases or slightly 
decreases over time, and Textual Similarity is lower when policymakers borrow from a foreign 
policy originator than when they borrow from a domestic one (see Figure 15 and Figure 16 in 
Appendix X). The average Text Similarity scores for states adopting foreign policies ranges by 
policy between 0.19 to 0.47, and the average score for adopting domestic policies ranges from 
0.44 to 0.58. The value of Text Similarity ranges from 0.02 to 0.80 in the complete dataset, with a 
mean of 0.43 and a standard deviation of 0.17.  
Examining legislation samples confirms that the cosine method’s lower Text Similarity 
scores between foreign states and higher similarity scores between domestic states is faithful to 
the text. For example, policy text from Victoria and New Jersey on mandatory bicycle helmets 
shows lawmakers wrote similar concepts and some similar words, but rarely in the same order 
and with some synonymic substitutes. One such instance is where Victoria’s text mandates that 
helmets be “approved by” the Roads Corporation, whereas New Jersey’s text requires helmets to 
“meet the standards of” the American National Standards Institute:  
Victoria: “A person must not drive a 
bicycle on a highway unless he or she is 
wearing a securely fitted bicycle helmet 
of a type approved by the Roads 
Corporation.”  
New Jersey (Similarity Score = 0.43): “A person 
under 14 years of age shall not operate, or ride 
upon a bicycle as a passenger, unless that person 
is wearing a properly fitted and fastened bicycle 
helmet which meets the standards of the American 
National Standards Institute.” 
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In contrast, Text Similarity between originator and borrower states in the same country is 
generally higher in terms of words and sentence structure, as in this anti-bullying paragraph: 
Georgia: “Each local board of education 
shall adopt policies, applicable to students in 
grades six through 12, that prohibit bullying 
of a student by another student...Each local 
board of education shall ensure that students 
and parents are notified of the prohibition 
against bullying” 
Oklahoma (Similarity Score = 0.68): “Each 
district board of education shall adopt a 
policy for the control and discipline of all 
children...The policy shall specifically 
prohibit harassment, intimidation, and 
bullying by students….The students, 
teachers, and parents or guardian of every 
child residing within a school district shall be 
notified by the district board of education 
about its adoption of the policy.” 
The Textual Similarity scores clearly reflect relative differences in textual similarity 
between cross-country originator-borrower pairs and same-country originator-borrower pairs. 
The scores attributed to the one- and two-word phrase matches in the cross-country pairs like 
originator Victoria and borrower New Jersey in the mandatory helmets example are noticeably 
lower than the scores attributed to the multi-word phrases and closer sentence structure of the 
same-country pairs like originator Georgia and borrower Oklahoma in the anti-bullying example. 
At the same time, the scores identify meaningful similarity in cross-country pairs that is evident 
when reading for thematic content. A final example of this is how Ontario’s graduated drivers 
licensing legislation authorizes authorities to make rules “respecting practical and written driving 
examinations and mental and physical, including ophthalmic and auditory, examinations for 
applicants for drivers licenses for novice drivers of any class or level,” and Tennessee’s 
legislation, which, while written very differently, states essentially the same concept, that “any 
person who is fifteen years of age or older, who has successfully passed the standard written test 
and visual examination…may be issued a learner permit by the Department of Safety.” Despite 
different phrases used for visual testing, written testing, and student driver, these concepts are 
quite similar to each other. Therefore, the lower but meaningful similarity scores between cross-
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country originators and borrowers seem suitably calibrated for this analysis. Additional 
diagnostics for each policy are included in Appendix X. 
The independent variables are whether a Policy is of Foreign Origin, Legislative 
Professionalism, and an interaction of these two terms. Legislative Professionalism is measured 
in three separate ways: as an index variable, by Staff Levels, and by Session Length. The index 
measure of 0 to 1 (higher values indicating higher Legislative Professionalism) is generated by 
Bowen and Greene (2014, 288) and includes observations for more years than the Squire Index 
but is correlated with the Squire Index at r = 0.92 (p < 0.001). Data were scaled for 
computational tractability and missing years were imputed by carrying forward the last 
observation.61 Figure 17 in Appendix XI displays how approximately six percent of the 
observations have high values of Legislative Professionalism that make them outliers when 
calculated using the Tukey 1977 method of 1.5 times the Interquartile Range. The outliers alter 
the results slightly when excluded, and results using a dataset composed solely of non-outliers 
are included in Appendix XIII in Table 26. 
The Bowen and Greene index is a generalized measure of Legislative Professionalism 
that represents intangible aspects of state legislatures that may contribute to studying a policy 
originator. This includes policy expertise, committee strength, research budgets, and other 
factors that would in the aggregate improve a legislature’s ability to discover both more 
examples from which to draw legislative text, as well as to refine and add to it through the 
 
61 The original scores for Legislative Professionalism in the Bowen and Greene index range between 0 to 10, which 
is a factor of ten greater than the range of the dependent variable (0 to 1) and increased processing time when 
running calculations for the models used in this paper. Scaling the units decreased computation time without 
changing the underlying relationship between Legislative Professionalism and Policy Adoption. No standard practice 
seems to have emerged as the dominant method for handling missing years but as Legislative Professionalism scores 
do not change very much from session to session this is not anticipated to be a problem. The last observation carried 
forward method is used because the fairly small year-on-year variation in Legislative Professionalism scores 
suggests that any more complex calculation would produce imputed scores that are quite similar to the values used. 
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process of policy innovation. Similar to Jansa et al. 2019, two specific aspects of state-level 
professionalism are hypothesized to have clear effects and are tested separately from the index 
variable. The first, Staff Levels, is expected to directly affect policy similarity because staff 
members do a great deal of the research and writing that goes into policy formation. (Hammond 
1996 (548), Grossback and Peterson 2004 (28)). Therefore, higher Staff levels should increase 
the volume of examples examined to learn about and craft policy, as well as increase 
innovativeness and drive down Textual Similarity. Longer Session Lengths should provide more 
time to conduct research, come up with innovative ideas, and carefully draft and revise policy to 
make it more innovative.  
Each of these three variables of Legislative Professionalism (index, Staff, and Session 
Length) therefore measures a separate mechanism by which expertise should drive policy 
change. Each conceptualization of Legislative Professionalism is predicted to decrease Textual 
Similarity, and the effect is predicted to be stronger for Policies of Foreign Origin. Because 
Legislative Professionalism and Staff are highly correlated, they are tested in separate models. 
However, since Staff and Session Length are not highly correlated, they are included in the same 
model. Staff levels are measured by the survey data issued by the National Conference of State 
Legislatures, with missing data imputed by carrying forward the last observation. Session Length 
was calculated from Bowen and Greene 2014. Both variables are scaled. 
Descriptive statistics and correlations are presented in Appendix XI in Table 24 and 
Table 25. The Legislative Professionalism variable ranges from 0.012 to 1.062 with a mean of 
0.198 and a median of 0.167. Table 25 shows that the high correlation of 0.697 for Legislative 
Professionalism and Staff Levels supports the decision to test these separately rather than in the 
 
62 A single observation from California earned this score; every other observation falls below it. 
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same model. The policy being of Foreign Origin and Textual Similarity are correlated at -0.616, 
providing preliminary support for Hypothesis One. 
Method 
 The method of analysis is a two-stage Heckman selection model (Heckman 1976) in 
which the association between Textual Similarity and the independent variables is conditioned on 
whether state lawmakers opted into passing the legislation, and therefore creating policy that 
would earn a Textual Similarity score. This model is suitable because it is necessary to account 
for selection bias within the Textual Similarity scores since the only observations for which 
scores are known are instances where a state legislature adopted a policy. Put another way, it is 
impossible to see what a Textual Similarity score would have been for a state in which the policy 
was never adopted. It is therefore likely that the data exhibit sample selection bias. This situation 
is common in analyses where the dependent variable is not observable in the entire population of 
states. Certo et al. 2016 (2,653) write that “in such cases, Heckman models may help to resolve 
sample selection bias.”  
The models are structured as a two-stage analysis where the first stage uses a probit to 
calculate the probabilities that observations select into the condition on which Textual Similarity 
is based, i.e., whether states adopt the policy. The Stage One independent variable and covariates 
are known as exclusion restrictions and they are: Neighbors Adopting, Citizen Ideology, State 
Ideology, Time, and Time Squared (to model the nonlinear effect of time on adoption outcomes). 
Scholarship has shown repeatedly that a state’s likelihood of adopting a policy is associated with 
whether its neighbors adopt the policy (for a review see Nicholson-Crotty 2016 (80)). Therefore, 
the predicted association between Policy Adoption and Neighbors Adopting is positive. Ideology 
is another factor in whether states will adopt a policy (Grossback and Peterson 2004, Carley and 
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Miller 2012, Butler et al. 2017), and two measures are therefore included as scaled variables, 
with higher numbers indicating more liberal positions. (Berry et al. 1998 (334) Without any way 
to compare ideologies across countries to determine ideological similarity between foreign and 
domestic dyads I am agnostic about the expected direction of these variables. The effect of Time 
is predicted to be positive, as the chance of adopting a policy increases in years following the 
original adoption. The coefficient of Time Squared is expected to be negative to model how 
adoptions are most common immediately following first passage and then decrease over time. 
The results do not change substantively when a variable for Proportion of Foreign States 
Adopting is included, but this variable is dropped due to a high Variance Inflation Factor score 
with the Policy is Foreign indicator that is an independent variable in Stage Two.63 
As the dataset contains adoption data for multiple policies and multiple states over time, 
it can be considered a type of pooled dataset that would be suitable for a repeated events duration 
model. Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2001 find that duration models for repeated events perform 
better when they allow for the risk of failure (in this case, adoption) to vary as time passes when 
likelihood of an event is contingent on previous events. This is an appropriate paradigm for 
policy adoptions since there is overwhelming evidence in the policy diffusion literature that the 
likelihood of a state adopting a policy is influenced to varying degrees by the adoptions that 
come before it. The current methodology on Heckman Selection Models does not yet account for 
 
63 When coefficients for Policy is Foreign, Proportion of Foreign Adopters, and an interaction of these terms are 
included in the model, the signs on each coefficient match the empirical findings in Chapter III about the effects of a 
policy being foreign on its likelihood of adoption. Higher proportions of foreign states and provinces that have 
adopted the policy are positively associated with a state’s likelihood of adopting the policy (though the coefficient of 
0.84 likely overreports the extent of the relationship due to the high Variance Inflation Factor caused by including so 
many measurements of foreign activity in the model). The log odds of adopting a policy of Foreign Origin are lower 
than a policy of domestic origin, and an interacted term of these two variables indicates that the log odds of adopting 
a policy of Foreign Origin increase by 0.551 when the Proportion of Foreign States Adopting the policy has gone 
from 0 to 1. Although the magnitudes of these coefficients are likely overstated due to the variables describing 
similar aspects of the data, they do inspire confidence for matching the results of the factors affecting the likelihood 
of states adopting policies of Foreign Origin. 
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dependence between the hazard rates of various observations. This is an oversight that, if 
corrected, could extend the usefulness of Heckman models for many more applications in 
political science. However, examining the models that Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2001 
calculate do not reveal too very drastic of differences between the standard repeated events 
model and the marginal risk-set model that calculates updated hazard ratios. This suggests that 
the results in this chapter should be interpreted with caution but that dependence between events 
is not likely distorting the results to an extent where they are no longer useful indicators of the 
underlying phenomena. The covariates of Time and Neighbors Adopting allay this problem as 
well. A useful extension would be to develop a Heckman selection model that incorporates 
techniques that can account for variation in the underlying risk sets and compare the results. 
The odds ratios calculated in the Stage One probit are factored into Stage Two, which 
models how change in the dependent variable Textual Similarity is associated with changes in the 
independent variables conditional on whether the policy was adopted. The independent variables 
here are Foreign, Legislative Professionalism, Staff Levels, Session Length, and an interaction 
term between Foreign and the Professionalism index and Staff variables. Following the findings 
of Kousser 2005, Sarbaugh-Thompson and Lyke 2017, and Miller et al. 2018, I also control for 
Term Limits. This state-level attribute should increase Text Similarity by shifting the incentives 
of legislators towards producing legislation rapidly to be able to point to laws passed as evidence 
of a successful policymaking past when starting new careers after being term-limited out. Lastly, 
whether the U.S. leader (i.e., passage by either California or New York) has adopted the policy is 
also included to control for text reuse that travels through diffusion chains. (Desmarais et al. 
2015, Boehmke et al. 2017, Linder et al. 2018) The sign on this is predicted to be negative to 
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represent the concept that textual similarity to a policy originator will decrease when the example 
of the first U.S. borrower is also available.  
 Simulations have shown that Heckman selection models return fairly accurate results 
even when data are not bivariate normally distributed. (Van der Klaauw and Koning 2003 (40)) 
However, to err on the side of caution I follow Jansa et al. 2019 (15) and conduct the analysis 
with a robust Heckman selection model, which relies on semiparametric calculations that allow 
for the assumption of bivariate normality to be relaxed. This results in expanded standard errors 
that are more robust to non-normality than in a two-step model. (Zhelonkin et al. 2016, (807)) 
My results concur with the findings in Van der Klaauw and Koning 2003 in that the coefficients 
are very similar to models tested with the stricter Two Step model and the Full Information 
Maximum Likelihood (FIML) model. As the FIML model was tested with robust standard errors 
clustered by state, this lends credence to the validity of the results. 
Results 
The results are displayed in Table 8 below. Examining the rho value and Inverse Mills 
Ratios in the tables suggests that sample selection bias is present and that a Heckman selection 
model is suitable (see Appendix XII for more discussion). The coefficient on the Foreign 
variable aligns very well with Hypothesis 1. The value of -0.15 indicates that Textual Similarity 
when a policy is of Foreign Origin is approximately fifteen percentage points lower than when a 
policy is of domestic origin but does not drop to zero.  
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Table 8: Textual Similarity and Legislative Professionalism 
  
As median Textual Similarity is 0.43, it suggests that similarity falls to 0.28, about a 35% 
decrease. The coefficient for Foreign is similar in Model 2, which shows the effect on Textual 
Similarity of a policy being foreign holding the Legislative Professionalism value at zero.64 
These findings reflect the characteristics in the examples outlined earlier comparing the 
similarity of text between New Jersey and Victoria when adopting mandatory bicycle helmet 
legislation. The text was thematically similar, but less linguistically similar than the text of 
 
64 Note that, as no states ever received a Legislative Professionalism score of zero, however, this represents an upper 
bound of the effect size. 
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policy borrower Oklahoma’s anti-bullying law to that of policy originator Georgia. More 
examples of this reduction in similarity can be found when comparing the cross-national 
verbiage in graduated drivers licensing laws to same-country verbiage in school of choice 
legislation. There is clear thematic overlap in the texts of policy originator Ontario and policy 
borrower Georgia, but sentence structure similarity is low:  
Cross-National Similarity: Ontario and Georgia (Graduated Drivers Licensing) 
Ontario:  
“The Lieutenant Governor...may make 
regulations...requiring novice drivers with 
drivers licenses of any class or level to be 
accompanied, while driving, by an 
accompanying driver” 
Georgia (Similarity Score = 0.53):  
“The department shall... issue to the applicant 
an instruction permit which shall entitle the 
applicant...to drive a Class C vehicle...when 
accompanied by a person at least 21 years of 
age who is licensed as a driver”  
  
On the other hand, the Textual Similarity of California’s school of choice legislation 
compared to policy originator Arkansas is much higher, even though Arkansas is not known for 
producing legislation that is commonly emulated by other states and California generally creates 
highly innovative and professional legislation: 
Same-Country Similarity: Arkansas and California (School of Choice) 
Arkansas:  
“Boards of Directors of local school districts 
are prohibited from granting legal 
transfers…(a) where either the resident or 
the receiving district is under a desegregation 
related court order...and (b) the transfer in 
question would negatively affect the racial 
balance of that district” 
California (Similarity Score = 0.60):  
“Either the pupil's school district of residence 
or the school district of choice may prohibit 
the transfer of a pupil under this article or 
limit the number of pupils so transferred if 
the governing board of the district determines 
that the transfer would negatively impact any 
of the following: (1) The court-ordered 
desegregation plan of the district. (2) The 
voluntary desegregation plan of the district 
that meets the criteria of Section 42249. (3) 
The racial and ethnic balance of the district.” 
Nevertheless, some similar policy themes and concepts seem to cross from states in one country 
to states in another. The negative coefficient and positive rho value indicate that the model likely 
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overestimates the strength of the relationship, so this estimate can be viewed as an upper bound 
for the effect associated with a policy being of Foreign Origin. (Certo et al. 2015 (2,641).  
Looking at the policy fixed effects suggest that Textual Similarity may also be associated 
with policy type, but no clear pattern emerges that would generate a theoretical prediction. Many 
of the coefficients are statistically significant in comparison to the reference policies (mandatory 
bicycle helmet laws for foreign-origin policies and anti-bullying legislation for policies of 
domestic origin). The mix of positive and negative as well as significant and non-significant 
coefficients is another indication that the policies included in the sample display wide variety and 
are thus more helpful in drawing inferences than policies that are too similar in some way. It is 
not immediately clear from the results in Table 8 what types of policy attributes would be likely 
associated with increased Textual Similarity but there are many possibilities. For example, 
policies of greater complexity may be associated with higher levels of Textual Similarity due to a 
preference by legislators for language that has been vetted on difficult policy topics. On the other 
hand, policies about contentious morality issues might display lower or even bimodal similarity 
patterns depending on the distance of citizen or state ideologies between originator and adopter. 
The topic of how policy types are associated with cross-national diffusion is therefore a 
promising area for future research. 
Hypothesis 2 examines the association between Textual Similarity and Legislative 
Professionalism. In contrast to expectation for this hypothesis, Model 1 shows a positive though 
not significant association between Legislative Professionalism and Textual Similarity in Stage 
Two. This means that for the policies sampled, a higher Legislative Professionalism rating is 
associated with an increase in Textual Similarity between laws. The finding for Staff Levels in 
Model 3 is statistically significant and implies that higher Staff Levels are also associated with 
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increased Textual Similarity in the legislation of the policy originator and the policy borrower. It 
appears that the activities of staff members deemed so essential by Hammond 1996 and Grossback 
and Peterson 2004 do indeed play an important role in researching policy history and legislative 
copy. But the significance of the general Legislative Professionalism index supports the theory 
that other factors within a legislature (such as the number of sponsored trips, committee breadth 
and depth, research budgets, etc.) are relevant too. 
The significance of both Legislative Professionalism and Staff Levels coefficients 
attenuate in the Non-Outlier dataset (Table 26 in Appendix XIII). This suggests that the 
propensity to learn from policy originators is stronger among states with more professional 
legislatures. Neither Session Length nor Term Limits are statistically significant in any model for 
either group of observations. Length of time in office (measured in both number of days in 
session as well as years available to each policymaker to serve) does not therefore appear to be 
associated with a change in Textual Similarity between borrower and originator. The null result 
for U.S. Leader has Adopted the Policy implies that the domestic leader passing a policy is not 
likely to be studied so exclusively by borrowers as to be associated with a de facto reduction in 
Textual Similarity.  
The interacted effects of the Foreign and Legislative Professionalism variables provide 
mixed support for Hypothesis 3 when comparing Textual Similarity between policies of foreign 
and domestic origin, as shown in Figure 8 below. The interacted coefficient using the Legislative 
Professionalism variable is negative but not statistically significant in Model 2. On the other 
hand, the interaction is statistically significant using the Staff Levels variable in Model 4, 
pointing to the idea that the Textual Similarity of a borrowing state’s legislation to the text of the 
originating state falls significantly when the policy is of Foreign Origin and as the borrowing 
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state’s Staff Levels increase. If the theorized relationship between legislative staffers and policy 
similarity is driving this finding, it means that greater numbers of legislative staff are critical to 
either creating more innovations to include, collecting more best practices from multiple sources 
beyond just the policy originator that appear in the final legislation, or both.  
Figure 8: Interaction Effects for Professionalism and Staff Levels When Policy Is Foreign 
 
To investigate further, I run Heckman selection models for each policy individually to 
assess on a case by case basis the direction of the relationship between Legislative 
Professionalism and Textual Similarity. The models do not have large enough sample sizes to 
trust the tests of statistical significance, but they provide clues about which policies drive the 
interaction results.65 The models for domestic policies show a uniformly positive association 
between Legislative Professionalism and Textual Similarity and are listed in Table 27 of 
Appendix XIII. Although in contravention to Hypothesis 2, this is compelling evidence that more 
professional legislatures do in fact take note of the policy originator in the domestic context, 
 
65 As a robustness check, I additionally estimate OLS regressions. They reveal coefficients signed identically, and 
four out of eight cases showed the same coefficient magnitude (in the other cases, regressions often showed inflated 
magnitudes and significance). The individual policy models therefore likely provide a meaningful look into how the 
variables may be interacting in each policy. The variable US Leader has Adopted was dropped to avoid quasi-
separation (as was Term Limits for primary seatbelt laws).  
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either because states with professional legislatures are early adopters and there are few cases 
available, or because the principles listed in the theory make a first adopter worthy of study by 
states whose legislators have the capability to do so regardless of how many additional states 
have passed the policy in the meantime (as suggested in Miller et al. 2018 that higher 
professionalism may be associated with later adoptions). The positive association also may mean 
that innovative content theorized to decrease Textual Similarity between policy originator and 
more professional borrower does not represent so large a portion of the content as to overwhelm 
the general similarity. Rather, the policies may be more similar than different even with 
innovation factored in, as might be the case in California’s school of choice legislation, which 
has a similarity score of 0.60 with policy originator Arkansas.  
On the other hand, two of the policies of Foreign Origin (graduated drivers licensing and 
mandatory bicycle helmets) have negative coefficients for Legislative Professionalism, while the 
other two policies of Foreign Origin show a positive association between these two variables 
(see Table 9 on the following page). The models therefore suggest only mixed support for 
Hypothesis 3 and prompt several important questions, namely, why would Legislative 
Professionalism sometimes be associated with more Textual Similarity and sometimes with less 
for policies of Foreign Origin, and what are the conditions under which one relationship or the 
other is expected?  
Keeping in mind that these results are based on only four policies and that a broader 
survey of policies will clarify additional nuance, this finding hints that there are likely many 
phenomena at play in cross-national policy learning that exert conflicting effects on policy 
similarity.  
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Table 9: Individual Selection Models (Policies of Foreign Origin) 
  
For example, as outlined in the theory section of this chapter, lawmakers in more 
professional state legislatures may find policies from multiple sources abroad but create very 
different policies from the original even while having more access to it, while lawmakers in less 
professional states with fewer resources at their disposal will likely still encounter the text of the 
policy originator during research but will study fewer additional examples and innovate less. But 
there are also several compelling reasons for a positive association between Legislative 
Professionalism and Textual Similarity. For example, perhaps some committees and networks in 
professional states are so developed that they can alert legislators to desirable new policies from 
foreign states before actors in a less professional state would be likely to research those subjects 
on the internet. In such cases adoption would likely reveal higher Textual Similarity scores due to 
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the very few previous adopters to study. Higher Textual Similarity would be especially plausible 
if the first state to adopt the policy in a foreign country was also considered quite professional 
and its legislators produced a policy on par with the standards of legislation in the professional 
home state. 
Table 10 helps to clarify some of the conditions under which high or low Textual 
Similarity would be expected. This paper theorizes and tests for evidence of circumstances where 
higher Legislative Professionalism would be associated with lower policy similarity. But reasons 
for which a legislature in a professional state might adopt a policy that is more like the policy 
originator even after many other states have passed a policy are also evident. This suggests that 
the association between Legislative Professionalism and policy similarity is more complex and 
that a more nuanced theory will not only clarify the conditions under which higher and lower 
similarity is expected in terms of borrowing from foreign sources and adding innovation, but it 
will also enable a better understanding of how the cross-national policy research and formation 
process differs from the same-country policy diffusion process, as well as whether the same 
legislative institutions are used for both or if different institutions are relied on more heavily for 
each type of diffusion. 
Table 10: Potential Relationships between Professionalism, Adoption Timing, and Similarity for 
Subsequent Research 
HIGH 
PROFESSIONALISM 
High Similarity Low Similarity 
Early Adopter  - Strong research capacity leads to early 
detection when few other examples exist 
 - It is a good policy with little innovation 
needed (potentially due to being written 
by a foreign state that is also highly 
professional) 
 - Good idea but text must 
be reworked to fit standards 
of professional borrowers 
- Research skills lead to 
finding many examples all 
synthesized into final text 
Later Adopter  - More widely publicized success or 
failure outcomes to study 
 - Foreign state has developed policy 
expertise to offer advice 
- Standard reasons for 
policy evolution over time 
(many additional examples, 
etc.) 
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LOW 
PROFESSIONALISM 
High Similarity Low Similarity 
Early Adopter  - Early discovery (perhaps due to acute 
policy problem, term limits, or internet 
research) with minimal capacity for or 
interest in innovation 
 - Legislation simplified for 
home use (especially if 
adopting from a more 
professional foreign 
originator) 
 - Fundamentally different 
objective (i.e., Florida with 
Right to Breastfeed) 
Later Adopter - Notoriety serves to bypass need to 
research many other jurisdictions 
 - More widely publicized success 
outcomes to study 
 - Foreign state has developed policy 
expertise to offer advice 
- Choosing to borrow from 
a neighbor or from lobbyist 
or model legislation 
With thousands of policies passed, and tens of thousands more policies drafted every 
year, these different mechanisms could very easily all be happening at once. A follow up 
investigation could clarify further the conditions under which a highly professional legislature 
can be expected to be produce policy that is very similar or very different to the original policy 
from abroad by testing how patterns of policy passage and similarity correspond to the 
possibilities outlined here. Table 10 provides a starting point for further theoretical development 
of some of the drivers that may be associated with similarity of policy content between cross-
nationally diffusing policies. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter investigates how policy origin source and state-level institutions are 
associated with sub-federal policy diffusion across international borders. It finds evidence that 
legislators do borrow policy text across international boundaries to some extent, and also that the 
relationship between Legislative Professionalism of the policy borrower and the policy’s Textual 
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Similarity to that of the policy originator may be sensitive to whether the policy is from a 
domestic or foreign source. Although many examples exist of state lawmakers studying 
legislation from foreign sources, particularly when the policy is innovative, the cross-national 
diffusion of policy content should be lower than same-country diffusion due to differing federal 
compliance requirements and linguistic norms. I theorize that the policies of more professional 
states demonstrate lower levels of shared policy content due to the resources available to 
lawmakers in professional states to gather greater numbers of best practices and add innovations 
to each policy. I tested hypotheses about policy Origin Source and Legislative Professionalism 
on a database of 294 policy adoptions across eight policies that originated in Australia, Canada, 
and the United States, measuring Textual Similarity via the cosine similarity method and using 
Heckman selection models to test the association between Textual Similarity, policy Origin 
Source, and institutions of state-level Legislative Professionalism.  
In line with Hypothesis 1, testing showed a consistent and negative association between 
Textual Similarity of policy originator and policy borrower when the policy was of Foreign 
Origin by about fifteen percentage points, or approximately thirty-three percent. These findings 
hold in both the full dataset and the sample of non-outliers, indicating that verbiage changes due 
to the policy being of Foreign Origin are consistent across levels of Legislative Professionalism 
and may therefore be more structural in nature rather than related to specific policy 
content. Although it is not necessarily surprising that policies decrease in Textual Similarity 
when crossing foreign borders, this is a valuable contribution because it is one of the first 
attempts to quantify the cost of cross-national sub-federal policy transfer. It also reveals a 
potentially more interesting fact, which is that the transfer of policy, though reduced, seems to be 
very real despite the potential obstacles to crossing international borders. For example, verbal 
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similarity to the policy originator in primary seatbelt legislation manifests in the text of states 
like Kansas, which passed its law sixteen years after Victoria did: 
Victoria:  
“A person shall not be seated in a motor car, 
that is in motion in a seat for which a safety 
belt is provided unless he is wearing the 
safety belt and it is properly adjusted and 
securely fastened.” 
Kansas: 
“Each front seat occupant of a passenger car 
manufactured with safety belts...shall have a 
safety belt properly fastened about such 
person’s body at all times when the vehicle is 
in motion.”  
The findings of this study mirror this example of Victoria and Kansas by finding that, while 
specific language differs more when crossing international boundaries, policy themes seem quite 
observable and transmittable from states in one country to states in another. Future studies could 
investigate this fascinating example of what Boyd 2017 (554) describes as policy inspiration by 
focusing both on the specific text of the policies to discern what is systematically ignored in that 
estimated 16% decrease, and additionally on identifying the specific themes contained in each 
policy and how they eventually spread.  
In contrast to the expectation for Hypothesis 2, the coefficient on Legislative 
Professionalism is positive and significant for models that use the full dataset, and positive but 
not significant for the dataset that only includes non-outliers on Legislative Professionalism. This 
indicates that Legislative Professionalism is positively associated with Textual Similarity and 
that the most professional states may drive the results. The analysis finds mixed support for 
Hypothesis 3 in that the interaction of Foreign and Legislative Professionalism is negative but 
not significant, and examining the association between Textual Similarity and Legislative 
Professionalism in each individual policy of Foreign Origin revealed a negative association for 
two policies and a positive association for two others. The finding suggests that there are 
additional mechanisms affecting the association between Text Similarity and policy Origin 
Source beyond simply a state’s level of Legislative Professionalism. As discussed in the Results 
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section, these can include such factors as policy specific considerations, the effects of timing and 
other examples available, and the extent to which a policy originator is known for its policy and 
its expertise. The fact that motivations exist for more or less policy similarity for states of both 
high and low Legislative Professionalism offers an intriguing possibility to craft a theory that can 
better define the conditions under which high and low similarity to the text of a foreign 
originator’s policy are expected.  
This would be of particular interest for more professional states, as there are contrasting 
theories about whether lawmakers in professional states borrow more or less policy content when 
adapting policies from other sources. One hallmark of professionalism is incorporating best 
practices from other states’ policies, as established by Shipan and Volden 2014 and Nicholson-
Crotty and Carley 2016. From this perspective it may theoretically be possible to see higher 
similarity between a professional state’s policy and the policy of a state whose practices have 
been deemed successful. On the other hand, professional states tend to modify previous policies 
through the inclusion of newly innovated clauses as theorized by Kousser 2005 and tested in 
Jansa et al. 2019, leading to the conclusion that policies from more innovative and professional 
states should have lower Textual Similarity to previous adopters. 
These two theories present contrasting predictions about levels of text similarity, but 
future studies could demonstrate how these two forces may work simultaneously in more 
professional state legislation by examining not only the word-by-word Textual Similarity scores 
to understand which aspects of the policy are clearly borrowed copy-and-paste legislation, but 
also identifying aspects within the documents that are a) textually distinct yet thematically 
similar, and b) passages which are wholly new and therefore likely due to the increased 
innovative powers ascribed to professionalism. This will provide insight into why states with 
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higher professionalism are said to emulate both more and less and bridge a small gap in the 
literature, while paving the way to test the theoretical implications about the conditions under 
which policymakers in highly professional states are expected to borrow more or less from 
policy originators in foreign jurisdictions. 
Overall, this chapter contributes to the study of policy diffusion by developing a theory 
for how shared policy content is affected when sub-national lawmakers engage in cross-national 
policy diffusion by borrowing policy ideas from states in other countries, and also by developing 
and testing a theory about how state-level legislative institutions affect the proclivity for cross-
national sub-federal policy diffusion as measured by Textual Similarity. These steps are 
important in the process of better understanding the global nature of state-level policy learning. 
Findings suggest both that more than a few ideas are indeed compelling enough for state 
policymakers to look abroad to find answers, and also provide preliminary insight into how 
policies of foreign origin are adapted for use at home.  
There are many additional questions worthy of investigation in this area. A study that 
continues an even deeper examination of which skills or attributes of professional state 
legislatures promote the study of policies in other countries would be informative since these 
characteristics provide access to vast sources of novel policy ideas unavailable to legislatures 
without these attributes. It would also be useful to see whether the advent of the internet has 
improved the ability of lawmakers in less professional states to research more thoroughly with 
fewer of the resources thought to assist lawmakers in professional states. Finally, future research 
that can account for diffusion influences of more states in different countries may reveal 
significantly greater indications of cross-national sub-federal policy diffusion than are evident in 
this study.  
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Ultimately, as the costs of international communication and collaboration continue to 
decline in the era of globalization, the feasibility of cross-national policy diffusion has great 
potential for growth. Legislators can improve the quality of life of their constituents through 
expanding the number of states and provinces they study in the global network of democracies 
from which policies are borrowed, thus accelerating the discovery and maturation of solutions to 
pressing policy issues. As legislators search for answers to new issues whose best practices are 
not yet known but which are shared by states and provinces around the world, the improved 
ability to observe and learn from counterparts in other countries who have made progress to 
viable solutions is an advantage that policymakers can use to move their home states forward and 
improve the lives of their citizens. 
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CHAPTER V 
Conclusion 
Cross-national policy diffusion between states and provinces remains an understudied 
phenomenon. Borrowing policy from states in different countries requires more effort than 
borrowing from local sources. It demands a research investment, a conviction that the policy will 
be relevant despite differing circumstances between home and abroad, and a commitment to 
modify the policy to suit local and federal requirements. With these three impediments to 
transfer between states in different countries, it seems that states would always lean towards 
easier and more local alternatives.  
Most of what is known about state governments, and especially state legislatures, 
suggests that state policymakers primarily gather inspiration from examples in their own country, 
particularly from lawmakers in neighboring states, model legislation, states that share 
comparable ideology, and states from the home country that are considered worthy of emulation 
for many other reasons. (Nicholson-Crotty and Carly 2016, Garrett and Jansa 2015, Grossback 
and Peterson 2004, Boehmke 2017) All of these domestic sources of inspiration pose lower 
research and policy drafting costs than studying states in foreign countries. Additionally, the 
amount of research that most policymakers in state governments can conduct is reduced for 
highly politicized issues. (Mooney 1991) The literature summary in Bogenschneider et al. 2013 
(264) indicates that policymakers feel that “political considerations, established patterns of 
information gathering, and increased partisanship of legislatures” sometimes prevent them from 
studying more professional research.  
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Despite these obstacles, evidence of sub-national learning and collaboration continues to 
accumulate. A classic example of state governments learning from a foreign national government 
is the concept of the enterprise zone, which originated in the United Kingdom under the Thatcher 
government and which “stirred interest among conservatives in the United States….Following its 
transatlantic crossing, the idea commenced a long odyssey across the American states.” 
(Mossberger 2000 (54)) Dolowitz and Medearis 2009 (694) write that New York policymakers 
studied German states for suggestions on “the revision and approval of risk-based standards of 
contaminated lands,” and that “a one-week tour to Germany’s Ruhr Valley actually resulted in 
practitioners coming back and pushing through changes to regional planning approaches in the 
New Jersey State Plan.” Massachusetts consulted research from Denmark about the feasibility of 
offshore wind stations (Motta 2015), and North Dakotan policymakers have studied Norway not 
only to develop their severance tax and revenue allocation system, but also to modify the state’s 
prison reform system. (Rabe 2018 (228), Janzer 2019) At the state-to-state level, U.S. governors 
have signed hundreds of Sister State Agreements and Memoranda of Understanding of varying 
levels of commitment to learn from other states and collaborate on policy initiatives.66  
It may be argued that cross-national learning should be more common in state-level 
executive branches with governors who travel between countries and act in many ways as heads 
of state. (McMillan 2017) In contrast, legislators generally face time constraints and reduced 
international contact. These factors, in addition to the previously mentioned sources of domestic 
inspiration, would seem to decrease legislator capacity to specialize in any one area and develop 
contacts that might lead them abroad in the same way as do executive branch policymakers.  
 
66 Ralston 2013 details the substantive progress on environmental policy that developed from meaningful 
partnerships between five pairs of U.S. states and German Länder between 1995 and 2004 alone. 
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And yet, evidence of cross-national learning appears regularly at the legislative level. 
Evidence abounds of states and provinces in Australia, Canada, China, and Germany passing 
legislation that originated in a U.S. state legislature. For example, legislation establishing 
guidelines for when and how to report child abuse originated in U.S. legislatures in the 1960s 
and spread to Canadian provinces and Australian states within five years. (Matthews and Kenny 
2008) A personal interview with a delegate from the Landtag of the German state of North 
Rhine-Westphalia (2017) indicated that the representatives of that legislative body had 
specifically studied legislation in several U.S. states regarding online universities in the process 
of developing their own legislation on the topic. Stalking and cyberstalking legislation spread 
within just two years to Canadian provinces and three years to Australian states after several 
stalking murders in the United States in the early 1990s achieved global media attention and 
brought similar crimes into the spotlight in other countries. (Watson 2005) 
U.S. states seem likely serve as role models for states in other countries around the world 
since the top ten wealthiest U.S. states all have GDPs that place them within the top forty 
wealthiest countries in the world.67 California’s GDP places it in the top ten of the world’s 
largest economies, and states in China, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the 
U.S. all had GDPs in the top 20 largest national economies in 2017.68 But evidence suggests that 
U.S. states, despite often being economically larger entities than most of their sub-national peers 
around the world, have policymakers who still observe and learn from states in other countries. 
Examples of this date back to at least the 1850s, with the Australian ballot example mentioned in 
 
67 2019 current dollars, International Monetary Fund and United States Bureau of Economic Analysis 
68 Fifteen states, provinces, or administrative divisions had larger GDPs than that of Switzerland, the 20th largest 
country (at $679 billion), including: Bavaria, California, City of London, Florida, Guangdong, Ile-de-France 
(Parisian region), Illinois, Jiangsu, New York, North-Rhine Westphalia, Pennsylvania, Shandong, Texas, Tokyo, and 
Zhejiang. Source: IMF World Economic Outlook. Accessed 4 September 2018.  
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Chapter I. Dolowitz and Medearis (2009, 694) suggest that learning from European models was a 
popular strategy before World War Two. They observe: 
“Between the 1980s and 1930s the US and Europe shared such an 
epistemic community - especially among environmentalists and planners. 
American academicians were regularly looking to Europe for urban planning 
and environmental lessons. ‘Grand tours’ to European capitals were organized 
to study park designs, transportation planning, and taxation policies.”  
The authors conclude by noting that “the U.S. university system, the introduction of 
kindergartens, and modern American forestry and natural resources management practices were 
imported from Germany under similar conditions.” Dolowitz and Medearis argue that the post-
war hegemony of the United States reduced the perceived importance of studying examples in 
many (now war-torn) foreign countries after World War Two. But later examples of policy 
germinating in state legislatures in foreign countries and subsequently being adopted in U.S. 
legislatures still arise. Twentieth-century examples include adopting policies on mandatory 
motorcycle helmets that originated in Victoria, Australia, and graduated drivers licensing 
systems first passed in the province of Ontario. Moving into the 21st century, the National 
Conference of State Legislatures published a years-long study spearheaded by Maryland but 
conducted jointly by several U.S. states to study the best practices of K-12 education in states 
around the world and implement best practices at home (as alluded to in earlier chapters). The 
commission analyzed top-performing school systems in foreign cities, provinces, and countries 
(including Finland, Ontario, Shanghai, Singapore, Alberta, and other regions) to develop a final 
recommendation based on four principles around which to target improvement. To date the study 
has guided legislation in at least five U.S. states. (Exstrom 2019) States have clearly been 
 143 
 
learning from their foreign counterparts for many decades and continue to see the benefits 
moving forward.    
Research Question and Summary of Findings 
The potential benefits from observing policy innovations in states in other countries are 
clear, but so too are the challenges. What, therefore, explains the conditions under which state 
policymakers look abroad versus looking at home for policy inspiration? What factors make this 
practice more or less likely? In what ways is the foreign context similar to or different from 
same-country state-level policy diffusion? And, if state legislatures in other countries produce 
legislation that is worthy of emulation and which could be of value to U.S. states, why does 
cross-national sub-federal policy diffusion not happen more frequently? What are the most 
important constraints that affect the ability for policymakers to borrow useful policies across 
international borders? 
Neither the current literature on policy transfer nor the literature on policy diffusion make 
much reference to cross-national learning at the state or provincial level. Boyd 2017 (549) 
develops a framework that points to technical learning, the desire to conform to external norms 
and values, and political benchmarking and bandwagoning as the key drivers of cross-national 
collaboration on climate change policies between U.S. states and Canadian provinces. Ralston 
2013 claims that the theories of multilevel governance (see Hooghe and Marks 1996 and 2001) 
and policy entrepreneurialism (see, for example, Mintrom 1997) are influential in helping 
policymakers discover that their peers in states in other countries are working on similar topics 
and may have useful information. Steinbacher 2018 follows Ralston 2013 and Boyd 2017 in 
suggesting that the theory of policy transfer as conceptualized in Dolowitz and Marsh 1996 and 
Dolowitz and Marsh 2000 is applicable at the sub-national level, in that learning from states in 
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other countries generally arises by singular actors looking for best practices to improve a policy 
that is not working well, or looking to implement a program for which no policy is yet in place. 
(Rose 1991, Newmark 2002 (154))  
However, while the previously mentioned studies on policy transfer (especially Ralston 
2013 and Steinbacher 2018) rely on these theories to explain specific case studies, these theories 
do not attempt to explain what internal factors characteristic of sub-national units drive cross-
national diffusion systematically. The policy diffusion literature identifies several institutional 
features likely to affect policy diffusion (for example, committee strength, lobbying strength, 
professional networks, and term limits),69 as well as types of peer states (such as neighbors, 
economic competitors, ideological counterparts, states identified by their citizens as similar, 
etc.)70 who might serve as domestic sources of policy learning. However, these theories are not 
extended to the case of actors transferring policies between states in different countries.   
I theorize, and this project has shown, that cross-national sub-national policy diffusion, 
while certainly bolstered by individual actors as advocated in policy transfer theory, manifests on 
a global scale consistently enough to suggest the presence of structures promoting cross-national 
diffusion that are more institutionalized than the actor-oriented policy transfer literature 
contends. I draw from the policy diffusion literature to develop an explanation for cross-national 
sub-federal policy diffusion that takes steps to identify 1) why legislators borrow cross-
nationally, 2) who they borrow from, and 3) the processes by which they borrow.  
To do this I first theorize that instances of cross-national policy diffusion aggregate into 
networks whose connections represent likely pathways for policy diffusion between states in 
different countries. Modeling policy borrowing in this fashion tests whether evidence favors the 
 
69 Mooney 1993, Shipan and Volden 2006, Balla 2001, Miller et al. 2018, and Kousser 2005 
70 Mallinson 2019, Berry and Baybeck 2005, Grossback and Peterson 2004, and Bricker and LaCombe 2020 
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single actor or policy entrepreneur model of policy adaptation, or alternatively the structural 
framework of policy diffusion that would justify subsequent testing into the institutional features 
associated with increased proclivity toward this type of policy learning and borrowing. I then 
study which state government institutions may be associated with cross-national diffusion. I 
theorize that Term Limits are associated with increased likelihood of looking abroad rather than 
looking at home in order to find novel and pre-formatted policy ideas that will stand a higher 
chance of passing through the legislature. This variable has been shown to be an important 
predictor of intra-American borrowing (Miller et al. 2018) and provides a starting point for 
discerning the conditions under which policymakers might look abroad versus looking to a 
neighbor or some other role model.  
I continue by expanding my theory about institutional features associated with cross-
national diffusion of policy content. I theorize that legislators must modify policies borrowed 
from abroad more than policies borrowed from same-country examples in order to make them 
compliant with federal regulations and different state legal norms. I also theorize that a state’s 
Legislative Professionalism affects both the policy research process and the policy formulation 
process when legislators are practicing cross-national policy transfer. More professional states 
have more capacity and incentive to research more polices during the policy learning stage, and 
to add more innovations during the policy formation stage, thus resulting in a policy that looks 
less similar to any of the examples than a policy formed in a less professional state. I theorize 
that this should be amplified in the foreign context due to the increased number of examples to 
study and the fact that more professional states have far greater capacity for more in-depth 
foreign research due to increased research staffs and budgets and potentially more access to 
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foreign contacts through professional organizations, personal contacts, and government 
committees focused on international policy. 
The first chapter finds evidence that lawmakers do transfer policies between countries in 
a pattern that is different than what would be expected by chance. It therefore supports the 
hypothesis that cross-national diffusion happens more methodically than what would be expected 
if driven purely by isolated actors independently creating similar policies. It also finds that states 
are connected in a network where more professional states are at the center and smaller states are 
linked to them in a pattern suggesting that both large and economically powerful states, as well 
as smaller and less professional states learn directly from large states. In this way, cross-national 
policy diffusion patterns are similar to the networks solely consisting of U.S. states found in 
Desmarais et al. 2015 and Boehmke et al. 2017 where many states of all sizes and capacities 
observe a smaller group of leader states. 
The policies that proliferate through the U.S. state legislatures indicate a tendency toward 
learning and emulation as opposed to competition or coercion. This provides insight into when a 
foreign originator may be valued over a neighbor, an ideological counterpart, or model 
legislation from the United States. The examples of graduated drivers licensing, mandatory 
bicycle helmets for minors, and primary seatbelt legislation indicate that lawmakers may be more 
likely to adopt policies of foreign origin when benefits are clearly measurable, when many 
studies exist, and, most likely, for simpler concepts that can integrate well and in situations 
where no clear best practice is established in the United States, even among a state’s role models. 
These findings corroborate the factors that best foster policy transfer described by Rose 1993 
(132), which are policies with single goals that address simpler problems, and which have direct 
relationships between problem and solution. Rose also supposes that actors are more likely to 
 147 
 
engage in cross-national policy transfer when there are few perceived side effects, copious 
information on implementation, and good ability to predict success outcomes.  
  The second chapter supports the findings in Miller et al. 2018 with respect to the 
institution of Term Limits and same-country diffusion processes, but reveals no strong findings 
of a significant association between Term Limits and a Likelihood of Adopting a policy from a 
state in a foreign country. In contrast to the findings that states with term limits are associated 
with borrowing policies that originated in the United States sooner than non-term-limited states, 
the study found that the likelihood of adopting a policy of Foreign Origin is positively associated 
with the Proportion of Foreign States that have adopted the policy for both term-limited and 
non-term-limited states, suggesting that states with term limits adopt these policies no sooner 
than states without term limits. Thus, legislators in term-limited states do not appear to be less 
interested than the legislators in non-term-limited states in learning from the experiences that 
foreign states and provinces have had with the implementation of the policy. This suggests that 
processes for researching and borrowing policies of foreign origin differ from those for policies 
of domestic origin. The process of borrowing policies of Foreign Origin appears to be less 
influenced by Term Limits and allows more opportunity for studying success outcomes in foreign 
states and provinces before deciding to adopt.  
The third chapter finds that a state’s level of Legislative Professionalism is positively 
associated with Textual Similarity of the state’s policy to that of the policy originator when the 
policy is of domestic origin, but finds either no relationship or a negative association when the 
policy is of Foreign Origin. It also finds a negative interaction between Staff Levels and 
similarity to policies of Foreign Origin. This suggests that, despite more professional states’ 
greatly increased capacities for finding policies of foreign origin, that they either do not study 
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them whatsoever (which seems unlikely), or that they do find and study them but add innovative 
ideas and combine best practices from other sources to create products that are less like the 
policy originator than other states who do not innovate as much. This gives rise to several 
intriguing research questions to better understand the relationships between professionalism, 
innovation, and capacity for cross-national policy learning that should be explored more 
thoroughly.  
Lastly, the study also finds lower levels of Textual Similarity between borrowed policies 
when a policy is developed abroad compared to when it originates in the same country as the 
state who borrows it. This preliminary effort to quantify the extent to which borrowing policy 
from abroad results in changes to policy content suggests that cross-national borrowing 
represents a higher opportunity cost to legislators in terms of more investment being needed into 
modifying a policy for home use. However, the results also indicate that themes from the earliest 
policies abroad are often maintained in policies that are passed by much later adopters in the 
United States. Policymakers therefore appear to deem concepts pioneered abroad as useful and 
applicable to their home jurisdiction on a regular basis.   
External Validity 
It is important to note how the states and provinces selected for this study may influence 
the findings. The most important factors that could affect external validity from this perspective 
are the degree to which sharing a common language and which sharing a common law system 
and British colonial heritage predisposes these jurisdictions to study each other instead of other 
sources. For example, studying the patterns between the states and provinces in Australia, 
Canada, and the United States reveals that proximity is not necessary for cross-national 
diffusion, as many of the examples of policies originating abroad and subsequently being 
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adopted by states in a different country were between Australian originators and U.S. borrowers. 
However, it will be necessary to examine cross-national patterns of diffusion between U.S. states 
and states in non-English-speaking and non-commonwealth countries to ascertain if these 
findings are externally valid. Examples such as the U.S. states studying German Länder for 
energy policy and the fervent study that scholars and U.S. states alike have undertaken 
 of the economic policies of the country and city-states nicknamed the Asian tigers71 suggest that 
policy learning is not limited to English-speaking jurisdictions. However, examples of U.S. states 
learning from states in non-OECD countries are currently scarce in the literature. The study 
undertaken here will provide a good baseline from which to assess the volume of cross-national 
learning between states in non-commonwealth countries, states in non-western countries, and 
states in non-OECD countries.  
 These findings should also be viewed considering the additional national and sub-
national factors that may influence policy diffusion between states in general and between 
Australian, Canadian, and U.S. jurisdictions in particular. One factor that was not investigated 
here was the degree to which cross-national diffusion between Canadian provinces and U.S. 
states may be increased due to sharing of borders. It seems likely that this increases diffusion 
between these governments. The degree of autonomy that states have from their federal 
government is also a factor that should be investigated to determine how cross-national sub-
national diffusion depends on the extent to which a state or province is authorized to legislate on 
a policy topic.  
 
71 This nickname refers to South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, which together represent four 
jurisdictions widely praised for their rapid economic growth at the end of the 20th century. A search of the 
University of Michigan library database for the exact phrase “Asian Tigers” (excluding all hits for the Asian tiger 
mosquito) yields 41 journal articles between 1975 and 1990, 2,845 articles between 1990 and 2005, and 4,658 
articles written between 2005 and 2020. This indicates a steady fascination with the economic lessons that can be 
drawn from these non-western governments. 
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Another consideration is the degree to which a state or province’s federal government or 
state-level executive branch has already legislated on the issue and whether or how that affects 
subsequent state-level legislation. For example, Australia was the only country in the three 
countries studied here which made it a right to breastfeed in public before any of its states did, 
yet all seven Australian states and territories subsequently passed their own laws on this topic. 
The empirical tests in Chapter III and Chapter IV work to control for the latent influences of 
gubernatorial or bureaucratic policies that may have already been in place in some states by 
including state and policy random effects in Chapter III and policy fixed effects in Chapter IV. 
However, as Shipan and Volden discuss in their 2006 paper on vertical diffusion between local 
and state governments, more investigation into when policies passed at a different level of 
government—whether from above or below—result in the actor or actors under observation (in 
this case, state legislators) deciding that no policy adoption is necessary would be a welcome 
contribution to the literature. 
Finally, interest groups and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) likely also 
play a role in both promoting and hindering diffusion of policies from abroad. Professional 
groups such as the Insurance Institute of Highway Safety (IIHS) and the International 
Association of Engineers develop expertise in how the policies of interest to them are carried out 
around the world, and as a result may both advocate for policies they support and against policies 
they oppose.72  Organizations dedicated to governance such as the Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Organization, the National Conference of State Legislatures, and the International Association of 
 
72 See section on graduated drivers licensing in Appendix IX; the International Institute of Highway Safety was a 
strong proponent of passing substantive graduated licensing systems and worked to make sure that new state laws 
did not simply pass symbolic legislation. It therefore seems likely that the IIHS would have relied on claims 
supported by evidence of best and worst practices from the graduated drivers licensing programs implemented in 
jurisdictions in other countries. 
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Court Administration simultaneously promote best practices like the aforementioned 
professional groups, while also going one step further to regularly put legislators, executive 
officials, and bureaucrats in contact to exchange policy ideas. Lastly, coalitions of sub-national 
governments such as the C40 Climate Leadership Group, the United Cities and Local 
Governments, and City Alliance (Swiney 2020) also likely foster diffusion, whether between 
state-level governments or from city governments up to state governments (as evidence from 
Shipan and Volden 2006 also suggests is common).  
It seems likely therefore that non-government organizations play a role in shaping the 
dataset of this study in terms of both the policies that were passed in some states, as well as in 
terms of policies that were not passed in others Though the expected effect of professional 
organizations, non-profits, and other non-governmental organizations is to generally increase 
cross-national policy diffusion rather than decrease it due to the known ability for NGOs to 
develop specialist knowledge in an area that makes them more likely to be familiar with 
successful policies in other jurisdictions, it must be noted that this study is not able to distinguish 
the cross-national policy diffusion attributable to legislator research or personal contacts from the 
diffusion attributable to NGO actors who advocated for a policy they discovered from a different 
country.  
Nonetheless, the studies here have several features that suggest the results are externally 
valid and applicable to other groups of states. First, the hallmarks of legislator interdependence 
likely to increase studying of states in other countries seem to exist in sub-national states all over 
the world. A review of the international roster for the annual Legislative Summit of the National 
Conference of State Legislatures indicates that the number of attending delegates from states in 
other countries more than doubled between 1998 and 2017. This suggests that legislators from 
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sub-national jurisdictions around the world find increased benefit from cross-national 
connections over time as more and more opportunities for collaboration arise. This example 
demonstrates both a rationale and a conduit for cross-national learning to occur between states in 
far more countries than just the three in this study.  
Second, many other states around the world have the capacity and professionalism that 
seem to increase the benefits of cross-national learning, meaning they are likely to participate as 
well. States, provinces, and prefectures like North Rhine-Westphalia and Bavaria, Zhejiang, Rio 
de Janeiro and São Paulo,73 Tokyo,74 Lagos (Nigeria), Gyeonggi (South Korea), and Maharashtra 
(India) are economic drivers of their countries and in many cases display high levels of 
professionalism that would enable them to study examples in other parts of the world and adapt 
them for use at home. Developing a measurement of professionalism that could standardize 
across states in different countries would greatly assist in measuring its effect on international 
policy learning, but there is no doubt that states around the world possess many of the capacities 
of legislatures in Australia, Canada, and the United States that are theorized to be important. 
Therefore, the results in these studies should be useful in furthering scholarly understanding of 
cross-national diffusion between other states and should guide the generation of theories and 
hypotheses about cross-national diffusion between larger and more diverse groups of sub-
national units. 
Lastly, these findings should be externally valid because it is expected that more policy 
ideas flow outward from U.S. states to other jurisdictions abroad than flow inward to U.S. states, 
which was the primary focus of this study. The United States has almost four times as many 
 
73 The states of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo (both of which contain cities by the same name) are, in addition to 
Minas Geris and Espírito Santo, considered two of the states most responsible for driving the Brazilian economy. 
74 Tokyo is another example of a jurisdiction where a city and a prefecture share the same name. 
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jurisdictions as Canada and more than seven times as many jurisdictions as Australia. By sheer 
numbers alone it is almost inevitable that the U.S. states are producing more policy ideas in the 
aggregate than arise from other systems with far fewer jurisdictions. When coupled with the high 
levels of state autonomy and authority that the U.S. states have inherited from a system that 
heavily prioritizes states’ rights compared to other federal systems, it seems likely that a more 
thorough examination of policy borrowing in Canada or Australia or sub-national jurisdictions in 
many other countries would reveal as many or more examples of policies borrowed from the 
U.S. states as this project was able to find of U.S. states borrowing from abroad.  
Overall, therefore, the finding that cross-national diffusion occurs systematically seems 
applicable to a broader range of states and provinces than just those in Australia, Canada, and the 
United States. The findings suggest that state-level institutions and attributes are associated with 
propensity for international learning in ways that invite additional investigation. The historical 
evidence mentioned in Chapter I and empirical evidence from three different quantitative studies 
relying on vastly different methodologies in Chapters II through IV all point to cross-national 
diffusion occurring between U.S. states and states and provinces in different countries. 
Opportunities for Future Research 
These findings present several fruitful possibilities for future research. The first would be 
to investigate further the research practices that promote or discourage cross-national policy 
learning. A finding that cross-national learning is very labor intensive and depends on having 
large research staffs and the capacity for international site visits would indicate a very different 
reason for the volume of cross-national learning currently underway than if cross-national 
research can be satisfactorily completed over the internet and via teleconferencing. A second 
avenue of exploration would be to better understand how policies change when legislators 
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transfer them from a foreign context to a domestic context. A study examining whether the 30% 
reduction in similarity between the policy originator and the policy borrower in Chapter IV is 
due more to adding additional clauses to comply with federal legislation but in all other ways is 
quite similar, or, rather, is due to significant changes in the policy itself, would shed light on the 
degree to which policymakers truly transfer policies between countries and therefore the extent 
to which cross-national learning (or emulation) may be occurring. 
Another factor that should be investigated is the extent to which policy characteristics 
affect adoption outcomes. It would be very useful to investigate whether same-country and cross-
national policy diffusion vary based on policy characteristics such as complexity, ideological 
leaning or moral stance, provision of public or private goods, and many other dimensions. 
Developing a system to categorize policies by complexity, number of studies conducted, 
publicity of results, etc. would enable a more accurate investigation by integrating a more 
nuanced acknowledgement of policy variety into the models than the fixed and random effects 
presented in Chapters III and IV. 
Testing the external validity of these findings by increasing the number of states in 
different countries studied, as well as the number of policies included, will provide better data 
from which to make improved conclusions. As discussed in the previous section, one promising 
first foray along these lines would be to conduct the same study on policies that lawmakers 
adapted from U.S. states to Canadian and Australian provinces and states. This would be useful 
because it is theorized that these states and provinces borrow at least as many ideas from U.S. 
states as U.S. state legislators have borrowed from them. Data limitations on the legislative 
professionalism of these jurisdictions prevented their being included in this study. However, this 
information could be readily assembled using the same sorts of data used for the Squire Index 
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and the Bowen and Greene index in terms of legislator salaries, session length, and staff 
volumes. Studying outbound cross-national policy learning from the United States would provide 
great benefit in terms of enhancing our understanding of cross-national sub-national diffusion. A 
study incorporating Australian and Canadian states and provinces would also provide useful 
variation for testing a more nuanced theory of the association between Legislative 
Professionalism and cross-national policy borrowing, as described in Chapter IV. 
Developing a cross-national index of Citizen Ideology and State Ideology would permit 
for examination of whether a state’s political leanings are associated with any effect on who a 
state’s policymakers study abroad. This is an attribute that has been found to be influential in 
determining who states look to for examples within their own country. (Grossback and Peterson 
2004) It was not found to be a driving factor in Chapter III, potentially because the policies 
included were not dramatically liberal or conservative and therefore may have been more likely 
to be adopted by states of any ideology. However, a promising avenue of research is to more 
thoroughly investigate if this is also an important predictor of cross-national diffusion. 
Systematizing a measure of ideology for states and provinces in other countries would permit for 
an investigation of how the ideology of both borrowing and lending states are associated with 
cross-national policy adoption, both in terms of which policies are taken across international 
borders and where they come from, as well as which states are most likely to adopt them. 
A promising and related avenue of future research would be to investigate the conditions 
under which borrowing policy (measured in either broad policy concepts, specific legislative 
text, or both) from states in other countries instead of states in the same country is associated 
with more political risk to legislators considering the policy transfer. Legislators are known to be 
risk averse and scholars such as Rose 1991, Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, and Parinandi 2020 
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suggest that policy borrowing may be one way to justify actions and decrease risk by 
demonstrating how a policy has worked well in a third-party example. Thus, it would be useful 
to examine the extent to which third-party states in different countries are seen as more or less 
credible and how this affects cross-national sub-national diffusion. As stated in Chapter IV, an 
argument can be made supporting either position. The suggestion in the preceding paragraph to 
measure the political ideologies of states in different countries would greatly facilitate this 
research, as policymakers’ perceptions of which states are credible are likely tied to the extent to 
which the ideology of the policymakers in both states is similar. Examining how risky borrowing 
policies from states in foreign countries is perceived to be, especially when the ideological 
similarity of state-and-province pairs is accounted for, will provide great insight into the extent 
that policymakers view policies from foreign states as transferable to home states, and therefore 
their usefulness. 
Categorizing policies by the extent to which success outcomes can be measured would be 
also be helpful for this. Such a measurement is a concept that Shipan and Volden 2008 frame as 
both important and difficult. Creating a dataset that standardizes success measures across many 
policy categories instead of just anti-smoking legislation (Shipan and Volden 2008) or renewable 
portfolio standards (Nicholson-Crotty and Carley 2016) would be an even greater challenge. 
Nonetheless, studies could investigate the extent to which cross-national policy diffusion is 
associated with either concrete success outcomes (in proactive policies with a stated objective) or 
perceived success outcomes (such as through average sentiment scores in studies and news 
media published about the policy). Studying how these outcomes in foreign states and provinces, 
as well as potentially from same-country states who adopt later, are associated with changes in 
policy adoption behavior would greatly improve scholarly understanding of the extent to which 
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policy outcomes in foreign and domestic jurisdictions are valued by legislators crafting policy. 
This in turn will provide great insight into the perceived risks of borrowing policies of foreign 
origin. 
Contributions 
This project thus advances the policy diffusion literature in terms of developing a theory 
of systemic cross-national sub-national policy diffusion that theorizes about the conditions under 
which state policymakers will look abroad rather than looking to domestic role models, as well 
as the processes by which they undertake this course of study. The findings add perspective to 
current theories and understanding of policy diffusion by showing that cross-national diffusion 
should be considered when discussing policy origins, both for an accurate understanding of 
policy evolution and also in order to attribute the proper characteristics to borrowing legislatures. 
For example, if New York is credited with creating ten policies that it in fact researched and 
imported from abroad, scholars may overestimate the ability of the New York legislature to 
formulate very innovative policies, while at the same time underestimating its capability to 
discover successful policies abroad and adapt them for use at home. These are two separate 
legislative processes that should not be blurred together.  
It is therefore important to incorporate the search for foreign examples into scholarly 
understanding of legislator policy research behavior because this reveals another facet of 
legislator creativity and drive to construct useful policy while operating under pressing political 
and time constraints. With studies such as that of Carley and Nicholson-Crotty published as 
recently as 2018 that point to extreme variation in the number and type of sources consulted, this 
is an area of policy diffusion research with active theoretical questions about how multiple 
sources of inspiration are synthesized into a single policy. These theories can generate both 
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quantitatively testable hypotheses and call for very comprehensive qualitative case studies that 
can provide insight into legislator and staff strategies for policy research.  
The research presented here also contributes by highlighting the importance of legislative 
professionalism in the cross-national context in addition to the same-country context in which it 
is often considered. It suggests that many factors drive policy similarity between states in 
different countries, and that these factors may also be affected by the professionalism of at least 
the borrowing state and possibly also the originating state. More work will be able to properly 
isolate and identify how legislative professionalism and its contributing elements promote access 
to foreign policy concepts, as well as how professionalism leads to changes that ultimately 
render the policy less similar to the policy originator.   
From a methodological perspective, this project integrates several methods and applies 
them to new contexts. I use network analysis to create a network that incorporates states from 
three countries instead of just one country, thereby opening the possibility to uncover new 
relationships between states outside national boundaries. I also use generalized linear mixed 
models that incorporate time splines to model states and policies as random effects whose slopes 
can vary. This provides valuable insight into the unpredictable influence of individual states and 
policies on adoption outcomes. In Chapter IV, I apply text analysis to the comparison of policy 
verbiage in states in different countries, and explore the delineation needed between theories of 
policy innovation and copy-and-paste policymaking to better identify if professional states 
innovate more or emulate more. I also contribute more evidence to the suitability of Heckman 
selection models for use in policy diffusion studies based on their ability to counter the selection 
bias problem that is endemic to policy diffusion studies where many states’ policy similarities 
cannot be known due to those states never adopting the policy. Lastly, this project also 
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contributes methodologically by demonstrating the need for a Heckman selection model that can 
account for repeated events and varying hazard rates in the first stage of the model due to the 
changing likelihoods of policy adoption based on the number of other states that have adopted. 
Implications 
The evidence of cross-national diffusion documented in this project has very positive 
implications for the state-level policymaking process and its impact on human life worldwide. It 
means that successful policy ideas are almost certainly created and discovered faster than they 
would have been if diffusion were not occurring. Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Louis 
Brandeis was the first to describe the U.S. states as laboratories of democracy in 1932 and did so 
in an explanation of how vital it was that the Supreme Court carefully consider the “serious 
consequences” of denying a state the right to experiment “in things social and economic.” (New 
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann) State-level experimentation enables many different policy ideas to be 
tried and good ones to be discovered faster. Naturally, increasing the number of experimenting 
actors allows lawmakers to try more policies in shorter succession and thus for the best ideas to 
be discovered more rapidly and diffuse more rapidly among all states who can benefit from 
them. Just as fifty U.S. states are better able to test multiple concepts and arrive at successful 
practices faster than the thirteen original colonies would be able to do, so too are seventy states 
and provinces from Australia, Canada, and the United States better able to test more ideas and 
arrive at policy solutions faster than just fifty American ones. When it comes to policy 
innovation, a larger network is almost certain to be more helpful than a smaller network, 
provided that policymakers can study and learn from their foreign counterparts. 
A question that has been raised from time to time is whether state legislators can become 
unduly influenced by foreign ideas in the study of policy from foreign states and provinces, 
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especially by private interests. Although this does not seem likely to be a problem when 
legislators borrow an innovative policy that is soon to become commonplace (such as bike 
sharing or graduated drivers licensing), it may be more of a concern when legislators actually 
travel to foreign locales, especially if their trips are purchased by special interest groups. Some 
constituents fear these trips might make them spend excessive amounts of taxpayer dollars, 
become beholden to organizations that sponsor the trips, or develop a new policy perspective that 
unfairly prioritizes a foreign influence. For example, in December 2019 a group of Minnesotan 
state legislators traveled to Israel and became the subject of an editorial published in the 
Minnesota Star Tribune that noted:  
“House Speaker Melissa Hortman is a prominent legislator on the tour. In 
a statement, she said she wants to learn about ‘the complex political and security 
issues facing Israel and the region.’ Such language is often code for justifying 
Israel’s brutal occupation of Palestinian territory, including the arrest and 
imprisonment without trial of Palestinians – even children. It is also used to 
justify controversial laws aggressively promoted by Israel’s lobbyists. Such laws 
aim to discourage American citizens from participating in the international BDS 
(boycott, divest, sanction) movement to protest Israel’s treatment of Palestinians. 
Sadly, Minnesota is one of 27 states that have passed such laws.” 
Ultimately, the possibilities alluded to in this editorial for foreign interest groups to sway 
policy are a separate issue from the potential benefit from studying and observing cross-national 
policy. The ability of foreign interest groups and lobbies to sway legislation is a serious threat 
that should not be underestimated. However, evidence suggests that this problem threatens many, 
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if not most policy areas today, not just topics that are overtly related to foreign policy.75 
Policymakers and constituents alike should therefore consider it a crucial duty to scrutinize all 
policy areas for evidence of either domestic or foreign corruption, and should not discount the 
benefits to be gained from cross-national learning out of a concern that cross-national policy is 
the primary bastion of negative foreign interference. In the case of the Minnesota state legislators 
traveling to Israel, the legislators themselves responded a week later with an editorial in the 
Tribune entitled “Yes, we state legislators belong in the Mideast. Here’s why we’re there,” in 
which the seven co-authoring legislators addressed the issue of trip funding and noted that 
“To be clear, all of us are participating in this bipartisan trip using our 
own personal funds. Since the next legislative session is not set to begin until 
February, none of us are taking time away from our responsibilities at the State 
Capitol to be here….On Monday we received briefings from the talented 
professionals of companies with a significant Minnesota presence about the 
remarkable breakthroughs driven by their Israeli researchers. Similarly, we met 
with experts in cybersecurity and data privacy whose work is critical for our 
state’s economy. It was fascinating to learn more about the Israeli health care 
system…We look forward to returning home with insights and understanding we 
could not have gained without coming here.” (Kiel et al. 2019) 
Another normative concern that may be expressed in the United States about policies that 
come from other countries is that perhaps the policies are in some way contrary to an 
“American” way of life. American policymakers have occasionally been either critiqued or 
 
75 Several (though likely not all) of the conduits for foreign interest groups to donate to candidates and causes 
through dark-money political groups, ballot measure support, and super PACs are well documented (Sozan 2019). 
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praised (depending on the source) for engaging in American exceptionalism, described in 
Keleman 2014 as “the notion that the United States is unique among all other nations, and that 
because of its distinctive history, culture, and values the normal rules and historical forces that 
apply in other countries do not apply in America…and that policies, institutions, and values 
found in Europe [and presumably the rest of the world] cannot or should not take root in the 
United States.” This dissertation shows that, not only have many European ideas and policies 
benefitted U.S. citizens (such as Dutch bike sharing programs, German sanitization systems, and 
Norwegian energy resource policies), but also that many policies and ideas from other cities, 
states, and countries around the world have been of great benefit to the United States as well. 
Examples include such policies as bottle deposit laws from British Columbia,76 Cape Town 
sealing from South Africa’s Cape Province,77 and, in a timely example, even public use and 
promotion of face masks during health crises, which was pioneered in China to stop the spread of 
airborne sickness during the Manchurian plague outbreak of 1910.78 
All of these policies of foreign origin have been embraced in the United States in levels 
that range from pockets of stout support in the limited areas where the policy is relevant and 
 
76 The Container Recycling Institute notes that “British Columbia’s beverage container recovery system, enacted in 
1970, is the oldest legislated deposit-return system in North America.”  
77 Cape Town sealing, also known as Cape sealing, is the process of paving over roads with Cape seal (a mix of tar 
and gravel) to extend the service life of the road. Consisting of “a chip seal covered by a slurry seal or a 
microsurface,” the process was developed in Cape Province in South Africa in 1950 and spread around the world 
due to its ability to provide “a smooth, dense surface, one having good skid resistance and a relatively long service 
life.”  (Solaimanian and Kennedy 1998) 
78 The use of the modern medical face mask to fight plague was pioneered by Liande Wu, an ethnically Chinese and 
Cambridge-educated doctor from Malaysia appointed by the Chinese imperial court to oversee efforts to fight the 
Manchurian plague epidemic of 1910, which had a 100% mortality rate among those infected. (Lynteris 2018). Wu 
theorized that the virus was airborne instead of being carried by rats and fleas, and that masks used in surgery to 
prevent doctors from infecting patients could also be used to prevent disease particles from spreading among plague 
victims. His innovation gained international traction when a French colleague who was also the head of the Beiyang 
Medical College refused to wear a mask and died within two days of being exposed to the plague. (Lei 2014, Jenne 
2018) Wu further assisted the international spread of the innovation by presenting a summary of his findings three 
months later at the International Plague Conference in modern-day Shenyang. (Jenne 2018) Writing for the New 
York Times, Lynteris 2020 notes that “when the Spanish influenza struck in 1918, face masks were readily adopted” 
around the world.  
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therefore in use (the aforementioned Norwegian energy resource policies in North Dakota), to 
acceptance that is widespread and commonplace (primary seatbelt laws and graduated drivers 
licensing systems). To borrow the phrasing used in Keleman 2014, these innovations and many 
others like them are evidence that “policies, institutions, and values” from both Europe and the 
rest of the world are quite capable of taking root in the United States. So many concepts and 
policies of foreign origin have become ingrained in U.S. culture that the argument that ideas 
from foreign states and countries are not valuable to, or are even contrary to American way of 
life seems to be predicated on a lack of understanding of how many commonly accepted ideas 
stem from states and countries abroad. It would be difficult to find an American citizen who 
would argue that either kindergarten or the Australian secret ballot system, for example, should 
not have been instituted in the United States. Instead, this project shows that policymakers in 
states and provinces around the world legislate on similar issues and develop policy innovations 
which are of widespread benefit to humans in jurisdictions far beyond where the ideas 
originated, including such jurisdictions as the U.S. states. 
Policy Recommendations 
These findings support the conclusion that cross-national policy proliferation has great 
potential to improve quality of life, but also requires more effort for legislators to study and 
borrow. Therefore, several policy steps can be taken to maximize the sharing of best practices 
between cross-national jurisdictions. These can be summarized into four specific policy 
recommendations. The first is that sub-national government policymakers should integrate at 
least a small amount of news about policy developments in other parts of the world into their 
standard process of learning about current events in order to reap the benefits of policy 
innovation abroad for use at home. The impressive volume of innovative sub-national policies 
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that originate outside of the United States demonstrates that very successful ideas regularly begin 
in other parts of the world and that legislators who discover these policies first stand to gain the 
most legislative credit for their transfer to the home state.  
Second, legislators and lobbyists alike should incorporate at least a cursory look at a 
policy’s global history into their research process for any specific bill if they are not doing so 
already (as theorized in Chapter IV). While it is true that legislators are pressed for time and 
cannot investigate any one policy topic as thoroughly as a bureaucrat might be able to, it is also 
the case that legislators conduct more research when drafting legislation than during any other 
activity and use more outside sources (as opposed to contacts in the legislature) for bill formation 
than for any other activity. (Mooney 1991) Furthermore, many legislators display genuine desire 
to craft the best policy possible that will do the most good and which is as airtight as possible 
against lawsuits. (Bogenschneider et al. 2019) Researching policies from abroad can accomplish 
this by approaching old policy problems from new perspectives and guaranteeing that the 
legislator’s proposed policy direction has the chance to be globally cutting edge, not just at the 
fore of domestic solutions to the topic. Nonprofits and other policy specialist organizations could 
make it vastly more efficient for legislators to access this research during the policymaking 
process. Many such organizations do this already and presumably this results in policies that 
lawmakers have vetted more thoroughly and whose outcomes in various settings can be more 
clearly predicted. This decreases the personal risk faced by legislators of proposing a policy 
whose outcome is uncertain, so any steps taken to facilitate this will be beneficial for both 
legislators and policy activists.  
Third, as suggested in the preceding two paragraphs, organizations that act as general 
information clearinghouses for state legislatures and executive branches on a wide array of 
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policy topics should formalize their efforts to collect and distribute information about beneficial 
policy developments abroad. The additional time and resources involved in collecting cross-
national information on policies that solve important problems facing constituents range from 
trivial (for a cursory google search) to exorbitant (for an out-of-country site visit). However, 
collecting information about a policy does not have to be such a barrier. Organizations like the 
National Conference of State Legislatures, the Uniform Law Commission, and state legislative 
research agencies could begin to more systematically include policy explanations for states in 
other countries on their websites in order to give legislators all the information that could benefit 
them in one convenient location. If the “laboratories of democracy” paradigm is accurate, 
providing more complete information about the known outcomes of policy experiments will 
enable legislators to create subsequent policies that they base on more accurate premises, thus 
increasing likelihood of successful outcomes. 
The value of compiling the results of worldwide policy experiments was highlighted in 
the coronavirus pandemic. Countries, states, and provinces met the challenge with wildly 
different policies and therefore provided critical opportunities for policymakers to study what 
might work in the face of grave danger to their communities. The severity of the problem was 
such that policymakers were forced to make life or death decisions with perilously incomplete 
information, suggesting that every additional example of how Policies A and B worked in 
Contexts C and D was likely important and useful to at least one other jurisdiction studying the 
problem. To improve lawmakers’ policy responses, the National Conference of State 
Legislatures announced that  
“Since the global outbreak of COVID-19, NCSL has been tracking 
more than 1,200 bills introduced in 42 state legislatures and the District 
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of Columbia related to coronavirus. Our new State Action on 
Coronavirus database helps lawmakers and others keep up to date with 
real time information about bills related to and responding to COVID-
19.”79 
 However, despite acknowledging the virus’ global reach in the message, NCSL limited 
their database to U.S. state responses. By tracking only U.S. state legislation, this database risks 
overlooking best practices like those in the state of Kerala, India. The state’s low-tech yet 
effective response has been praised by The New York Times Interpreter, The Diplomat, The MIT 
Technology Review, and The Economist as one of the most successful state government 
responses so far, which suggests that elements of Kerala’s preparation and response may offer 
useful lessons that can be implemented elsewhere.80 Shipan and Volden 2020 point out how 
important it is for state legislators hoping to benefit from successful ideas elsewhere to not 
merely to emulate but to study which practices can best be transferred to the home context. 
Having the information about global responses available in a central location will make it easier 
for state legislators to do this, both for fighting COVID-19 and improving policy sharing more 
broadly. These agencies could also be extremely useful by developing indexed and searchable 
profiles of states in other countries that show the physical, economic, demographic, and 
industrial characteristics by which states in different countries might be similar to each other and 
might therefore stand to benefit from cross-national learning. Making it easier for states to learn 
about each other in this way would do much to facilitate cross-national partnerships.  
 
79 NCSL Distance Learning Report. Email received 22 May 2020 from marketing@ncsl.org. 
80 See Fisher and Taub 2020, Nowrojee 2020, Faleiro 2020, “Bargain Abatement.”  
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Fourth, states and state legislators themselves could help future generations of 
policymakers by documenting their policymaking process whenever possible. Studying what 
lawmakers have done outside a legislator’s home jurisdiction is a widespread practice. 
Policymakers can therefore help each other by fostering a culture of documenting their 
policymaking process for subsequent legislators to study and build on, in the same way that 
academic scholars strive for transparency so that subsequent researchers can use what was 
learned before and push the discipline further.  
This is a process that can be established over time and which could also come to be 
considered an aspect of legislative professionalism. For example, committee chairs could insist 
that bill sponsors add a summary of the research process to the committee website. Additionally, 
legislative research agencies helping a querying legislator could include reports of what previous 
legislators have read and who they have consulted with the help of the research agency when 
creating previous legislation on the same topic. Steps like these save legislators’ time by giving 
them clear and efficient access to a source that Mooney 1991 claims they value highly: previous 
legislators who have been in a similar situation and faced similar constraints. Incentives for any 
one legislator to benefit from other legislators’ documentation efforts but skip the cost of 
documenting his or her own process can be minimized by leadership establishing documentation 
of process as a norm in the legislature and as the mark of a respected legislator. Negative 
incentives to free ride could also be minimized by entrusting as much of the work of 
documentation as possible to third parties such as permanent staff and research agencies. By 
amassing several examples of inspiration in cross-national policy transfer, this study helps take a 
first step in this direction of improved documentation. 
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Concluding Remarks 
This study investigated the extent to which cross-national policy diffusion occurs 
systematically at the state level, as well as the institutional features of state-level government 
associated with this type of policy transfer. State-to-state cross-national diffusion seems to be the 
least studied level of cross-national diffusion between similar governing bodies81 yet continues to 
occur on a regular basis. Looking at diffusion through legislatures rather than executive branches 
also provided an opportunity to study diffusion among policymakers whose tenures are 
characterized by tension between the need for thorough research and pressing time constraints 
and a more politicized environment than bureaucratic agencies and executive branch leaders 
face. (Bogenschneider et al. 2013) The fact that a robust amount of international learning takes 
place even in U.S. state legislatures is a testament to the assertion that policy developments 
around the world can be useful far beyond the jurisdiction where they were created.  
Additionally, this project took an ambitious methodological approach to understanding 
the phenomenon of cross-national sub-national diffusion: the interdependent nature of policy 
diffusion via social network analysis, the unpredictable nature of states and policies via 
generalized linear mixed models, and the content of policy similarity with text analysis. The 
result is a broad examination that delivers a thorough introduction to the realm of cross-national 
state-level policy diffusion. Overall, these methods proved very well suited to revealing unique 
and important aspects of cross-national policy diffusion that provided insight on its structure and 
proliferation. 
The potential benefits of cross-national policy diffusion are clear in the urgent policy 
responses being considered by states to combat COVID-19. Dolowitz and Marsh 2000 (17) note 
 
81 Compared to city-city cross-national diffusion and country-country cross-national diffusion 
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that “if there is some form of ‘global’ crisis, such as the economic downturn during the mid-
1980s, actors are more likely to feel some pressure to engage in transfer.” The emergency 
lockdown actions taken by governors represent only a first wave of policy diffusion on this topic. 
Every branch of state-level government will be grappling for years to come with issues that have 
no known answers as they deliberate on how to handle financial fallout from the current 
pandemic, preparedness for future pandemics, the correct balance of emergency powers that 
should be delegated to executive branches, appropriate safeguards for personal privacy in the 
face of urgent public need, and more. With citizens around the globe deeply affected by the 
pandemic, there is much potential for carefully researched and well-formulated cross-national 
sub-federal collaboration to accelerate the diffusion of helpful policies that can bring relief faster 
to people all over the world.  
But the importance of cross-national sub-national collaboration stands on its own in 
normal times as well. Implementing primary seatbelt legislation in terms of lives and dollars 
saved is one of the most tangible examples of normative benefits provided by cross-national 
learning. Estimates in Grey 1985 indicate that the state of Virginia would lose at least 66 – 261 
lives annually and pay $1.2 to $3 million dollars82 in expenses related expressly to traffic 
fatalities caused by not wearing a seatbelt for every year that a primary seatbelt law was not 
implemented. When aggregated over time and across jurisdictions globally, and adjusted to 
account for productivity saved by avoiding death and injury, primary seatbelt legislation has 
helped save tens of thousands of lives and likely avoided what would now be trillions of dollars 
in medical costs. Examples like this reveal in bold strokes the kinds of benefits available to 
 
82 $2.96 to $7.4 million in 2020 dollars 
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legislators who can successfully discover policies from states in other countries and adapt them 
for home use.  
Plato observed that citizens of a “well-ordered city” could “amend what is deficient” and 
“establish more firmly institutions…which are good already” by studying foreign examples to be 
found “over sea and over land.” Almost two thousand four hundred years later, modern cities and 
states continue to heed this advice. In the modern era, state congresses, legislatures, assemblies, 
Landtäge, prefectures, parliaments, provincial committees, and regional councils worldwide face 
a plethora of similar problems at the same time and in rapid-fire sequence. This is abundantly 
clear even in the non-COVID-related policies legislators are tackling this year, such as the 
legality of microchipping employees, whether nut milks and plant-based proteins can be labeled 
as milk or meat, taxing music and video streaming services, drones, artificial intelligence, 
transgender athletes, electronically linking suicide hotlines, block chain and cryptocurrencies, 
scooter regulations, “fair work” scheduling, Next Generation 911 services, and much more. Clear 
answers for most of these topics are not readily apparent, and states around the world are taking 
innovative stances that will be of value to states in other countries. Though he could not have 
envisioned the topics on which policymakers would conduct “examination and inquiry,” Plato 
would no doubt be gratified to see the extent to which policymakers in sub-national states and 
provinces around the world study and borrow each others’ best practices to the benefit of 
constituents at home. Indeed, as cross-national networks strengthen with continued improvement 
in communications, the opportunity for policymakers to find beneficial policies for their 
communities from counterparts in other countries will only continue to grow. 
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APPENDIX I  
Goodness of Fit Statistics 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Goodness of Fit Statistics for Model 2 (55 Policies) 
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Figure 10: Goodness of Fit Statistics (Cross-National Ties Only) 
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APPENDIX II   
Edge Lists (55-Policy Networks Only) 
 
Edges Emanating from Australia, Ranked by Improvement to Model Fit 
         Origin Node   Destination Node   Improvement P-Value 
1    New South Wales Northern Territory   367.15407 7.327770e-10 
2    South Australia  Western Australia   364.32137 6.370388e-09 
3    South Australia         Queensland   358.48867 2.776626e-08 
4    South Australia           Tasmania   319.48867 9.093300e-08 
5    New South Wales           Victoria   293.32326 6.485614e-07 
6         Queensland    New South Wales   250.82515 2.269186e-05 
7           Victoria    South Australia   173.66163 9.755369e-04 
8    New South Wales Western Australia   141.16352 1.640445e-03 
9           Victoria    New South Wales   128.66352 3.900147e-03 
10   New South Wales    South Australia   104.66352 1.003456e-02 
11          Victoria         Queensland    99.33081 1.089706e-02 
12        Queensland           Victoria    97.33081 3.198933e-03 
13   New South Wales           Tasmania    96.49811 7.209707e-03 
14   South Australia    New South Wales    76.49811 2.263828e-02 
15        Queensland Northern Territory    74.16541 7.609077e-03 
16        Queensland    South Australia    71.49811 3.053450e-02 
17          Victoria           Tasmania    70.66541 1.919605e-02 
18 Western Australia    South Australia    44.16541 8.064690e-02 
 
 
Edges Emanating from Canada, Ranked by Improvement to Model Fit 
         Origin Node      Destination Node  Improvement P-Value 
1       British Columbia                   Alberta   317.32326 1.765523e-07 
2                Ontario                  Manitoba   300.15596 2.307497e-08 
3                Ontario          British Columbia   298.15596 1.516366e-07 
4                Ontario               Nova Scotia   268.82326 1.195113e-06 
5                Ontario                    Quebec   248.32515 7.898022e-06 
6       British Columbia Newfoundland and Labrador   243.82326 1.054343e-06 
7                Ontario      Prince Edward Island   237.15785 3.122700e-06 
8                Ontario             New Brunswick   235.32515 1.533864e-05 
9       British Columbia              Saskatchewan   226.49244 1.937065e-05 
10                Quebec     Northwest Territories   192.32515 2.438440e-05 
11               Ontario                     Yukon   182.32704 1.436072e-04 
12               Alberta                   Nunavut   170.16163 8.193017e-04 
13           Nova Scotia                   Ontario   155.49433 5.842723e-04 
14              Manitoba          British Columbia   153.99622 6.436814e-04 
15         New Brunswick Newfoundland and Labrador   121.66352 2.024093e-03 
16           Nova Scotia                  Manitoba   108.83081 2.604575e-03 
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17           Nova Scotia             New Brunswick   103.33081 6.473639e-03 
18               Alberta               Nova Scotia    95.33081 1.944656e-03 
19 Northwest Territories                   Nunavut    92.83081 1.513259e-02 
20         New Brunswick      Prince Edward Island    90.49811 7.233794e-03 
21                Quebec              Saskatchewan    90.33081 8.902337e-03 
22                Quebec                   Alberta    90.33081 1.278497e-02 
23                Quebec                   Ontario    88.33081 9.887393e-03 
24               Alberta                  Manitoba    80.99811 1.638150e-02 
25              Manitoba                    Quebec    77.33081 1.718741e-02 
26              Manitoba     Northwest Territories    76.49811 5.437986e-03 
27  Prince Edward Island Newfoundland and Labrador    72.33270 7.729352e-03 
28               Alberta              Saskatchewan    68.99811 1.747237e-02 
29               Ontario              Saskatchewan    58.99811 3.903754e-02 
30         New Brunswick          British Columbia    54.66541 2.733932e-02 
31      British Columbia                   Ontario    54.16541 4.479977e-02 
32  Prince Edward Island                    Quebec    53.66541 4.574003e-02 
33           Nova Scotia                    Quebec    48.16541 6.486388e-02 
 
 
Edges Emanating from the United States, Ranked by Improvement to Model Fit 
       Origin Node Destination Node   Improvement P-Value 
1       California          Montana   480.81759 5.976131e-11 
2       Washington          Indiana   471.48489 3.671490e-10 
3        Wisconsin         Maryland   459.81759 2.327493e-10 
4        Wisconsin           Oregon   457.31759 5.260135e-10 
5       Washington          Vermont   456.81948 1.751708e-07 
6        Wisconsin    West Virginia   456.48489 2.993066e-08 
7       California         Nebraska   449.98489 5.496756e-10 
8       California            Texas   448.81759 2.649505e-10 
9    West Virginia          Wyoming   443.65219 1.125406e-08 
10       Wisconsin       Washington   442.48489 1.180176e-08 
11      Washington         Colorado   439.81948 6.812641e-09 
12     Connecticut     Pennsylvania   439.48678 3.969691e-09 
13      Washington     Rhode Island   431.98678 4.828078e-09 
14      California         Missouri   426.81948 4.163215e-09 
15       Louisiana   South Carolina   424.81948 2.822195e-09 
16      California    New Hampshire   420.31948 2.687517e-09 
17       Wisconsin       New Jersey   416.81948 2.278720e-08 
18        Colorado        Louisiana   407.65407 2.061448e-08 
19      New Jersey             Ohio   407.48678 1.342690e-08 
20      California   North Carolina   405.81948 2.418879e-09 
21       Minnesota        Tennessee   402.65407 2.080217e-08 
22       Wisconsin         Michigan   398.31948 4.307463e-08 
23     Connecticut            Maine   393.98678 1.379766e-08 
24       Wisconsin         Virginia   390.98678 1.507696e-07 
25        Colorado         Kentucky   389.32137 5.722310e-08 
26       Louisiana       New Mexico   387.15407 3.610142e-08 
27      California         Illinois   387.15407 5.599843e-08 
28       Wisconsin        Minnesota   384.81948 7.736294e-08 
29      California          Florida   382.98678 3.511529e-08 
30      New Jersey         Delaware   379.65407 3.102322e-08 
31      Washington         Oklahoma   372.48867 1.589581e-07 
32      New Jersey       California   371.82137 6.044822e-08 
33       Wisconsin           Kansas   369.98678 1.316149e-07 
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34       Wisconsin             Iowa   361.15407 8.101847e-07 
35      California            Idaho   358.82137 2.114499e-07 
36   Massachusetts      Connecticut   358.32137 1.221403e-07 
37       Wisconsin           Nevada   352.15407 1.236694e-07 
38       Wisconsin          Arizona   350.65407 2.041840e-07 
39        Colorado             Utah   347.15596 6.001745e-07 
40       Wisconsin         Arkansas   344.98678 3.673182e-07 
41     Connecticut          Georgia   339.82137 3.274017e-07 
42       Minnesota     South Dakota   338.15596 6.629789e-07 
43       Wisconsin         New York   330.15596 1.893270e-06 
44        New York    Massachusetts   326.82326 1.636669e-06 
45        Colorado      Mississippi   320.48867 5.590887e-07 
46      California     North Dakota   314.48867 1.167172e-06 
47   Massachusetts        Wisconsin   300.15785 6.950047e-05 
48          Nevada          Alabama   296.49056 4.922448e-06 
49      New Jersey         Illinois   227.82704 1.464242e-04 
50   Massachusetts     Rhode Island   219.65974 6.642016e-05 
51        Colorado    West Virginia   202.66163 2.507432e-04 
52      California        Louisiana   191.32704 3.726316e-04 
53            Utah            Texas   190.32893 1.057265e-03 
54        Colorado          Montana   189.66163 2.238310e-04 
55       Louisiana      Connecticut   188.49433 2.311161e-04 
56        Colorado           Oregon   185.82893 5.528412e-04 
57       Minnesota            Idaho   182.99433 5.781494e-04 
58     Connecticut    Massachusetts   182.66163 5.715586e-04 
59    Rhode Island             Ohio   180.66163 6.091761e-04 
60       Minnesota            Maine   172.66163 7.891977e-04 
61         Arizona       Washington   170.82893 8.342725e-04 
62            Iowa          Georgia   170.82893 6.928875e-04 
63     Mississippi         Oklahoma   170.66163 1.110089e-03 
64      Washington     Pennsylvania   170.16163 1.253480e-03 
65      New Jersey         Colorado   170.16163 4.505961e-04 
66         Vermont         Nebraska   165.49622 5.803570e-04 
67       Wisconsin       California   163.82893 1.415097e-03 
68        Michigan             Iowa   162.82893 6.226783e-04 
69     Connecticut         New York   162.82893 1.309186e-03 
70           Maine          Vermont   161.82893 1.432967e-03 
71        Michigan           Nevada   159.82893 9.656599e-04 
72            Ohio         Virginia   159.82893 9.536021e-04 
73   Massachusetts        Minnesota   157.82893 1.041183e-03 
74           Maine         Missouri   155.99622 7.747846e-04 
75   Massachusetts         Maryland   155.32893 1.258874e-03 
76      New Jersey         Michigan   154.49622 1.461582e-03 
77         Vermont    New Hampshire   153.49622 9.353383e-04 
78            Iowa           Kansas   152.49622 1.618876e-03 
79        Oklahoma         Arkansas   151.16352 6.619928e-04 
80      Washington   North Carolina   150.49622 1.169480e-03 
81       Louisiana          Florida   150.32893 1.485502e-03 
82        Colorado          Indiana   148.49622 1.978963e-03 
83            Utah     North Dakota   144.49622 1.345651e-03 
84        New York       New Jersey   144.49622 2.157164e-03 
85      Washington       New Mexico   142.99622 1.882791e-03 
86      Washington           Alaska   138.82893 5.663548e-03 
87     Connecticut         Delaware   137.99622 1.809343e-03 
88       Minnesota           Hawaii   135.16163 2.254901e-03 
89     Connecticut           Oregon   129.66352 3.873146e-03 
90        Colorado        Tennessee   128.49622 3.700056e-03 
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91         Vermont          Arizona   127.66352 1.802990e-03 
92      California       Washington   123.49622 4.587597e-03 
93            Iowa        Wisconsin   121.16352 3.777361e-03 
94        Maryland         Kentucky   120.66352 5.375234e-03 
95         Vermont          Wyoming   116.66352 4.841840e-03 
96       Wisconsin         Missouri   115.66352 9.301866e-03 
97        Virginia         New York   114.66352 6.989552e-03 
98         Vermont         Illinois   111.83081 5.988618e-03 
99       Tennessee      Mississippi   109.83081 5.771833e-03 
100       Colorado       California   108.33081 5.353998e-03 
101           Iowa             Utah   107.16352 9.449028e-03 
102       Colorado          Vermont   104.33081 9.243987e-03 
103       Michigan        Minnesota   104.33081 4.799217e-03 
104           Utah          Florida   102.99811 8.267657e-03 
105     California           Kansas   101.99811 9.122677e-03 
106     California     South Dakota    97.16352 1.081592e-02 
107      Wisconsin         Colorado    96.33081 7.692008e-03 
108        Georgia        Louisiana    95.83081 1.096395e-02 
109     California         Michigan    94.33081 1.126601e-02 
110      Louisiana     Rhode Island    92.83081 1.155878e-02 
111           Ohio     Pennsylvania    92.83081 1.594895e-02 
112           Utah        Tennessee    92.33081 2.377031e-02 
113     California          Indiana    91.33081 1.193325e-02 
114        Montana         Delaware    89.83081 1.621295e-02 
115       Michigan        Wisconsin    89.33081 1.429220e-02 
116  Massachusetts         Oklahoma    88.83081 1.627369e-02 
117     California    Massachusetts    88.33081 1.704934e-02 
118 South Carolina      Connecticut    87.49811 1.395140e-02 
119        Georgia          Alabama    87.16352 1.223978e-02 
120        Arizona         Maryland    86.49811 1.131412e-02 
121        Vermont       New Jersey    85.99811 1.226013e-02 
122   Rhode Island    West Virginia    85.49811 1.733402e-02 
123     New Jersey         Arkansas    83.99811 1.572756e-02 
124     New Jersey       Washington    82.66541 1.651641e-02 
125       Kentucky    New Hampshire    81.99811 1.451078e-02 
126      Louisiana             Ohio    81.99811 1.908667e-02 
127       Colorado   South Carolina    80.49811 1.587626e-02 
128     New Jersey         Nebraska    80.49811 1.282042e-02 
129       Virginia   North Carolina    79.99811 1.709731e-02 
130       Colorado            Maine    79.49811 1.860789e-02 
131      Louisiana          Montana    78.49811 1.391293e-02 
132     New Jersey             Iowa    75.99811 2.218357e-02 
133        Vermont       New Mexico    75.49811 1.952745e-02 
134     California          Georgia    73.99811 2.592991e-02 
135     California           Hawaii    72.49811 2.386042e-02 
136     Washington         Virginia    72.16541 1.688160e-02 
137      Minnesota     North Dakota    71.16541 2.309996e-02 
138           Utah         Kentucky    70.49811 2.436544e-02 
139        Florida            Idaho    70.16541 2.162459e-02 
140        Florida       Washington    69.99811 2.096608e-02 
141      Tennessee          Vermont    69.99811 3.450097e-02 
142         Nevada            Texas    68.99811 1.523441e-02 
143   South Dakota          Arizona    67.66541 1.457463e-02 
144      Louisiana           Alaska    66.99811 4.098122e-02 
145           Utah         Arkansas    66.16541 2.771367e-02 
146           Utah    Massachusetts    64.49811 3.731939e-02 
147        Arizona           Nevada    64.16541 2.693039e-02 
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148  Massachusetts          Wyoming    63.49811 3.095595e-02 
149       Kentucky       New Jersey    62.99811 2.983275e-02 
150   Rhode Island      Connecticut    62.66541 2.276456e-02 
151       Illinois            Texas    62.16541 3.170236e-02 
152       Colorado             Ohio    59.16541 2.680816e-02 
153       New York     Rhode Island    58.66541 2.937942e-02 
154           Ohio   North Carolina    58.49811 3.856520e-02 
155      Minnesota          Alabama    57.16541 3.876711e-02 
156          Texas         Colorado    56.16541 3.789411e-02 
157     New Jersey    West Virginia    55.66541 3.654223e-02 
158    Connecticut        Wisconsin    55.16541 4.399594e-02 
159   North Dakota         Virginia    54.16541 3.485813e-02 
160       Colorado    Massachusetts    53.99811 4.676874e-02 
161  Massachusetts        Tennessee    53.66541 4.055157e-02 
162 North Carolina     Rhode Island    53.66541 4.404467e-02 
163        Florida        Minnesota    53.66541 4.228728e-02 
164      Wisconsin         Illinois    53.66541 4.613678e-02 
165      Louisiana    New Hampshire    53.16541 4.623532e-02 
166   Rhode Island         Michigan    51.66541 3.793854e-02 
167      Minnesota           Oregon    50.66541 5.364149e-02 
 
 
 
All Edges, Ranked by Improvement to Model Fit 
(Cross-national edges underlined) 
              Origin Node          Destination Node  Improvement P-Value 
1                Colorado                   Montana   480.48489 1.722803e-10 
2              Washington                   Indiana   469.48489 4.710846e-10 
3               Wisconsin                  Maryland   457.31759 3.138463e-10 
4               Wisconsin             West Virginia   456.48489 3.470050e-08 
5               Wisconsin                    Oregon   456.31759 7.235947e-10 
6              Washington                   Vermont   455.31948 1.958092e-07 
7              California                  Nebraska   449.98489 6.930698e-10 
8              California                     Texas   448.81759 3.418139e-10 
9           West Virginia                   Wyoming   442.65219 1.334501e-08 
10              Wisconsin                Washington   442.48489 1.393250e-08 
11             Washington                  Colorado   439.81948 8.128571e-09 
12            Connecticut              Pennsylvania   439.48678 4.792527e-09 
13             Washington              Rhode Island   431.98678 5.804776e-09 
14             California                  Missouri   426.31948 5.082550e-09 
15              Louisiana            South Carolina   424.81948 3.433774e-09 
16             California             New Hampshire   419.81948 3.292409e-09 
17              Minnesota                 Tennessee   417.98678 7.989627e-09 
18              Wisconsin                New Jersey   416.81948 2.648938e-08 
19               Colorado                 Louisiana   407.65407 2.402552e-08 
20             New Jersey                      Ohio   406.98678 1.589187e-08 
21            Connecticut                  Delaware   399.98678 1.548051e-08 
22              Wisconsin                  Michigan   396.81948 5.021260e-08 
23             California            North Carolina   395.31948 5.964748e-09 
24            Connecticut                     Maine   392.98678 1.619555e-08 
25              Wisconsin                  Virginia   390.98678 1.697358e-07 
26               Colorado                  Kentucky   388.32137 6.707838e-08 
27              Louisiana                New Mexico   387.15407 4.166348e-08 
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28             California                  Illinois   387.15407 6.407693e-08 
29              Wisconsin                 Minnesota   383.81948 8.867168e-08 
30             California                   Florida   382.48678 4.129959e-08 
31               Colorado                      Utah   376.98867 2.686184e-07 
32             New Jersey                California   371.32137 6.868474e-08 
33             Washington                  Oklahoma   370.98867 1.793577e-07 
34              Wisconsin                    Kansas   369.98678 1.477990e-07 
35             Washington         Western Australia   368.65219 1.596940e-07 
36              Minnesota                  Arkansas   362.15407 8.917695e-08 
37            Connecticut                   Georgia   361.65407 1.287423e-07 
38              Wisconsin                      Iowa   361.15407 8.858323e-07 
39             California                     Idaho   358.32137 2.362362e-07 
40          Massachusetts               Connecticut   356.82137 1.385876e-07 
41              Wisconsin                    Nevada   351.65407 1.383158e-07 
42              Wisconsin                   Arizona   350.15407 2.282920e-07 
43          Massachusetts                   Ontario   349.15407 1.046830e-07 
44              Minnesota              South Dakota   348.48867 2.780859e-07 
45              Wisconsin                  New York   330.15596 2.054780e-06 
46               New York             Massachusetts   326.82326 1.776753e-06 
47        South Australia                Queensland   326.48867 4.152821e-07 
48               Colorado               Mississippi   319.98867 6.214672e-07 
49             California              North Dakota   313.48867 1.289415e-06 
50       British Columbia                   Alberta   305.32326 3.368738e-06 
51        New South Wales                  Victoria   298.15596 1.855282e-06 
52                 Nevada                   Alabama   296.49056 5.251441e-06 
53            Connecticut           New South Wales   296.32137 8.496625e-07 
54          Massachusetts                 Wisconsin   290.15785 8.857656e-05 
55        South Australia                  Tasmania   290.15596 2.989170e-06 
56        New South Wales        Northern Territory   288.48867 6.435274e-07 
57                Ontario          British Columbia   286.65596 2.757571e-06 
58             California                  Manitoba   282.82137 3.684748e-07 
59                Ontario               Nova Scotia   262.82326 1.179552e-05 
60               Michigan                    Quebec   258.82326 3.335586e-06 
61             New Jersey                  Illinois   227.32704 1.503845e-04 
62                Ontario             New Brunswick   227.32515 6.311626e-05 
63          Massachusetts              Rhode Island   218.65974 6.835290e-05 
64                Ontario      Prince Edward Island   217.15785 3.389250e-05 
65                Ontario Newfoundland and Labrador   217.15596 2.980304e-05 
66             California              Saskatchewan   215.15785 2.088701e-05 
67             New Jersey           South Australia   209.15785 6.135440e-05 
68               Colorado             West Virginia   202.66163 2.523180e-04 
69              Minnesota                     Idaho   199.82704 2.761635e-04 
70                   Utah                     Texas   199.66163 5.148754e-04 
71             California                 Louisiana   190.82704 3.772711e-04 
72             California                   Montana   189.49433 3.978286e-04 
73              Louisiana               Connecticut   188.49433 2.393945e-04 
74               Colorado                    Oregon   185.82893 5.623091e-04 
75                 Quebec     Northwest Territories   183.82515 8.005150e-05 
76            Connecticut             Massachusetts   182.66163 5.828972e-04 
77     Northern Territory                   Nunavut   182.49433 6.524787e-04 
78              Minnesota                  Nebraska   181.66163 5.307079e-04 
79           Rhode Island                      Ohio   180.66163 6.309805e-04 
80                   Ohio                  Virginia   179.16163 4.558265e-04 
81        New South Wales         Western Australia   175.49622 2.116629e-04 
82            Nova Scotia                  Manitoba   174.82893 3.873887e-04 
83              Minnesota                     Maine   172.66163 8.036977e-04 
84            Connecticut                  Maryland   172.32893 6.257411e-04 
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85           Rhode Island                  Victoria   172.15974 4.358125e-04 
86                Arizona                Washington   170.82893 8.414900e-04 
87                   Iowa                   Georgia   170.82893 7.040457e-04 
88            Mississippi                  Oklahoma   170.66163 1.133287e-03 
89             Washington              Pennsylvania   170.16163 1.271771e-03 
90             New Jersey                  Colorado   169.66163 4.653509e-04 
91                Ontario                     Yukon   169.32704 3.521548e-04 
92              Wisconsin                California   163.82893 1.448189e-03 
93            Connecticut                  New York   162.82893 1.326998e-03 
94               Michigan                      Iowa   161.82893 6.335989e-04 
95                  Maine                   Vermont   161.32893 1.447393e-03 
96               Michigan                    Nevada   159.82893 9.848035e-04 
97          Massachusetts                 Minnesota   156.82893 1.047661e-03 
98                  Maine                  Missouri   155.99622 7.879312e-04 
99             New Jersey                  Michigan   154.49622 1.474291e-03 
100            California                  Arkansas   154.32893 1.702302e-03 
101               Vermont             New Hampshire   153.49622 9.466591e-04 
102                  Iowa                    Kansas   152.49622 1.634231e-03 
103            Washington            North Carolina   149.99622 1.174204e-03 
104              Colorado                   Indiana   148.49622 1.998554e-03 
105             Louisiana                   Florida   148.32893 1.485059e-03 
106              Manitoba          British Columbia   147.99622 1.136168e-03 
107            Queensland           New South Wales   147.32893 1.871384e-03 
108                  Utah              North Dakota   143.99622 1.362025e-03 
109             Minnesota                  Delaware   143.16352 1.313829e-03 
110            Washington                New Mexico   142.99622 1.897443e-03 
111              Victoria           South Australia   142.49622 2.859606e-03 
112              New York                New Jersey   142.49622 2.151568e-03 
113            Washington                    Alaska   138.82893 5.700372e-03 
114           Connecticut                    Hawaii   133.32893 3.133410e-03 
115           Connecticut                    Oregon   129.66352 3.893472e-03 
116              Colorado                 Tennessee   128.49622 3.678021e-03 
117               Vermont                   Arizona   127.16352 1.795458e-03 
118               Alberta              Saskatchewan   126.49622 1.834815e-03 
119          Rhode Island                Queensland   125.99622 3.509103e-03 
120            California                Washington   122.16352 5.142153e-03 
121                  Iowa                 Wisconsin   121.16352 3.792943e-03 
122              Maryland                  Kentucky   120.66352 5.483035e-03 
123              Arkansas Newfoundland and Labrador   117.16352 2.273371e-03 
124               Vermont                   Wyoming   116.66352 4.852558e-03 
125             Wisconsin                  Missouri   115.66352 9.338722e-03 
126               Vermont                  Illinois   111.33081 6.043222e-03 
127            Washington               Nova Scotia   111.32893 6.199821e-03 
128             Tennessee               Mississippi   109.83081 5.865472e-03 
129         Massachusetts                   Alberta   109.82893 3.923275e-03 
130              Virginia                  New York   109.16352 7.290277e-03 
131              Colorado                California   108.33081 5.400149e-03 
132                  Iowa                      Utah   107.16352 9.472137e-03 
133              Victoria                  Tasmania   105.99811 5.947307e-03 
134            Washington             New Brunswick   104.99622 6.156755e-03 
135              Colorado                   Vermont   104.33081 9.162149e-03 
136              Michigan                 Minnesota   104.33081 4.770039e-03 
137            California                    Kansas   101.99811 9.203718e-03 
138              Delaware              South Dakota   101.33081 6.884022e-03 
139       New South Wales                   Ontario    98.33081 5.312928e-03 
140                  Utah                   Florida    97.49811 8.060401e-03 
141             Tennessee                  Arkansas    95.83081 1.001967e-02 
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142               Georgia                 Louisiana    95.83081 1.107066e-02 
143                Quebec           New South Wales    95.16541 4.991697e-03 
144            California                  Michigan    94.33081 1.138040e-02 
145             Wisconsin                  Colorado    94.33081 8.085292e-03 
146       South Australia                 Tennessee    94.16352 2.502583e-02 
147              Colorado                    Hawaii    93.33081 1.406992e-02 
148             Louisiana              Rhode Island    92.83081 1.158503e-02 
149                  Ohio              Pennsylvania    92.83081 1.603075e-02 
150            California                   Indiana    90.83081 1.185887e-02 
151         Massachusetts                  Oklahoma    88.83081 1.630005e-02 
152               Alberta                  Victoria    88.66541 3.525166e-03 
153            California             Massachusetts    88.33081 1.725488e-02 
154       South Australia               Connecticut    87.83081 1.995673e-02 
155               Georgia                   Alabama    87.16352 1.237773e-02 
156              Tasmania                New Jersey    86.83081 2.107616e-02 
157          Rhode Island               Connecticut    85.49811 9.440920e-03 
158         New Brunswick      Prince Edward Island    85.49811 7.938380e-03 
159          Rhode Island             West Virginia    85.49811 1.764549e-02 
160            New Jersey          British Columbia    84.33081 2.106640e-02 
161            New Jersey                Washington    82.66541 1.653559e-02 
162       South Australia                 Wisconsin    82.33081 2.158843e-02 
163              Kentucky             New Hampshire    81.99811 1.453383e-02 
164             Louisiana                      Ohio    81.99811 1.900537e-02 
165         Massachusetts     Northwest Territories    81.33081 1.242000e-02 
166              Victoria                   Georgia    80.99811 2.031497e-02 
167       New South Wales                    Quebec    80.83081 8.519360e-03 
168              Colorado            South Carolina    80.49811 1.584230e-02 
169              Virginia            North Carolina    79.99811 1.763032e-02 
170              Colorado                     Maine    79.49811 1.868811e-02 
171             Louisiana                   Montana    78.49811 1.379896e-02 
172              Kentucky                New Jersey    77.99811 1.817975e-02 
173             Louisiana        Northern Territory    76.49811 1.217247e-02 
174             Minnesota                  Maryland    75.49811 2.256180e-02 
175            New Jersey                      Iowa    75.49811 2.273648e-02 
176       New South Wales                  Tasmania    74.49811 1.959399e-02 
177            Washington                 Wisconsin    73.99811 2.869739e-02 
178               Vermont                New Mexico    73.99811 1.848806e-02 
179               Vermont                  Nebraska    73.66541 9.571726e-03 
180            Washington                   Ontario    72.66541 1.804874e-02 
181            Washington                  Virginia    72.16541 1.685804e-02 
182             Minnesota              North Dakota    71.16541 2.275790e-02 
183          Saskatchewan           South Australia    70.66541 1.518850e-02 
184               Florida                     Idaho    70.16541 2.176340e-02 
185               Florida                Washington    69.99811 2.088160e-02 
186           Connecticut                  Kentucky    69.99811 2.580292e-02 
187              Colorado           New South Wales    69.16541 2.343433e-02 
188                Nevada                     Texas    68.99811 1.540723e-02 
189 Northwest Territories                   Nunavut    68.99811 2.514411e-02 
190             Tennessee                   Vermont    68.99811 3.451989e-02 
191       South Australia                    Nevada    68.49811 2.501624e-02 
192          South Dakota                   Arizona    67.66541 1.412110e-02 
193     Western Australia                  Manitoba    67.33270 2.951589e-03 
194             Louisiana                    Alaska    66.99811 4.103454e-02 
195               Alberta               Nova Scotia    66.16541 8.690112e-03 
196            California               Connecticut    65.99811 2.691129e-02 
197            New Jersey                  Delaware    65.49811 3.622137e-02 
198       South Australia         Western Australia    64.83270 2.513247e-02 
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199               Alberta             New Brunswick    64.16541 2.369818e-02 
200         Massachusetts                 Tennessee    63.66541 2.898174e-02 
201         Massachusetts                   Wyoming    62.99811 3.088283e-02 
202       South Australia                  Illinois    62.99811 3.720137e-02 
203              Illinois                     Texas    62.16541 3.105517e-02 
204               Arizona                      Ohio    60.99811 3.689958e-02 
205                  Utah             Massachusetts    59.99811 3.684095e-02 
206               Georgia                  Arkansas    59.83270 1.939535e-02 
207                  Ohio            North Carolina    58.49811 3.821987e-02 
208              New York              Rhode Island    58.16541 2.862233e-02 
209      British Columbia                      Utah    57.99811 3.465807e-02 
210              Victoria                Queensland    57.66541 3.632101e-02 
211             Minnesota                   Alabama    57.16541 3.926647e-02 
212            Queensland                   Alberta    56.83270 2.352981e-02 
213  Prince Edward Island Newfoundland and Labrador    56.50000 2.582631e-03 
214                 Texas                  Colorado    56.16541 3.724554e-02 
215            New Jersey             West Virginia    55.66541 3.682037e-02 
216       South Australia                California    55.49811 4.284470e-02 
217            Queensland        Northern Territory    55.33270 1.703369e-02 
218          North Dakota                  Virginia    54.16541 3.537839e-02 
219              Colorado             Massachusetts    53.99811 4.685619e-02 
220               Florida                    Nevada    53.66541 4.222002e-02 
221        North Carolina              Rhode Island    53.66541 4.530466e-02 
222               Florida                 Minnesota    53.66541 4.357849e-02 
223             Louisiana             New Hampshire    53.16541 4.631072e-02 
224    Northern Territory     Northwest Territories    53.00000 1.121472e-02 
225        North Carolina              Saskatchewan    52.83270 1.943927e-02 
225       New South Wales                   Florida    52.66541 4.483327e-02 
227               Vermont                New Jersey    51.16541 3.568857e-02 
228          Rhode Island                  Michigan    51.16541 3.897615e-02 
229              Maryland         Western Australia    51.16541 4.132578e-02 
230            Queensland                  Kentucky    50.99811 4.284274e-02 
231             Minnesota                    Oregon    50.66541 5.362942e-02 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 183 
 
APPENDIX III  
List of Policies Collected for Chapter II  
 
Table 11: Policies Used in Network Analysis (Boehmke and Skinner 2012) 
 
 
 
 184 
 
APPENDIX IV  
Discussion of In-Degree 
 Does the method used to test network interdependence pre-determine the outcome? 
Consider the statistically significant finding of positive In-Degree, indicating that the more 
inbound ties a state has attached to it, the more likely it is to garner an additional inbound tie. It 
is unlikely that the ERGM simulations would find this statistically significant if it does not 
accurately reflect the relationships between actors in the network. If actors in the network 
behaved in a way that discourages In-Degree, this variable would demonstrate indications of 
irrelevance for producing simulations that approximate the observed network. For example, if 
adopting policies from states in foreign countries had a reputation for delivering policies poorly 
suited to the home state, the sign on In-Degree would probably be negative to connote that the 
more inbound ties an actor has, the less likely it is to gain an additional inbound tie. However, no 
such stigma seems to exist. Evidence from Sugiyama 2011 and Parinandi 2020 shows that there 
are circumstances under which adopting policies from external sources can in fact be seen as 
superior due to authority attached to their neutral third-party status. Thus, the positive coefficient 
on In-Degree aligns with theoretical expectations for actors in a transnational policy diffusion 
network. 
 This chapter also demonstrates how ERGMs will return results counter to expectations if 
the network structure does not support the hypothesis. Reciprocity is a very common attribute of 
social networks, ostensibly because reciprocal behavior is a critical survival tool among social 
beings. (Cialdini 1987) But contrary to expectation, the data generated using the NetInf 
algorithm showed that this network does not exhibit meaningful Reciprocity. Subsequent 
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attempts to include a variable for Reciprocity in the ERGM simulations worsened model fit 
instead of improving it. The fact that the ERGMs successfully rejected a hypothesis about a 
variable that seemed likely to matter is a good sign that it is correctly assessing which factors 
accurately describe the network, and not simply returning coefficients that characterize all 
networks. Therefore, it would not likely include In-Degree if the network did not exhibit this 
property. 
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APPENDIX V 
States with Term Limits 
 
 
Figure 11: States with Term Limits (Lifetime Ban, Consecutive Ban, and Repealed) 
 
 
Using a Continuous Measure of Term Limits 
Sarbaugh-Thompson 2010 created a continuous measure of Term Limits that measures 
the increase in proportion of turnover in a legislature compared to its turnover in the decade 
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before limits were placed, adjusted for potential to cycle between legislatures. For example, term 
limits increase turnover by 27% in the Arizona legislature. Sarbaugh-Thompson 2010 (201) 
theorizes that the negative values for Louisiana and Nevada may indicate that the generous term 
limits of these states may inspire legislators to serve the full term instead of serving for fewer 
years as they did when there were no term limits. 
 
 
Table 12: Years of Impact and Severity of Term Limits by State 
State Year of Impact Year Enacted Severity 
California 1996 1990 1.37 
Maine 1996 1993 0.21 
Arkansas 1998 1992 1.99 
Colorado 1998 1990 0.33 
Michigan 1998 1992 1.55 
Oregon 1998 - 2002 1992 N/A 
Arizona 2000 1992 0.27 
Florida 2000 1992 0.15 
Montana 2000 1992 0.47 
Ohio 2000 1992 0.52 
South Dakota 2000 1992 0.09 
Missouri 2002 1992 0.75 
Oklahoma 2004 1990 0.00 
Nebraska 2000 2006 0.35 
Louisiana 2007 1995 -0.18 
Nevada 2010 1996 -0.02 
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APPENDIX VI  
Description of Policies in Dataset for Generalized Linear Mixed Models 
 
Table 13: Policies and First Adopters in Foreign Locations 
Policy State or 
Province  
of Origin 
Year First Foreign 
Adopter 
Year 
Charter Schools Minnesota 1991 Alberta 1993 
Individual Development Accounts Iowa, Kansas 1993 NA  
Identity Theft Laws Arizona 1996 South Australia 2003 
Infant Hearing Screening Utah, Virginia 1998 Ontario 2001 
Mandated Coverage of Clinical Trials Arizona 1994 NA  
Restrictions on Methamphetamine 
Precursors in over the counter drugs 
Oklahoma 1996 NA  
Office of Women’s Health Ohio 1993 British Columbia 1994 
Prescription Drug Monitoring California 1940 Queensland 1983 
Post-DNA Conviction Illinois 1997 NSW 2001 
Stalking Definition California 1990 Queensland 1993 
Credit Report Authorization Queensland 1971 California 2001 
Electricity Deregulation Alberta 1995 California 1996 
Graduated Drivers Licenses Ontario,  1993 Connecticut 1996 
Bicycle Helmets for Minors Victoria 1990 New Jersey 1992 
Kinship Care Laws Ontario 1984 California 1998 
State Lotteries Queensland 1916 New Hampshire 1964 
Primary Seatbelt Laws Victoria 1970 New York 1984 
Public Breastfeeding Laws Queensland 1991 Florida 1993 
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Smoking Banned in Work Area Ontario 1994 California 1995 
Strategic Transportation Authority Western Aus. 1966 Florida 1974 
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APPENDIX VII  
Descriptive Statistics for Chapter III (Term Limits and Cross-National Diffusion) 
 
 
 
Table 14: Descriptive Statistics (All Policies) 
All Observations 
 Min Mean Median Max St. Dev. 
Term Limits 0 NA 0 1 NA 
Term Limits Continuous Measure -0.18 0.05 0 1.99 0.31 
Foreign 0 NA 0 1 NA 
Proportion of Foreign Adoptions 0 0.16 0.05 1 0.24 
Neighbors Adopting 0 0.14 0 1 0.29 
Legislative Professionalism 0.03 0.20 0.17 0.66 0.12 
Citizen Ideology -2.28 0.08 0.02 2.97 0.92 
State Ideology -2.76 -0.13 -0.09 1.82 1.11 
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Table 15: Descriptive Statistics (Domestic and Foreign-Origin Policies) 
Domestic-Origin Policies Only 
 Min Mean Median Max St. Dev. 
Term Limits 0 NA 0 1 NA 
Term Limits Continuous Measure -0.18 0.04 0.00 1.99 0.32 
Foreign 0 NA 0 0 NA 
Proportion of Foreign Adoptions 0 0.07 0 0.65 0.17 
Neighbors Adopting 0 0.13 0 1 0.29 
Legislative Professionalism 0.03 0.20 0.17 0.66 0.12 
Citizen Ideology -2.28 0.12 0.06 2.97 0.93 
State Ideology -2.76 -0.10 -0.06 1.82 1.13 
Foreign-Origin Policies Only 
 Min Mean Median Max St. Dev. 
Term Limits 0 NA 0 1 NA 
Term Limits Continuous Measure -0.18 0.05 0 1.99 0.30 
Foreign 1 NA 1 1 NA 
Proportion of Foreign Adoptions 0 0.24 0.20 1 0.25 
Neighbors Adopting 0 0.15 0 1 0.28 
Legislative Professionalism 0.03 0.19 0.16 0.66 0.12 
Citizen Ideology -2.28 0.05 -0.01 2.97 0.90 
State Ideology -2.76 -0.16 -0.12 1.82 1.10 
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Table 16: Correlations 
  Term 
Limits 
Citizen 
Ideology 
State 
Ideology 
Legislative 
Professlsm. 
Neighbors 
Adopting 
Foreign 
Adopters 
Policy is 
Foreign 
Year 
Term Limits 1        
Citizen Ideology 0.01 1       
State Ideology -0.17 0.45 1      
Professionalism -0.01 0.32 0.20 1     
Neighbors Adopt 0.23 0.03 -0.17 -0.11 1    
Foreign Adopters 0.21 0.03 0.01 -0.13 0.33 1   
Policy is Foreign 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.35 1  
Year 0.37 0.07 -0.30 -0.13 0.55 0.51 -0.00 1 
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APPENDIX VIII 
Tables for Proportions of Foreign Adoptions by Country 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 17: Domestic Policies Only and Foreign Policies Only (Australian and Canadian Adopters) 
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Table 18: Association Between Term Limits and Policy Adoption 
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Table 19: Effect of Foreign Adopting when Term Limits are in Place (Domestic) 
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Table 20: Effect Foreign Adopting when Term Limits are in Place (Foreign) 
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APPENDIX IX 
Policy Details 
 
Graduated Drivers Licensing 
Graduated drivers licensing (GDL) is a system that requires new and, especially, young 
drivers, to pass through several stages of learner’s licenses before being issued a full driver’s 
license. The system is an effort to reduce younger driver fatalities. The concept of a graduated 
licensing system for beginning drivers first arose in the 1970s in the highway traffic and road 
safety industry. A 1977 paper by the U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
describing the concept is often cited as one of the seminal works on the concept. Though a few 
state legislatures instituted piecemeal aspects of the program, no U.S. state is considered to have 
implemented any major elements of the program and no model legislation was produced or 
circulated. (Mayhew et al. 2005 (3), Holloway 2007 (102))  
The first full GDL system was enacted in New Zealand and “much heralded in North 
America and cited extensively as a legislative initiative to emulate. Of equal importance was the 
commitment by New Zealand officials to evaluate the program’s effectiveness – an outcome 
anxiously anticipated by observers in North America.” (Mayhew et al. 2005 (3)) Ontario passed 
The Highway Traffic Amendment Act (Novice Drivers) on December 14th, 1993, thus launching a 
cascade of adoptions across North America. Adoptions in the United States began a few years 
later in 1996, when Kentucky passed the first bill on April 4th and Virginia, Connecticut, Florida, 
and Michigan followed within the year. This policy was picked up rapidly and thirty-three states 
 198 
 
adopted a graduated licensing program for student drivers by 1999. Mayhew et al. 2005 (5) note 
that the U.S. nonprofit Insurance Institute for Highway Safety compiled research and “actively 
promoted” the adoption of graduated licensing in the United States in addition to urging that the 
adoptions were rigorous and not superficial. This organization likely derived many of its 
researched conclusions from programs such as Ontario’s that were already in place, thus 
providing an example of when interest groups may assist in cross-national policy diffusion.  
 
Mandatory Bicycle Helmets for Minors 
This legislation requires minors of varying ages to wear a helmet while operating a bicycle, 
until only eight years of age in Rhode Island (passed in 1995) until as old as eighteen years of 
age (California (1993), Alberta (2001), New Mexico (2007), Manitoba (2012)). California and 
New York both passed laws mandating that passengers under the age of five must be equipped 
with helmets, but Victoria was the first state in the world to mandate that not just passengers but 
rather cyclists of all ages, including and especially minors, wear helmets in June of 1990 and 
taking effect July 1st. (Leicester et al. 1992 (221)) The results were quickly and extensively 
studied, with at least four studies specifically about the Victorian policy out by 1993 (see 
footnotes 8-11 in Lane and McDermott 1993 (721)).  
New South Wales was immediately behind Victoria, issuing regulations a mere four months 
afterward declaring on November 16th, 1990, that all bicycle operators, including minors, were to 
wear a helmet. Like Victoria, New South Wales quickly published and publicized at least three 
studies on the results of the legislation (see footnote 23 in Lane and McDermott 1993 (164)). The 
first mandatory bicycle helmet law for minors in the United States was passed a few years later 
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in New Jersey in 1992, and nineteen of the twenty-one adopting states had done so within ten 
years. With very few U.S. examples of success outcomes to turn to, it seems probable that the 
policy originators provided a starting point for drafting policy.  
Another reason that it is likely that policymakers in U.S. states were observing international 
peers is that Australia’s aggressive stance on helmets has gained worldwide recognition over the 
past several decades. The state of Victoria passed the world’s first state-level mandatory helmet 
law for all motorcyclists in 1960 (Curnow 2008 (141, 159), a deeply contested issue in the 
United States. (Jones and Bayer 2007) While not to be considered direct evidence of policy 
transmission, one anecdote provides credence for the concept that states whose legislatures are 
the first to pass a policy can develop a famous or infamous reputation for notable policies passed. 
An Australian journalist found upon a visit to the Netherlands that “helmets are nonexistent [in 
Amsterdam], and when people asked me where I was from, they would grimace and mutter: ‘Ah, 
yes, helmet laws.’ These had gained international notoriety on a par with our deadly sea 
animals.” (Mayerhofer 2008) This case thus presents a situation where policy leaders gain a 
reputation as being the first and noteworthy case that is memorable and then subsequently may 
be studied, if only as a jumping off point.  
 
Primary Seatbelt Legislation 
This is legislation that makes it a ticketable offense to drive without wearing a seatbelt. 
Previously, not wearing a seatbelt was considered a secondary offence and violators could only 
be ticketed if they were already pulled over for a separate offense. This legislation changed the 
laws so that drivers could be pulled over expressly for not wearing a seatbelt. The first 
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mandatory state-level seatbelt law in world was passed in Victoria in 1970 and “spread to a 
number of European countries, Canadian provinces, and other jurisdictions in the subsequent 
decade,” although Andreassend 1971 (593) claims that the country of Malawi passed a similar 
law before then to preclude Victoria from earning the distinction of creating the first such law in 
the world. (Wagenaar et al. 1988 (51)) As with mandatory bicycle helmets, this policy 
innovation was widely and publicly analyzed, with at least six studies being issued within the 
first ten years. (Conybeare 1980 (27))  
Like graduated drivers licensing, primary seatbelt legislation spread quickly through the 
United States when it eventually arrived. The first state to adopt it was New York in 1984. 
Twenty-eight states had passed legislation within two years, and forty-nine out of fifty states had 
passed enacting legislation within ten years. A report for the Virginia Highway and 
Transportation Research Council in 1985 wrote that  
“The purposes of this study were to review mandatory seat belt laws as 
they have been used around the world, to forecast the impact of such a law in 
Virginia, and if appropriate, to propose a mandatory seat belt law...The results 
indicate that a mandatory seat belt law would save hundreds of lives and cause 
great reductions in injuries from automobile accidents. The relatively low 
administrative costs associated with this law would be vastly outweighed by 
savings directly attributable to seatbelt use.” (Grey 1985 (vii))  
This suggests an example of legislation where policy originators facilitated policy diffusion with 
a clear and rigorous testing of results by which borrowers could assess the policy outcomes.  
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Right to Breastfeed in Public 
One policy with a unique pattern is the right to breastfeed in public. Legislation on this 
topic in the originating province of Yukon and other subsequent adopters in Canada and 
Australia frames the law in a human rights context, but early U.S. adopters framed it in the 
context of decriminalizing public nudity. The very low similarity score between Yukon and 
Florida (the first U.S. state to pass the legislation) reflects this. Policymakers in later states to 
adopt chose stronger language describing breastfeeding as a human right that more closely 
matches the original legislative text. 
An issue of very public contention, this topic covers legislation declaring that women have 
the right to breastfeed in any area of public accommodation. The first U.S., Canadian, or 
Australian sub-national state or province to codify this concept as a human right was Yukon on 
February 12th, 1987, when legislators amended the Human Rights Act to state that “it is 
discrimination to treat any individual or group unfavorably on any of the following grounds…(f) 
sex, including pregnancy, and pregnancy related conditions,” and states that “No person shall 
discriminate (a) when offering or providing services, goods, or facilities to the public.” This was 
followed almost immediately by Manitoba, whose legislators amended their Human Rights Code 
on July 17th, 1987, to state that “discrimination means differential treatment of an individual on 
the basis of…(f) sex, including pregnancy, the possibility of pregnancy, or circumstances related 
to pregnancy,” and forbid discrimination “with respect to any service, accommodation, facility, 
good, right, license, benefit, program or privilege available or accessible to the public or to a 
section of the public.” Although protected at the federal level in Australia since 1984, similar 
legislation arose in the Australian states of Queensland in 1991 and the Northern Territory in 
1992. Although the Queensland legislation was somewhat ambiguous about the circumstances 
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under which public breastfeeding was protected, the legislation of both Queensland and the 
Northern Territory explicitly include the term breastfeeding instead of leaving it to defendants to 
argue that breastfeeding is a pregnancy-related condition. (Easten 2003 (12)) The legislative text 
in each of these jurisdictions frames the issue as a matter of human rights and nondiscrimination, 
as did many of the policies subsequently adopted by Australian jurisdictions on this topic.  
The passage of the first U.S. state law on this topic in Florida on March 9th, 1993 
revealed that Floridian state legislators were not likely looking at their foreign counterparts when 
passing the legislation. The text of An Act Relating to Breastfeeding clearly shows that the 
purpose of the legislation was to reconcile the fact that studies reported that breastfeeding is 
beneficial to human development, but that “the social constraints of modern society militate 
against the choice of breastfeeding and lead new mothers…to opt for formula feeding for reasons 
such as embarrassment and the fear of social ostracism or criminal prosecution.” This 
explanation ostensibly refers to Florida’s laws regulating public nudity, indecent exposure, and 
“unnatural and lascivious acts,” the threat of which may have been intimidating to breastfeeding 
mothers. The Florida legislation proceeds to clarify the ways in which breastfeeding does not 
count as an obscene or sexual act. In contrast to the nondiscriminatory phrasing in the Canadian 
and Australian legislation, the sentence that declares breastfeeding in public to be a right is 
heavily oriented toward reframing breastfeeding as a noncriminal act: “A mother may breastfeed 
her baby in any location, public or private, where the mother is otherwise authorized to be, 
irrespective of whether the nipple of the mother’s breast is uncovered during or incidental to the 
breastfeeding.” As many of the other pieces of legislation passed in the U.S. soon thereafter 
follow this pattern, it seems unlikely that the first U.S. adopters of right to breastfeed in public 
legislation were passing this legislation in emulation of their foreign counterparts’ aspirational 
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tone, but rather were promoting breastfeeding as a health issue by amending previous laws to 
remove the threat of being prosecuted under legislation with potentially alarming phrases like 
“obscene, sexual, lascivious, deviant, genitals,” etc.  
In contrast to the early U.S. adopters, many of the later U.S. adopters follow the style of 
the Canadian and Australian legislation and indeed go much further to sanctify public 
breastfeeding as a human right rather than an activity that simply should not be prosecuted. For 
example, New York, (which may have delayed passing legislation on the right to breastfeed in 
public because its legislature had earlier passed legislation that, while not guaranteeing it as a 
right, had decriminalized breastfeeding in public), enacted the Breastfeeding Mothers’ Bill of 
Rights on August 11th, 2009. The legislation provides an extensive list of where and how mothers 
have the right to breastfeed, and mandates that this information be provided to all mothers who 
deliver at any hospital or health care facility in the state. In contrast to Florida’s An Act Relating 
to Breastfeeding but more like the Canadian provinces and Australian states, the title of the 
legislation for Washington state passed in 2007 begins with An Act Relating to Protecting a 
Woman’s Right to Breastfeed. This legislation frames breastfeeding in public and at a mother’s 
place of employment as a civil right: 
Yukon: “On the basis of sex, including pregnancy, and pregnancy related conditions…no person 
shall discriminate when offering or providing services, goods or facilities to the public.” 
Florida (Similarity Score = 0.02): “A 
mother may breastfeed her baby in any 
location, public or private, where the 
mother is otherwise authorized to be, 
irrespective of whether the nipple of the 
mother’s breast is uncovered during or 
incidental to the breastfeeding.” 
Washington (Similarity Score = 0.41): “ It shall be 
an unfair practice for any person ... to commit an 
act which directly or indirectly results in... refusing 
or withholding  from any person the admission, 
patronage, custom, presence, frequenting,  dwelling, 
staying, or lodging in any place of public resort, 
accommodation, assemblage, or amusement, ... 
regardless of ..., status as a mother breastfeeding 
her child” 
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The graph of frequency over time of the word “right,” in legislation for the right to 
breastfeed in public affirms this pattern, as displayed in Figure 12. This is the only word that is 
one of the top ten most frequent words in the Yukon legislation that is also one of the top ten 
most frequent words in the entire dataset of U.S. state legislation on this topic. A typical pattern 
for common words in the text of the foreign policy originator that are also common in the text of 
U.S. state laws is displayed on the left for graduated drivers licensing for the words “vehicle,” 
“driver,” and “licens.” Words compared like this for most of the policies in this dataset are used 
frequently in the first few years after the first adoption, as borrowers follow the often-discussed 
“S Curve” of policy adoptions. Usage then declines.  
Figure 12: Top Words in Common Between Foreign Originator and U.S. Borrowers Over Time 
 
In contrast, the annual frequencies for the word “right” in right to breastfeed in public 
legislation are shown on the right. The twenty-eight states that passed legislation on this topic 
before 2005 collectively included this word an average of ten times per year or less. But the 
number of times the word is included skyrockets between 2005 and 2010 when sixteen more 
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states passed legislation. This differs from the typical pattern and indicates that diffusion of both 
the spirit and specific verbiage of the law occurred later than diffusion of the policy topic. The 
comprehensive list of rights outlined in the New York legislation suggests extensive research 
that very well could have led back to the policy originators for examples of best practices in the 
spirit of which the legislation was intended. 
 
Anti-Bullying Legislation 
This is legislation that prohibited bullying in schools and frequently laid out anti-bullying 
curricula to be taught, as well as sometimes requiring each school district in the state to create an 
anti-bullying plan. All U.S. states had legislation prohibiting harassment as a violation of human 
rights, but this legislation is considered to be distinct to previously existing legislation on 
harassment, as bullying is frequently characterized in the policies as more general behavior than 
harassment, as the latter must specifically “be motivated by characteristics of the targeted 
victim….[and] is generally viewed as a subset of more broadly defined bullying behavior. 
(Greene and Ross 2005)” (Stuart-Cassel et al. 2011 (17)) The first state to pass legislation 
specifically geared toward anti-bullying policies was Georgia on April 22nd, 1999, coincidentally 
just two days after the Columbine High School massacre. Seventeen more states had adopted 
anti-bullying policies within the next five years. Currently all fifty states have anti-bullying 
measures in place, with Montana being the last state to pass a policy on this topic in 2015.  The 
first Canadian anti-bullying legislation that could be found for this study was passed in 2004 in 
Manitoba, and the first anti-bullying legislation that could be found for Australia was passed in 
2012 in South Australia (although evidence suggests that a policy was in place in New South 
Wales as early as 2007). (NSW Department of Education)  
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Medical Marijuana 
This legislation permits for marijuana to be consumed palliatively for medical conditions. It 
was first passed in California in 1996 and has subsequently been adopted in thirty-three states, 
with several bills stalling out in the 2020 legislative session due to COVID-19. (Zhang 2020) 
Many of the laws authorizing medical marijuana are based largely on the text of the ballot 
initiatives by which marijuana was legalized. Later policies were drafted and passed in the 
legislatures and are sometimes therefore much longer. Several gradations of what constitutes 
fully legalized medical marijuana exist, with some states prohibiting medical marijuana at large 
but allowing cannabidiol or allowing medical marijuana usage in all forms but for a restricted set 
of medical conditions.  
The marijuana policy domain is an area in which model legislation is very prominent and 
likely plays a large role in promoting similar policy themes across states. For example, the 
Marijuana Policy Project claims credit specifically for helping to formulate medical marijuana 
legislation and ballot initiatives in Hawaii (2000), Rhode Island (2006), Michigan (2008), Maine 
(2009), Arizona (2010), Delaware (2011), and Pennsylvania (2016), and claims credit for 
assisting in legislation drafting for decriminalization initiatives and recreational use initiatives as 
well. (Marijuana Policy Project) This is another example of a policy topic in which nonprofits 
probably play a role in driving policy change; an interesting case study for future research would 
be to investigate the extent to which pro-marijuana factions in states in other countries consult 
with groups like the Marijuana Policy Project for advice towards legalization in their home state. 
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Electronic Prescription Drug Monitoring 
Electronic prescription drug monitoring programs were created to track drug 
prescriptions in real time to better detect when patients are systematically abusing prescriptions 
or when doctors are systematically over-prescribing. The first prescription monitoring programs 
date back at least as early as 1913 (and probably earlier), when Connecticut mandated that 
pharmacists must not sell narcotics without a prescription from a licensed physician furnished by 
the patient, and that they must keep a copy of the prescritpton and regularly make copies 
available for “the inspection of all prosecuting authorities.” This system sought to monitor opiate 
addicts as the United States was in the midst of a burgeoning opioid crisis due to doctors 
mistakenly believing heroin could be prescribed to treat morphine addiction. (NarcAnon) Over 
time states added additional rules about using prescription forms issued by the state government 
and even writing copies in triplicate. Although Oklahoma is credited with instituting the first up-
and-running electronic system for monitoring prescriptions through its Bureau of Narcotics in 
1990, (Fishman et al. 2004 (314), legislative authorization for a similar program in Michigan 
predates this by two years by declaring on March 19th, 1988 that  
“The Controlled Substances Advisory Commission…shall establish a 
standardized database format which may be used by dispensing pharmacies to 
transmit the prescription related information required to the Department of 
Licensing and Regulation electronically. Within 2 years after establishing 
electronic or storage media transmission of data required under section 7334, the 
Controlled Substance Advisory Commission shall evaluate the continued need for 
triplicate prescription forms and report to the legislature.”  
 208 
 
Regardless of whether the Controlled Substances Advisory Commission met its mandate 
to have a system up and running within one year, this legislation clearly indicates that the intent 
of the Michigan legislature was to design, institute, and evaluate an electronic prescription 
monitoring database. The Michigan legislation also contains provisions for what is heralded as 
innovative about the Oklahoma initiative, that is, enabling pharmacists to send prescription 
information instantaneously to the state instead of either keeping a copy in case of audit or 
mailing a physical copy to the state. (PDMP TTAC 2018 (5)) Therefore, while Oklahoma’s 
electronic prescription drug monitoring seems to have been the first fully implemented program 
(Brushwood 2003 (44)), legislation written with the intent to capitalize on the opportunities of 
instantaneous electronic transmission originated in the Michigan legislature. Only eleven states 
adopted electronic prescription drug monitoring in the 1990s, presumably because most states 
already had what were considered viable paper systems in place. However, twenty-one states 
legislated electronic prescription monitoring in the 2000s. Currently the state of Missouri is the 
only state without an electronic prescription drug monitoring program. A bill for an electronic 
prescription drug monitoring program was proposed in Missouri in 2020 for the seventh year in a 
row, but failed to pass the senate due to a Republican filibuster over data privacy and civil liberty 
concerns. (Weber 2020) 
 
School of Choice Legislation 
This is legislation that authorizes students to attend school in a school district other than 
where they live even if there are no extenuating circumstances, such as parents living in two 
districts or the student being an orphan. Minnesota is sometimes cited as the first state to pass 
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school of choice legislation (Logan 2018 (9)), but legislation enacting school of choice policies 
in Arkansas predate those of Minnesota by two months. The legislation in Arkansas declares that  
“Upon the petition of a student residing in one school district to transfer to 
another school district, the Board of Directors of the resident district may enter 
into an agreement with the Board of Directors of the receiving school district 
transferring the student to the receiving district for the purposes of education.”  
This may however be an instance where a state whose policy gains more publicity or 
notoriety may be more observed, as the Minnesota education system also gained recognition for 
passing the first charter school law in 1991. (“The Minnesota School Choice Project”) A policy 
that remains contentious, school of choice legislation has been passed in only twenty-one states, 
with fifteen of those happening within the first ten years.  
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APPENDIX X 
TEXTUAL DIAGNOSTICS BY POLICY 
 
Table 21 presents descriptive statistics for the tokens (post-processed unique words) in 
each policy grouping. The largest bodies of text are for graduated drivers licensing and medical 
marijuana legislation at 213,462 and 382,417 words in each corpus, and the smallest sets are in 
mandatory bicycle helmet and right to breastfeed in public laws (19,074 and 20,112 tokens), 
closely followed by school of choice (23,849).  
 
Table 21: Token Descriptive Statistics 
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 Table 22: Words Changed to American English 
 
Keyness plots in Figure 13 and Figure 14 show examples of where policies are quite 
similar or different when measured by keyness. Keywords are words that occur statistically more 
often in one document compared to a reference group of other texts, and that therefore suggest 
which words are, in this case, more unique to a policy originator compared to the proportion of 
keywords unique to the followers. (Gabrielatos 2018 (225)) For example, the keyness plot for 
mandatory bicycle helmets shows that the Victorian legislation does not contain many important 
keywords that are notably different from the text in the policies of the entire subsequent group of 
U.S. borrowers, with a maximum chi-squared value of about 160 and only a few words 
(“section,” “passeng,” “shall”) that are statistically unique for the U.S. legislation group. This 
means that the policies may be more similar as there are fewer words that can distinguish one 
text from the others. 
On the other hand, the much higher high chi-squared values for Ontario’s graduated 
drivers licensing law shows that the use of the word novice, as in “novice driver,” is extremely 
unique. This bears out when reading the actual laws, as all U.S. legislation uses phrases like 
“student learner” or “student driver.” The plot also demonstrates that words surrounding 
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infractions involving alcohol very much distinguish Ontario’s legislation compared to the 
subsequent graduated drivers licensing laws passed.  
However, the much smaller chi-squared values for the words that are distinct to the U.S. 
legislation when compared to Ontario’s policy means that those words are much less unique, i.e., 
that the U.S. states’ unique words are not as unique to them as Ontario’s words are to Ontario. 
Overall, the largest chi-squared values for each of the foreign policies (100, 150, 600, and 4000) 
displayed similar variation to the largest chi-squared values for each of the domestic policies (60, 
150, 200, 4000). This reveals evidence of variation in textual uniqueness that will be helpful for 
testing. 
Figure 13: Keywords for Mandatory Bicycle Helmets for Minors (Victoria) 
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Figure 14: Keywords for Graduated Drivers Licensing (Ontario) 
 
 
Table 23 on the next page shows the most common words found in the original policy, 
and the most common words found in the body of U.S. legislation for each policy, ranked by 
how commonly they appear (numbers, jurisdictions, and legal terms in the top ten were 
dropped). Words that are underlined appear in the Top Ten in both the original policy and the 
U.S. borrower texts. Policies with many similar words in the two rows indicate instances where  
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Table 23:  Most Frequent Words by Policy, Ranked 
 
 215 
 
more similarity is likely present as time passes. On the other hand, policies with low similarity 
between originator and subsequent borrowers (for example, right to breastfeed in public, anti-
bullying, and electronic prescription drug monitoring) are evidence of instances where the policy 
content may have evolved significantly as more borrowers innovated on the original policy topic.  
Figure 15 and Figure 16 provide a quick summary of similarity over time as well as the 
range of similarity scores compared across policies. The similarity scores of U.S. states to 
policies of foreign origin generally fall in the 0.3 – 0.5 range and average similarity remains 
mostly constant over time, either increasing or decreasing slightly. An exception is similarity for 
the legislation on right to breastfeed in public, which is lower (between 0.0 to 0.2) and rises over 
time. Similarity over time graphs for the domestic-origin policies show higher average similarity 
scores closer to 0.5 to 0.7, and the decline in similarity over time is somewhat steeper. The 
exception is the legislation for electronic prescription drug monitoring, the similarity for which 
increases slightly over time. 
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Figure 15: Cosine Similarity for All Adopters by Years Since First Adoption (Foreign Policies) 
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Figure 16: Cosine Similarity for All Adopters by Years Since First Adoption (Domestic Policies) 
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APPENDIX XI  
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
Figure 17: Outliers for Textual Similarity (Left) and Professionalism (Right) 
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Table 24: Descriptive Statistics for Chapter IV (Text Analysis) 
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Table 25: Correlations for Chapter IV (Calculated using the Spearman Method) 
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APPENDIX XII 
 Suitability of the Heckman Selection Model 
 
When Heckman Selection Models are Appropriate 
Certo et al. 2016 write that a Heckman Selection model is increasingly suitable when 
three conditions are present in the data:  
1. The exclusion restriction variables of interest are significant, with the strength of the 
significance directly related to the indication of bias,  
2. Correlation between the errors in both models is nonzero, and  
3. The Inverse Mills Ratio is significant.  
The first two conditions are handily met with this data, with highly significant exclusion 
restrictions for almost all coefficients and a nonzero correlation of error terms (rho). The Inverse 
Mills Ratios are not significant, but Certo et al. 2016 (2,655) caution rejecting the hypothesis that 
sample selection bias is present simply because the Inverse Mills Ratio is not significant, noting 
that “our simulations indicate that weak exclusion restrictions and/or small samples may result in 
insignificant lambdas [Inverse Mills Ratios], even when selection bias is present.” The exclusion 
restrictions used in this chapter are strong, but the sample size is small. Certo et al. report that the 
median sample size in the literature they surveyed was 500. (2016 (2,646)) With second-stage 
datasets of 291 and 267, this study includes what would likely be categorized as a small sample 
size. Therefore, two out of three conditions indicate sample selection bias is present, and 
Heckman selection models can contribute useful information to the analysis.  
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The smaller values of rho ranging from 0.198 to 0.215 (the variable is on a scale of 0 to 1) 
report a meaningful but not substantial amount of sample selection bias within the data. This is 
fortunate, as “the cases where the need to correct for selectivity bias are largest are those with a 
high correlation between the error terms of the selection and the outcome equation… 
Unfortunately, though…in exactly those cases Heckman’s estimator is particularly inefficient.” 
(Puhani 2000 (65)) The small-to-medium size rho values suggest that the Heckman selection 
model is desirable to combat nonzero sample selection bias, and not in particularly great danger 
of inefficient estimation. 
 
Assessing Suitability of Exclusion Restrictions 
 Earlier generations of scholarship presenting Heckman models tended to include the 
same independent variables in both stages of the model. However it later studies showed that  the 
quality of the model’s predictions for the Stage Two dependent variable (which is generally the 
variable of interest) improved greatly when the Stage One independent variables are not relevant 
to or included in predicting the Stage Two outcomes. Certo et al. 2016 (2,644) write that 
exclusion restrictions are suitable when the independent variables for Stage One are not included 
in Stage Two also that the error terms of each stage are correlated. As discussed in the previous 
section, the nonzero rho in the results satisfies the second condition. In addition, the low 
correlation between proportion of Neighbors Adopting and Textual Similarity (at -0.057) suggest 
that the number of neighbors who have adopted is of little consequence in explaining the Textual 
Similarity. In contrast, the correlation between Neighbors Adopting and whether a state adopts a 
policy is approximately three times greater at 0.152. In summary, the exclusion restrictions for 
this model are theoretically motivated and demonstrate satisfactory properties. 
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APPENDIX XIII  
Robustness Checks 
                                   
 
Table 26: Results of Chapter IV Analysis with Non-Outliers 
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Table 27: Individual Policy Models (Domestic Origin) 
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Table 28: Individual Policy Models (Foreign Origin) 
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